Manag. Sci.Pub Date : 2022-04-04DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4397
Vincent Laferrière, David Staubli, C. Thöni
{"title":"Explaining Excess Entry in Winner-Take-All Markets","authors":"Vincent Laferrière, David Staubli, C. Thöni","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2022.4397","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4397","url":null,"abstract":"We report experimental data from standard market entry games and winner-take-all games. At odds with traditional decision-making models with risk aversion, the winner-take-all condition results in substantially more entry than the expected-payoff-equivalent market entry game. We explore three candidate explanations for excess entry: blind spot, illusion of control, and joy of winning, none of which receive empirical support. We provide a novel theoretical explanation for excess entry based on cumulative prospect theory and test it empirically. Our results suggest that excess entry into highly competitive environments is not caused by a genuine preference for competing, but is instead driven by probability weighting. Market entrants overweight the small probabilities associated with the high payoff outcomes in winner-take-all markets, while they underweight probable failures. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis.","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"16 1","pages":"1050-1069"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84408427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Manag. Sci.Pub Date : 2022-03-31DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4398
Jason L. Brown, Patrick R. Martin, Geoffrey B. Sprinkle, Dan Way
{"title":"How Return on Investment and Residual Income Performance Measures and Risk Preferences Affect Risk-Taking","authors":"Jason L. Brown, Patrick R. Martin, Geoffrey B. Sprinkle, Dan Way","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2022.4398","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4398","url":null,"abstract":"Return on investment (ROI) and residual income (RI) are two important accounting measures that are commonly used to evaluate managers’ performance, and evidence suggests that both ROI and RI can help motivate long-term investments. Research is limited, though, regarding whether ROI and RI differentially affect managers’ actions, and, more specifically, research has not examined the effects of ROI and RI on risk-taking. We conduct an experiment to examine the separate and interactive effects of individuals’ risk preferences and ROI and RI performance measures on risk-taking in capital investment decisions. We predict and find that the use of ROI as a performance measure leads to riskier choices, as compared with RI, and that this effect is concentrated in relatively more risk-averse individuals. We also provide process evidence that reveals some of the ways in which ROI and RI performance measures affect decision making. Collectively, our results contribute to literature examining the effects of accounting information and performance measures on managers’ risk-taking behaviors. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"252 1","pages":"1301-1322"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78197977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Manag. Sci.Pub Date : 2022-03-31DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4389
S. Rathee, Kritika Narula, Arul Mishra, Hari Prasad Mishra
{"title":"Alphanumeric vs. Numeric Token Systems and the Healthcare Experience: Field Evidence from Healthcare Delivery in India","authors":"S. Rathee, Kritika Narula, Arul Mishra, Hari Prasad Mishra","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2022.4389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4389","url":null,"abstract":"Long wait times for patients are an important health policy issue in many countries, especially developing countries in which there is generally poorer health infrastructure, appointments are not very common, and the opportunity cost of competing life priorities is high. In this research, we examine via field experiments in health clinics in India whether providing numeric versus alphanumeric wait tokens can affect pain perceptions of patients and whether the type of tokens can also affect their wait-time perception and visit satisfaction. Our research provides initial evidence that alphanumeric tokens, in most cases, lead to lower pain perception, lower wait-time perception, and higher satisfaction levels with the healthcare system compared with numeric tokens. However, this is not always true; we also demonstrate boundary conditions when numeric tokens perform better and when the differences between tokens are attenuated. We conducted field experiments in three separate clinics and vary the type of tokens (numeric versus alphanumeric) used to test multiple token operationalizations in varied healthcare contexts. We explain our findings using the cognitive strategy of wait-time perception and discuss why this strategy is helpful for a developing country. This paper was accepted by Matthew Shum, marketing.","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"129 1","pages":"1180-1221"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76407658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Manag. Sci.Pub Date : 2022-03-31DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4357
Xue-Jia Jia, Rahul Menon
{"title":"Shareholder Short-Termism, Corporate Control and Voluntary Disclosure","authors":"Xue-Jia Jia, Rahul Menon","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2022.4357","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4357","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines how a manager uses voluntary disclosure to influence corporate control by a short-term shareholder. Because a short-term shareholder intervenes excessively, the manager’s disclosure strategy is determined by the trade-off between excessive and insufficient intervention. In equilibrium, when shareholder short-termism is not too high, the manager discloses both good and bad news and withholds intermediate news. Alternatively, when shareholder short-termism is high, the manager only discloses good news and withholds bad news. In both equilibria, withholding information is value-enhancing for the nondisclosing firms. We also show that the likelihood of disclosure weakly decreases as the shareholder is more short-term-oriented. Moreover, nondisclosing firms are more likely to face shareholder intervention than disclosing firms. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting.","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"185 1","pages":"702-721"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81590410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Manag. Sci.Pub Date : 2022-03-30DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4384
