D. Fragiadakis, Atsushi Iwasaki, Peter Troyan, Suguru Ueda, M. Yokoo
{"title":"Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas","authors":"D. Fragiadakis, Atsushi Iwasaki, Peter Troyan, Suguru Ueda, M. Yokoo","doi":"10.1145/2841226","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2841226","url":null,"abstract":"We study matching markets in which institutions may have minimum and maximum quotas. Minimum quotas are important in many settings, such as hospital residency matching, military cadet matching, and school choice, but current mechanisms are unable to accommodate them, leading to the use of ad hoc solutions. We introduce two new classes of strategyproof mechanisms that allow for minimum quotas as an explicit input and show that our mechanisms improve welfare relative to existing approaches. Because minimum quotas cause a theoretical incompatibility between standard fairness and nonwastefulness properties, we introduce new second-best axioms and show that they are satisfied by our mechanisms. Last, we use simulations to quantify (1) the magnitude of the potential efficiency gains from our mechanisms and (2) how far the resulting assignments are from the first-best definitions of fairness and nonwastefulness. Combining both the theoretical and simulation results, we argue that our mechanisms will improve the performance of matching markets with minimum quota constraints in practice.","PeriodicalId":194623,"journal":{"name":"ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126091257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Expressive Mechanism for Auctions on the Web","authors":"Paul Dütting, M. Henzinger, Ingmar Weber","doi":"10.1145/2716312","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2716312","url":null,"abstract":"Auctions are widely used on the Web. Applications range from sponsored search to platforms such as eBay. In these and in many other applications the auctions in use are single-/multi-item auctions with unit demand. The main drawback of standard mechanisms for this type of auctions, such as VCG and GSP, is the limited expressiveness that they offer to the bidders. The General Auction Mechanism (GAM) of Aggarwal et al. [2009] takes a first step toward addressing the problem of limited expressiveness by computing a bidder optimal, envy-free outcome for linear utility functions with identical slopes and a single discontinuity per bidder-item pair. We show that in many practical situations this does not suffice to adequately model the preferences of the bidders, and we overcome this problem by presenting the first mechanism for piecewise linear utility functions with nonidentical slopes and multiple discontinuities. Our mechanism runs in polynomial time. Like GAM it is incentive compatible for inputs that fulfill a certain nondegeneracy assumption, but our requirement is more general than the requirement of GAM. For discontinuous utility functions that are nondegenerate as well as for continuous utility functions the outcome of our mechanism is a competitive equilibrium. We also show how our mechanism can be used to compute approximately bidder optimal, envy-free outcomes for a general class of continuous utility functions via piecewise linear approximation. Finally, we prove hardness results for even more expressive settings.","PeriodicalId":194623,"journal":{"name":"ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122306577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Auctioning Time: Truthful Auctions of Heterogeneous Divisible Goods","authors":"Y. Aumann, Yair Dombb, A. Hassidim","doi":"10.1145/2833086","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2833086","url":null,"abstract":"We consider the problem of auctioning time - a one-dimensional continuously-divisible heterogeneous good - among multiple agents. Applications include auctioning time for using a shared device, auctioning TV commercial slots, and more. Different agents may have different valuations for the different possible intervals; the goal is to maximize the aggregate utility. Agents are self-interested and may misrepresent their true valuation functions if this benefits them. Thus, we seek auctions that are truthful. Considering the case that each agent may obtain a single interval, the challenge is twofold, as we need to determine both where to slice the interval, and who gets what slice. We consider two settings: discrete and continuous. In the discrete setting, we are given a sequence of m indivisible elements (e1, …, em), and the auction must allocate each agent a consecutive subsequence of the elements. In the continuous setting, we are given a continuous, infinitely divisible interval, and the auction must allocate each agent a subinterval. The agents’ valuations are nonatomic measures on the interval. We show that, for both settings, the associated computational problem is NP-complete even under very restrictive assumptions. Hence, we provide approximation algorithms. For the discrete case, we provide a truthful auctioning mechanism that approximates the optimal welfare to within a log m factor. The mechanism works for arbitrary monotone valuations. For the continuous setting, we provide a truthful auctioning mechanism that approximates the optimal welfare to within an O(log n) factor (where n is the number of agents). Additionally, we provide a truthful 2-approximation mechanism for the case that all pieces must be of some fixed size.","PeriodicalId":194623,"journal":{"name":"ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130958154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Display