Manag. Sci.最新文献

Utility Tokens, Network Effects, and Pricing Power 实用代币、网络效应和定价能力

Manag. Sci. Pub Date : 2023-09-26 DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.4917

Kirill Shakhnov, Luana Zaccaria

引用次数: 0

Decentralized Platforms: Governance, Tokenomics, and ICO Design 去中心化平台：治理、代币经济学和 ICO 设计

Manag. Sci. Pub Date : 2023-09-12 DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2021.02076

Jingxing Gan, Gerry Tsoukalas, Serguei Netessine

{"title":"Decentralized Platforms: Governance, Tokenomics, and ICO Design","authors":"Jingxing Gan, Gerry Tsoukalas, Serguei Netessine","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2021.02076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.02076","url":null,"abstract":"Traditional two-sided platforms (e.g., Amazon, Uber) rely primarily on commission contracts to generate revenues and fuel growth, whereas their decentralized counterparts (e.g., Uniswap, Filecoin) often forego these in favor of token retention. What economics underpin this choice? We show that with properly designed initial coin offerings (ICOs), both mechanisms can independently alleviate market failures at the initial fundraising stage and incentivize long-term platform building. However, they achieve this in different ways. Although commission contracts often lead to higher profits for founders, token retention leads to higher service levels, benefiting the users and service providers. In essence, token retention surrenders a fraction of earnings to better align with the tenets of decentralized governance. Combining both mechanisms can add value, but only in relatively limited cases. These findings offer guidance and a possible rationale for why platforms may want to favor one mechanism over the other or use both. This paper was accepted by Will Cong, Special Issue of Management Science: Blockchains and crypto economics. Funding: This work is funded by the Mack Institute at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.02076 .","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"884 1","pages":"6667-6683"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139340810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Conceptual Flaws of Decentralized Automated Market Making 去中心化自动做市的概念缺陷

Manag. Sci. Pub Date : 2023-09-11 DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2021.02802

Andreas Park

{"title":"The Conceptual Flaws of Decentralized Automated Market Making","authors":"Andreas Park","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2021.02802","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.02802","url":null,"abstract":"Decentralized exchanges (DEXs) are an essential component of the nascent decentralized finance (DeFi) ecosystem. The most common DEXs are so-called automated market makers (AMMs): smart contracts that pool liquidity and process trades as atomic swaps of tokens. AMMs price transactions with a deterministic liquidity invariance rule that only uses the AMM’s token deposits as inputs and that has no precedent in traditional finance. Yet, in the context of transparent and open blockchain operations, any liquidity invariance pricing function allows so-called sandwich attacks (akin to front running) that increase the cost of trading and threaten the long-term viability of the DeFi ecosystem. Invariance pricing is also not regret free. Linear pricing rules have similar problems except for uniform pricing, which has regret-free prices and limits sandwich attack profits but which invites excessive order splitting. Comparing trading costs using a model of liquidity provision, constant product pricing is often cheaper except when the variance of the underlying asset is small or when the order is large. This paper was accepted by Will Cong, special issue of Management Science: Blockchains and crypto economics. Funding: A. Park received financial support from the Global Risk Institute and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada [Grant 435-2017-0647]. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.02802 .","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"11 1","pages":"6731-6751"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139341268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

How Resilient Are Firms' Financial Reporting Processes? 企业财务报告流程的弹性如何?

Manag. Sci. Pub Date : 2023-02-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4239246

E. dehaan, T. D. Kok, Dawn Matsumoto, E. Rodriguez-Vazquez

{"title":"How Resilient Are Firms' Financial Reporting Processes?","authors":"E. dehaan, T. D. Kok, Dawn Matsumoto, E. Rodriguez-Vazquez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.4239246","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4239246","url":null,"abstract":"The timely flow of financial information is critical for efficient capital market functioning, yet we have little understanding of firms’ and auditors’ collective abilities to maintain timely financial reporting when under duress. We use COVID as a stress test case to examine whether reporting systems can withstand systemic increases in complex economic events and coordination challenges. Despite COVID-related challenges persisting through 2020 and beyond, we document surprisingly modest average delays in financial reports during COVID and only in Q1-2020. Reporting timeliness reverts to pre-COVID levels no later than Q2-2020. We find no evidence of meaningful declines in actual reporting quality during COVID, but we do find some evidence consistent with declines in perceived reporting quality. Overall, our findings indicate that current financial reporting processes are remarkably robust and provide insights about financial reporting more broadly. In particular, given that nearly all firms were able to weather the unprecedented disruptions caused by COVID, our findings imply that most material reporting delays observed outside of COVID are likely a result of either a firm’s strategic choices or exceptionally fragile reporting processes. This paper was accepted by Ranjani Krishnan, accounting. Supplemental Material: The data and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4670 .","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"59 1","pages":"2536-2545"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81346007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

Negative Advertising and Competitive Positioning 负面广告和竞争定位

Manag. Sci. Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4439

Gorkem Bostanci, Pinar Yildirim, Kinshuk Jerath

引用次数: 2

FinTech Lending and Bank Credit Access for Consumers 面向消费者的金融科技贷款和银行信贷渠道

Manag. Sci. Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4319

T. Balyuk

引用次数: 15

From the Editor - January 2023 编辑——2023年1月

Manag. Sci. Pub Date : 2022-12-14 DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4644

