Manag. Sci.最新文献_第6页

The Growth of Information Asymmetry Between Earnings Announcements and Its Implications for Reporting Frequency 盈余公告之间信息不对称的增长及其对报告频率的影响

Manag. Sci. Pub Date : 2022-04-29 DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4408

Robert C. Stoumbos

引用次数: 2

Comment on "Modeling Purchasing Behavior with Sudden 'Death': A Flexible Customer Lifetime Model" 评《以突然“死亡”为购买行为建模:一个灵活的顾客生命周期模型》

Manag. Sci. Pub Date : 2022-04-26 DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4422

Jost Adler

引用次数: 0

The Effect of Cash Flow Presentation Method on Investors' Forecast of Future Cash Flows 现金流量列报法对投资者预测未来现金流量的影响

Manag. Sci. Pub Date : 2022-04-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3975918

Sompong Pornupatham, H. Tan, Thanyaluk Vichitsarawong, G-Song Yoo

{"title":"The Effect of Cash Flow Presentation Method on Investors' Forecast of Future Cash Flows","authors":"Sompong Pornupatham, H. Tan, Thanyaluk Vichitsarawong, G-Song Yoo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3975918","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3975918","url":null,"abstract":"The decision usefulness of the direct versus indirect presentation method of a cash flow statement has been a long-standing issue in both practice and accounting research. By capitalizing on comparative advantages of experimental methods, we provide insights into how investors process the information contained in different presentation methods to make cash flow forecasts, especially in the context of various types of nonrecurring items. We predict and find that, when nonrecurring accrued expenses are present, the indirect method leads to lower forecast errors by activating investors’ underlying knowledge structures of operating cash flows in terms of an accrual (versus cash) basis. We also find that, in the presence of nonrecurring cash or nonrecurring accrued revenues, there is no difference in forecast errors between the indirect and direct methods. Moreover, we find that the combination of the direct and indirect methods (the direct-plus-indirect method) leads to lower forecast errors than the direct method, but it does not provide an incremental benefit for forecast accuracy beyond the indirect method. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting.","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"444 1","pages":"1877-1900"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77514086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Analyzing Active Fund Managers' Commitment to ESG: Evidence from the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment 分析主动型基金经理对ESG的承诺:来自联合国负责任投资原则的证据

Manag. Sci. Pub Date : 2022-04-18 DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4394

Soohun Kim, Aaron S. Yoon

{"title":"Analyzing Active Fund Managers' Commitment to ESG: Evidence from the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment","authors":"Soohun Kim, Aaron S. Yoon","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2022.4394","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4394","url":null,"abstract":"The United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) is the largest global environmental, social, and governance (ESG) initiative in the asset-management industry to date. We analyze what happens after active U.S. mutual funds sign the PRI to assess whether they exhibit ESG implementation. We find that PRI signatories attract a large fund inflow, but we do not observe improvements in fund-level ESG scores or fund returns. We consider a battery of ways to proxy for funds’ ESG incorporation (e.g., entry/exit, screening, engagement, voting for pro-ESG proposals), but fail to observe evidence of meaningful on average follow-through. Next, we explore cross-sectional fund characteristics and find that only quant funds exhibit small improvements in ESG performance versus other funds, mainly through buying high-ESG-performing stocks. Furthermore, we note that signatories are not superior performers in ESG issues prior to joining the PRI relative to non-PRI funds, but PRI affiliation tends to be widely advertised on company websites, marketing materials, and fund documents. Overall, a reasonable reader may perceive our findings as consistent with PRI funds’ greenwashing. We note, however, that what we uncover is based only on outcome-based measures and may miss some actual efforts of signatories. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting.","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"21 1","pages":"741-758"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85981458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 51

Two-Sided Platform Competition in a Sharing Economy 共享经济中的双边平台竞争

Manag. Sci. Pub Date : 2022-04-18 DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4302

Chenglong Zhang, Jianqing Chen, Srinivasan Raghunathan

{"title":"Two-Sided Platform Competition in a Sharing Economy","authors":"Chenglong Zhang, Jianqing Chen, Srinivasan Raghunathan","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2022.4302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4302","url":null,"abstract":"We examine competition between two-sided platforms in a sharing economy. In sharing economies, workers self-schedule their supply based on the wage they receive. The platforms compete for workers as well as consumers. To attract workers, platforms use diverse wage schemes, including fixed commission rate, dynamic commission rate, and fixed wage. We develop a model to examine the impacts of the self-scheduled nature of the supply on competing platforms and the role of the wage scheme in the platform competition. We find that the price competition between platforms is more intense in a sharing economy compared with an economy with a fixed supply of workers if and only if the platforms serve more consumers and workers in the sharing economy than in the traditional economy, regardless of the wage scheme employed by the platforms. Further, any of the three wage schemes can be the best for the platforms and the worst for consumers and workers, depending on the market characteristics. In markets where the competition is more fierce on the demand side than on the supply side, the fixed-wage scheme results in the highest profits for the platforms and lowest surpluses for consumers and workers. In contrast, in markets where the competition on the supply side is more competitive, when the supply is highly (mildly) more competitive, the fixed-commission-rate (dynamic-commission-rate) scheme generates the highest profits for platforms, leading to the lowest surpluses for consumers and workers and the lowest social welfare. The differential impacts of the wage scheme on the price (demand side) and quantity (supply side) competition explain our findings. This paper was accepted by Kartik Hosanagar, information systems.","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"19 1","pages":"8909-8932"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84900346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 12