Advertising Auctions with Arbitrage","authors":"R. Cavallo, R. McAfee, Sergei Vassilvitskii","doi":"10.1145/2668033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2668033","url":null,"abstract":"Online display advertising exchanges connect Web publishers with advertisers seeking to place ads. In many cases, the advertiser obtains value from an ad impression (a viewing by a user) only if it is clicked, and frequently advertisers prefer to pay contingent on this occurring. But at the same time, many publishers demand payment independent of clicks. Arbitragers with good estimates of click-probabilities can resolve this conflict by absorbing the risk and acting as an intermediary, paying the publisher on allocation and being paid only if a click occurs. This article examines the incentives of advertisers and arbitragers and contributes an efficient mechanism with truthful bidding by the advertisers and truthful reporting of click predictions by arbitragers as dominant strategies while, given that a hazard rate condition is satisfied, yielding increased revenue to the publisher. We provide empirical evidence based on bid data from Yahoo's Right Media Exchange suggesting that the mechanism would increase revenue in practice.","PeriodicalId":194623,"journal":{"name":"ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124903957","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Incentives in Large Random Two-Sided Markets","authors":"Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Mahdian","doi":"10.1145/2656202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2656202","url":null,"abstract":"Many centralized two-sided markets form a matching between participants by running a stable matching algorithm. It is a well-known fact that no matching mechanism based on a stable matching algorithm can guarantee truthfulness as a dominant strategy for participants. However, we show that in a probabilistic setting where the preference lists on one side of the market are composed of only a constant (independent of the size of the market) number of entries, each drawn from an arbitrary distribution, the number of participants that have more than one stable partner is vanishingly small. This proves (and generalizes) a conjecture of Roth and Peranson [1999]. As a corollary of this result, we show that, with high probability, the truthful strategy is the best response for a random player when the other players are truthful. We also analyze equilibria of the deferred acceptance stable matching game. We show that the game with complete information has an equilibrium in which, in expectation, a (1−o(1)) fraction of the strategies are truthful. In the more realistic setting of a game of incomplete information, we will show that the set of truthful stratiegs form a (1+o(1))-approximate Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for uniformly random preferences. Our results have implications in many practical settings and are inspired by the work of Roth and Peranson [1999] on the National Residency Matching Program.","PeriodicalId":194623,"journal":{"name":"ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130935436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Envy-Free Pricing in Large Markets: Approximating Revenue and Welfare","authors":"Elliot Anshelevich, K. Kar, S. Sekar","doi":"10.1007/978-3-662-47672-7_5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47672-7_5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":194623,"journal":{"name":"ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133385817","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Weighted Congestion Games: The Price of Anarchy, Universal Worst-Case Examples, and Tightness","authors":"Kshipra Bhawalkar, M. Gairing, T. Roughgarden","doi":"10.1145/2629666","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2629666","url":null,"abstract":"We characterize the Price of Anarchy (POA) in weighted congestion games, as a function of the allowable resource cost functions. Our results provide as thorough an understanding of this quantity as is already known for nonatomic and unweighted congestion games, and take the form of universal (cost function-independent) worst-case examples. One noteworthy by-product of our proofs is the fact that weighted congestion games are “tight,” which implies that the worst-case price of anarchy with respect to pure Nash equilibria, mixed Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria are always equal (under mild conditions on the allowable cost functions). Another is the fact that, like nonatomic but unlike atomic (unweighted) congestion games, weighted congestion games with trivial structure already realize the worst-case POA, at least for polynomial cost functions.\u0000 We also prove a new result about unweighted congestion games: the worst-case price of anarchy in symmetric games is as large as in their more general asymmetric counterparts.","PeriodicalId":194623,"journal":{"name":"ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126475740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tomasz P. Michalak, Piotr L. Szczepanski, Talal Rahwan, A. Chrobak, Simina Brânzei, M. Wooldridge, N. Jennings