D. Simchi-Levi

引用次数: 0

Privacy Regulation and Barriers to Public Health 隐私法规和公共卫生障碍

Manag. Sci. Pub Date : 2022-11-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3983334

J. Buckman, Idris Adjerid, Catherine Tucker

{"title":"Privacy Regulation and Barriers to Public Health","authors":"J. Buckman, Idris Adjerid, Catherine Tucker","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3983334","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3983334","url":null,"abstract":"The COVID-19 pandemic has killed millions and gravely disrupted the world’s economy. A safe and effective vaccine was developed remarkably swiftly, but as of yet, uptake of the vaccine has been slow. This paper explores one potential explanation of delayed adoption of the vaccine, which is data privacy concerns. We explore two contrasting regulations that vary across U.S. states that have the potential to affect the perceived privacy risk associated with receiving a COVID-19 vaccine. The first regulation—an “identification requirement”—increases privacy concerns by requiring individuals to verify residency with government approved documentation. The second regulation—“anonymity protection”—reduces privacy concerns by allowing individuals to remove personally identifying information from state-operated immunization registry systems. We investigate the effects of these privacy-reducing and privacy-protecting regulations on U.S. state-level COVID-19 vaccination rates. Using a panel data set, we find that identification requirements decrease vaccine demand but that this negative effect is offset when individuals are able to remove information from an immunization registry. Our results remain consistent when controlling for CDC-defined barriers to vaccination, levels of misinformation, vaccine incentives, and states’ phased distribution of vaccine supply. These findings yield significant theoretical and practical contributions for privacy policy and public health. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, information systems. Supplemental Material: Data and the e-companion are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4580 .","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"1 1","pages":"342-350"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89661821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Fending Off Critics of Platform Power with Differential Revenue Sharing: Doing Well by Doing Good? 用差异化收入分成抵挡对平台权力的批评:做得好就做得好?

Manag. Sci. Pub Date : 2022-09-14 DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4545

H. Bhargava, Kitty Wang, X. Zhang

{"title":"Fending Off Critics of Platform Power with Differential Revenue Sharing: Doing Well by Doing Good?","authors":"H. Bhargava, Kitty Wang, X. Zhang","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2022.4545","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4545","url":null,"abstract":"Many digital platforms have accrued enormous power and scale, leveraging cross-side network effects between the sides they connect (e.g., producers and consumers or creators and viewers). Platforms motivate a diverse spectrum of producers, large and small, to participate by sharing platform revenue with them, predominantly under a linear revenue-sharing scheme with the same commission rate regardless of producer power or size. Under pressure from society, lawsuits, and antitrust investigations, major platforms have announced revenue sharing designs that favor smaller businesses. We develop a model of platform economics and show that a small-business oriented (SBO) differential revenue sharing design can increase total welfare and outputs on the platform. Although smaller producers almost always benefit from the shift in revenue sharing design, spillover effects can also make large producers better off under some conditions. More interestingly, we show that platforms are the most likely winner under a differential revenue sharing scheme. Hence, an intervention that ostensibly offers concessions and generous treatment to producers might well be self-serving for platforms and good for the entire ecosystem. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, information systems–fast track.","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"71 1","pages":"8249-8260"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85197835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Learning to Successfully Hire in Online Labor Markets 学习如何在网络劳动力市场成功招聘

Manag. Sci. Pub Date : 2022-08-26 DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4426

Marios Kokkodis, S. Ransbotham

{"title":"Learning to Successfully Hire in Online Labor Markets","authors":"Marios Kokkodis, S. Ransbotham","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2022.4426","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4426","url":null,"abstract":"Hiring in online labor markets involves considerable uncertainty: which hiring choices are more likely to yield successful outcomes and how do employers adjust their hiring behaviors to make such choices? We argue that employers will initially explore the value of available information. When employers observe successful outcomes, they will keep reinforcing their hiring strategies; but when the outcomes are unsuccessful, employers will adjust their hiring behaviors. To investigate these dynamics, we propose a two-component framework that links hiring choices with task outcomes. The framework’s first component, a Hidden Markov Model, captures how employers transition from unsuccessful to successful hiring decisions. The framework’s second component, a conditional logit model, estimates employer hiring choices. Analysis of 238,364 hiring decisions from a large online labor market shows that, often, employers initially explore cheaper contractors with a lower reputation. When these options result in unsuccessful outcomes, employers learn and adjust their hiring behaviors to rely more on reputable contractors who are not as cheap. Such hiring tends to be successful, guiding employers to reinforce their hiring processes. As a result, the market observes employers transition from cheaper, lower-reputation options with poorer performance to more expensive reputable options with better performance. We attribute part of this behavior to employer confidence and risk attitude, which can change over time. This work is the first to investigate how employers learn to make successful hiring choices in online labor markets. As a result, it provides platform managers with new knowledge and analytics tools to target employer interventions. This paper was accepted by Anandhi Bharadwaj, information systems.","PeriodicalId":18208,"journal":{"name":"Manag. Sci.","volume":"46 1","pages":"1597-1614"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89270143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4