Yi-Hsing Han, Yiming Liu, G. Loewenstein
{"title":"Confusing Context with Character: Correspondence Bias in Economic Interactions","authors":"Yi-Hsing Han, Yiming Liu, G. Loewenstein","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2022.4384","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4384","url":null,"abstract":"When drawing inferences about a person’s personal characteristics from the person’s actions, “correspondence bias” is the tendency to overestimate the influence of those characteristics and underestimate the influence of situational factors, such as incentives the individual faces. We build a simple framework to formalize correspondence bias and test its predictions in an online experiment. Consistent with correspondence bias, subjects are, on average, willing to pay to receive the dictator-game givings of an individual with whom they are randomly assigned to play a game that encourages cooperation rather than one with whom they play a game that encourages selfish behavior. We show, further, that experiencing both games oneself, as opposed to playing one and observing the other, reduces the bias, and receiving information about how each of the players behaved in both games eliminates it. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis.","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"27 1","pages":"1070-1091"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83739071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Manag. Sci.Pub Date : 2022-03-25DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4343
J. Watson, Megan J. MacGarvie, J. McKeon
{"title":"It Was 50 Years Ago Today: Recording Copyright Term and the Supply of Music","authors":"J. Watson, Megan J. MacGarvie, J. McKeon","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2022.4343","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4343","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the effect of the expiry of recording copyright on the supply of music—in the form of rereleases, availability on streaming platforms, and concert performances—by artists popular in the United Kingdom in the 1960s. We find that recording copyright expiry has different effects on a song’s availability in different distribution channels. The lapsing of copyright leads to a large increase in the number of rereleases in physical formats, holding constant artist, age, and year fixed effects. However, when a song’s original recording copyright expires, it becomes less likely to be performed in concert. Moreover, copyright status is not associated with differences in availability on the digital streaming platform Spotify. These results show that copyright expiry has nuanced effects on availability and can lead to different and even opposite effects on availability of a product across different distribution channels. They also show that within the context of digital distribution, the impact of copyright on availability differs based on the business model of a platform. This paper was accepted by Chris Forman, information systems.","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"5 1","pages":"351-376"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82466667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Manag. Sci.Pub Date : 2022-03-25DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4391
Yunke Mai, Bin Hu, S. Pekec
{"title":"Courteous or Crude? Managing User Conduct to Improve On-Demand Service Platform Performance","authors":"Yunke Mai, Bin Hu, S. Pekec","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2022.4391","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4391","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we study how an on-demand service platform could improve its performance through managing user conduct. In such a platform, service providers may reject certain platform-proposed service requests, and their responses, in turn, incentivize users to adjust their conduct. We develop an evolutionary game theory model of user conduct and provider responses that shows that the platform could improve user conduct through either setting a low wage for service providers or implementing priority matching. Building upon these results, we further model providers and users joining and leaving the platform by once again utilizing the evolutionary game theory approach. We find that wage setting alone is a blunt instrument to improve platform performance via managing user conduct, whereas supplementing the wage decision with priority matching could overcome its limitations and serve as an effective strategy to further improve platform performance in terms of growth and profitability. This finding suggests that matching prioritization could be an important strategy for managing platforms with user and provider heterogeneities. In addition, our analysis and results also demonstrate the potential of the evolutionary game theory approach for analyzing the impact of pricing and matching decisions on the performance of large markets. This paper was accepted by Gabriel Weintraub, revenue management and market analytics.","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"101 1","pages":"996-1016"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90667178","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Manag. Sci.Pub Date : 2022-03-25DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4336
Ali Hajjar, Oğuzhan Alagöz