{"title":"Implementation and Computation of a Value for Generalized Characteristic Function Games","authors":"Tomasz P. Michalak, Piotr L. Szczepanski, Talal Rahwan, A. Chrobak, Simina Brânzei, M. Wooldridge, N. Jennings","doi":"10.1145/2665007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2665007","url":null,"abstract":"Generalized characteristic function games are a variation of characteristic function games, in which the value of a coalition depends not only on the identities of its members, but also on the order in which the coalition is formed. This class of games is a useful abstraction for a number of realistic settings and economic situations, such as modeling relationships in social networks. To date, two main extensions of the Shapley value have been proposed for generalized characteristic function games: the Nowak-Radzik [1994] value and the Sánchez-Bergantiños [1997] value. In this context, the present article studies generalized characteristic function games from the point of view of implementation and computation. Specifically, the article makes two key contributions. First, building upon the mechanism by Dasgupta and Chiu [1998], we present a non-cooperative mechanism that implements both the Nowak-Radzik value and the Sánchez-Bergantiños value in Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibria in expectations. Second, in order to facilitate an efficient computation supporting the implementation mechanism, we propose the Generalized Marginal-Contribution Nets representation for this type of game. This representation extends the results of Ieong and Shoham [2005] and Elkind et al. [2009] for characteristic function games and retains their attractive computational properties.","PeriodicalId":194623,"journal":{"name":"ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.","volume":"2013 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127384277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Maria-Florina Balcan, Sara Krehbiel, G. Piliouras, Jinwoo Shin
{"title":"Near-Optimality in Covering Games by Exposing Global Information","authors":"Maria-Florina Balcan, Sara Krehbiel, G. Piliouras, Jinwoo Shin","doi":"10.1145/2597890","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2597890","url":null,"abstract":"Mechanism design for distributed systems is fundamentally concerned with aligning individual incentives with social welfare to avoid socially inefficient outcomes that can arise from agents acting autonomously. One simple and natural approach is to centrally broadcast nonbinding advice intended to guide the system to a socially near-optimal state while still harnessing the incentives of individual agents. The analytical challenge is proving fast convergence to near optimal states, and in this article we give the first results that carefully constructed advice vectors yield stronger guarantees.\u0000 We apply this approach to a broad family of potential games modeling vertex cover and set cover optimization problems in a distributed setting. This class of problems is interesting because finding exact solutions to their optimization problems is NP-hard yet highly inefficient equilibria exist, so a solution in which agents simply locally optimize is not satisfactory. We show that with an arbitrary advice vector, a set cover game quickly converges to an equilibrium with cost of the same order as the square of the social cost of the advice vector. More interestingly, we show how to efficiently construct an advice vector with a particular structure with cost O(log n) times the optimal social cost, and we prove that the system quickly converges to an equilibrium with social cost of this same order.","PeriodicalId":194623,"journal":{"name":"ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.","volume":"102 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116343263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Altruism and Its Impact on the Price of Anarchy","authors":"Po-An Chen, B. D. Keijzer, D. Kempe, G. Schäfer","doi":"10.1145/2597893","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2597893","url":null,"abstract":"We study the inefficiency of equilibria for congestion games when players are (partially) altruistic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player i's perceived cost is a convex combination of αi times his direct cost and αi times the social cost. Tuning the parameters αi allows smooth interpolation between purely selfish and purely altruistic behavior. Within this framework, we study primarily altruistic extensions of (atomic and nonatomic) congestion games, but also obtain some results on fair cost-sharing games and valid utility games.\u0000 We derive (tight) bounds on the price of anarchy of these games for several solution concepts. Thereto, we suitably adapt the smoothness notion introduced by Roughgarden and show that it captures the essential properties to determine the robust price of anarchy of these games. Our bounds show that for atomic congestion games and cost-sharing games, the robust price of anarchy gets worse with increasing altruism, while for valid utility games, it remains constant and is not affected by altruism.\u0000 However, the increase in the price of anarchy is not a universal phenomenon: For general nonatomic congestion games with uniform altruism, the price of anarchy improves with increasing altruism. For atomic and nonatomic symmetric singleton congestion games, we derive bounds on the pure price of anarchy that improve as the average level of altruism increases. (For atomic games, we only derive such bounds when cost functions are linear.) Since the bounds are also strictly lower than the robust price of anarchy, these games exhibit natural examples in which pure Nash equilibria are more efficient than more permissive notions of equilibrium.","PeriodicalId":194623,"journal":{"name":"ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133016601","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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