Leveraged Exchange-Traded Funds with Market Closure and Frictions 市场关闭和摩擦的杠杆交易所交易基金

Manag. Sci. Pub Date : 2022-04-18 DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4407

M. Dai, S. Kou, H. Soner, Chen Yang

引用次数: 4

Choosing Competition on Behalf of Someone Else 代表别人选择竞争

Manag. Sci. Pub Date : 2022-04-15 DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4413

Helena Fornwagner, Monika Pompeo, N. Serdarevic

{"title":"Choosing Competition on Behalf of Someone Else","authors":"Helena Fornwagner, Monika Pompeo, N. Serdarevic","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2022.4413","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4413","url":null,"abstract":"We extend the existing literature on gender differences in competitive behavior by investigating tournament entry choices when a principal decides for an agent. In a laboratory experiment, we randomly assign subjects the role of either principal or agent. The principal decides whether the agent performs a real-effort task under piece-rate or tournament incentives. When deciding, the principal is informed about the agent’s previous performance, age, and residency. Between treatments, we vary whether the principal knows the agent’s gender. In a baseline treatment, we replicate the standard setting in which subjects decide for themselves whether to compete. Our main findings are, first, that there is no gender gap in tournament entry when principals decide for agents as opposed to the baseline treatment. Second, the gender gap closes because more women are made to compete by principals. Third, whereas there is no gender gap in either of the principal treatments, revealing the agent’s gender is associated with higher overall tournament entry rates. Exploratory analyses of principals’ choice determinants reveal a positive effect of preferences to take risks, competitiveness, and confidence in agents’ performances on making agents compete. In addition, we find no difference in how principals evaluate male and female agents’ performances. Finally, we test the efficiency of principals’ competition choices and show that they lead to fewer payoff-maximizing outcomes than when subjects decide for themselves. Additionally, overall tournament performances and winners’ performances are lower when agents are made to compete, but this effect is not robust to controlling for agents’ previous performances. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis.","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"28 1","pages":"1555-1574"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89408313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Female Directors and Firm Value: New Evidence from Directors' Deaths 女性董事与公司价值:来自董事死亡的新证据

Manag. Sci. Pub Date : 2022-04-11 DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4412

Thomas Schmid, Daniel Urban

引用次数: 3

Mismarking in Mutual Funds 共同基金的失误

Manag. Sci. Pub Date : 2022-04-11 DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4366

V. Atanasov, John J. Merrick, Philipp Schuster

引用次数: 1

Firm-Induced Migration Paths and Strategic Human-Capital Outcomes 企业诱导的迁移路径与战略性人力资本成果

Manag. Sci. Pub Date : 2022-04-07 DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4361

P. Choudhury, T. Khanna, V. Sevcenko

{"title":"Firm-Induced Migration Paths and Strategic Human-Capital Outcomes","authors":"P. Choudhury, T. Khanna, V. Sevcenko","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2022.4361","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4361","url":null,"abstract":"Firm-induced migration typically entails firms relocating workers to fill value-creating positions at destination locations. But such relocated workers are often exposed to external employment opportunities at their destinations, possibly triggering turnover. We conceptualize the firm-induced migration path, consisting of the relocated workers’ place of origin and destination, as relevant in determining worker performance and turnover postrelocation. Using a unique data set from a large Indian technology firm that hires talent from both large cities and smaller towns, we document robust econometric patterns by exploiting the firm’s randomized assignment of workers to production centers across the country. These production centers are located in the largest technology cluster in India (Bangalore), smaller technology clusters, and noncluster locations. We find that the firm-induced migration path shapes both worker performance and turnover. Compared with workers from large cities, workers from smaller towns achieve higher performance when relocated to Bangalore than to other production centers, but are also more likely to join competing firms. Fine-grained data on employment and human-capital-augmentation opportunities at workers’ destination locations, and on socioeconomic conditions in workers’ places of origin, help us rule in an abductive explanation: across firm-induced migration paths, differences in external labor-market opportunities between workers’ places of origin and their destinations, as well as intrafirm skill-development opportunities at the destination, are related to heterogeneous human-capital outcomes. This paper was accepted by Alfonso Gambardella, business strategy.","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"31 1","pages":"419-445"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89853522","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3