{"title":"Personalized Disease Screening Decisions Considering a Chronic Condition","authors":"Ali Hajjar, Oğuzhan Alagöz","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2022.4336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4336","url":null,"abstract":"Clinical practice guidelines do not sufficiently address the needs of patients with chronic conditions as these guidelines focus on single disease management and ignore unique patient-specific conditions. As a result, a nonpersonalized approach to the management of the patients with chronic conditions leads to adverse events and increases the financial burden on the healthcare system as over 150 million Americans experience chronic conditions. To this end, we develop a stochastic modeling framework to personalize the disease screening decisions for patients with or at risk for developing a chronic condition and provide an exact solution algorithm. We consider the optimal management of the screening decisions for an index disease (e.g., breast cancer, colorectal cancer, human immunodeficiency virus, etc.) while accounting for the existence of a chronic condition (e.g., hypertension, diabetes, Alzheimer’s disease, etc.). Our modeling framework is particularly useful for the cases where the chronic condition affects the risk of the index disease. In a case study using real breast cancer epidemiology data, we demonstrate how our modeling framework can be used to personalize breast cancer screening for women with type 2 diabetes. In addition to providing a personalized breast cancer screening schedule for women with diabetes, we find some important policy insights that were not previously recognized by the medical community. More specifically, we find that compared with women without diabetes, women with diabetes should be screened less aggressively, but screening should end at similar ages. We also find that adherence to the optimal screening policy is more crucial for women with diabetes compared with nondiabetic women. Our main insight on screening recommendations also has important resource implications as it leads to fewer screening mammograms. That is, compared with the current national breast cancer screening guidelines, the optimal breast cancer screening policy for women with diabetes could save the healthcare system approximately 2.6 million mammograms annually. This paper was accepted by Stefan Scholtes, healthcare management.","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"38 1","pages":"260-282"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79110984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Manag. Sci.Pub Date : 2022-03-24DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4385
Elizabeth Blankespoor, Bradley E. Hendricks, Gregory S. Miller, Douglas R. Stockbridge
{"title":"A Hard Look at SPAC Projections","authors":"Elizabeth Blankespoor, Bradley E. Hendricks, Gregory S. Miller, Douglas R. Stockbridge","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2022.4385","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4385","url":null,"abstract":"Firms’ use of special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) to go public has increased dramatically, leading to market and regulatory debate about their use of projections. Examining SPAC mergers from 2004 through 2021, we find that 80% of firms provide projections for four years ahead on average, with approximately one-quarter of recent projections extending more than five years. For the sample of SPAC mergers with observable postmerger revenue, we find that only 35% of firms meet or beat their projections. This proportion declines for forecasts that are longer horizon, and nonserial SPAC sponsors miss forecasts by greater percentages. When we compare SPAC projected revenue growth with benchmark samples of firms completing an initial public offering (IPO) and matched firms, the SPAC projections are approximately three times larger on average than benchmark firms’ actual revenue growth, with even greater differences for long-term projections. After the merger, firms reduce their use of projections, providing them at statistically similar rates as benchmark firms. Overall, the evidence supports concerns that the SPAC merger includes highly optimistic projections. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"82 1","pages":"4742-4753"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73388441","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Manag. Sci.Pub Date : 2022-03-24DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4344
Coby Morvinski, Silvia Saccardo, On Amir
{"title":"Mis-Nudging Morality","authors":"Coby Morvinski, Silvia Saccardo, On Amir","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2022.4344","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4344","url":null,"abstract":"Morals constrain self-serving behavior. Yet, self-regulation failures in the face of monetary temptation are common at the workplace. To limit such failures, organizations can design environments that limit the temptation to behave self-servingly, nudging workers to uphold their morals. In a series of experiments where participants may be tempted to take excessive pay after exerting effort, we study whether a simple intervention—asking individuals to state the wage they believe should be paid ex ante, before facing the temptation to take excessive compensation—prevents self-serving behavior. In contrast to lay beliefs and the predictions from prior work, we find that such an intervention is not effective, leading to self-serving behavior. However, a more realistic elicitation procedure of the appropriate wage mitigates this effect. These findings contribute to work on the malleability of moral behavior showing that simple interventions thought to effectively mitigate self-serving behavior can prompt individuals to stretch their moral boundaries. They also stress the importance of properly testing interventions that might seem intuitive. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis.","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"31 2","pages":"464-474"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91507156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}