{"title":"Demystifying Blockchains: Decentralized and Fault-Tolerant Storage for the Future of Big Data? (Keynote Lecture)","authors":"A. E. Abbadi","doi":"10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.1","url":null,"abstract":"Bitcoin is a successful and interesting example of a global scale peer-to-peer cryptocurrency that integrates many techniques and protocols from cryptography, distributed systems, and databases. The main underlying data structure is blockchain, a scalable fully replicated structure that is shared among all participants and guarantees a consistent view of all user transactions by all participants in the cryptocurrency system. The novel aspect of Blockchain is that historical data about all transactions is maintained in the absence of any central authority. This property of Blockchain has given rise to the possibility that future applications will transition from centralized databases to a fully decentralized storage based on blockchains. In this talk, we start by developing an understanding of the basic protocols used in blockchain, and elaborate on their main advantages and limitations. To overcome these limitations, we will explore some of the challenges of managing large scale fully replicated ledgers in the context of achieving large scale consensus. Finally, we ponder over recent efforts to use blockchains in diverse applications. 2012 ACM Subject Classification Computing methodologies → Distributed algorithms","PeriodicalId":174732,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130056332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Julien Hatin, Emmanuel Bertin, Baptiste Hemery, Nour El Madhoun
{"title":"Welcome to the Jungle: A Reference Model for Blockchain, DLT and Smart-Contracts (Short Paper)","authors":"Julien Hatin, Emmanuel Bertin, Baptiste Hemery, Nour El Madhoun","doi":"10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.13","url":null,"abstract":"11 Blockchain technology has gained increasing attention from research and industry over the recent 12 years. This interest is mainly due to its core property that allows users to perform transactions 13 without a Trusted Third Party (TTP), while offering a transparent and fully protected tracking of 14 these transactions. However, there is a lack of reference models to describe and compare various 15 Blockchain technologies, leading to some confusion between different kinds of solutions. We propose 16 in this paper a reference model aiming to assess and compare different kind of Blockchain-based 17 ecosystems, including Decentralized Applications (DApp). 18","PeriodicalId":174732,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134082657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Flexible BFT: Separating BFT Protocol Design from the Fault Model (Keynote Lecture)","authors":"D. Malkhi","doi":"10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.2","url":null,"abstract":"Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) protocols designed for building replicated services collapse if deployed under settings that differ from the fault model they are designed for. For example, in a partialsynchrony model, a known lower bound for BFT is 1/3. Optimal-resilience solutions completely break if the fraction of Byzantine faults exceeds 1/3. The only way we know to achieve > 1/3 resilience is by assuming synchrony, but this requires the protocol to be designed with that assumption. Flexible BFT is a new approach to BFT protocol design that separates between the fault model and the solution. Clients in Flexible BFT specify (i) the adversarial threshold they need to tolerate, and (ii) whether they believe in synchrony (and the presumed bound on transmission delays). We present a Flexible BFT solution that simultaneously supports different clients, who differ simply by the number of messages and/or time the clients are willing to wait for. At an even finer grain, Flexible BFT supports under the same solution high-value and low-value transactions, each tolerating a different threat model. 2012 ACM Subject Classification Theory of computation → Distributed algorithms","PeriodicalId":174732,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121857526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Algorithmic Game Theory and Blockchains (Invited Talk)","authors":"E. Koutsoupias","doi":"10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.1","url":null,"abstract":"Algorithmic game theory has developed into a mature field over the past three decades. However, the emergence of blockchains has raised new fundamental questions at the intersection of computer science, economics, and game theory. 2012 ACM Subject Classification Theory of computation → Algorithmic game theory","PeriodicalId":174732,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124202356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How Blockchain Tokens Are Changing Platform Economics (Invited Talk)","authors":"Hanna Halaburda","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.4440485","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4440485","url":null,"abstract":"Blockchain technologies are technologies inspired by Bitcoin, which emerged in 2008. Since then, many cryptocurrencies, altcoins, and other blockchain applications have emerged. For example, Ethereum introduced smart contracts, and with them came tokens, fungible tokens, non-fungible tokens, decentralized finance (DeFi), and decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs). All these technologies can be grouped under the umbrella term “blockchain technologies.” Each new generation of blockchain technology promises decentralization, disintermediation, a level playing field for entry, and improved value creation and distribution. However, it is essential to examine to what extent and under what conditions blockchain technologies deliver on these promises. It turns out that sometimes they do, and sometimes they do not. This distinction is essential to apply blockchain technologies effectively for large-scale practical applications. I focus here on blockchain-based cryptographic tokens and their impact on platform economics. Blockchain-based tokens, in conjunction with smart contracts, allow for new design choices in platforms. Therefore, I explore how these new design choices may help solve old problems in platform economics.","PeriodicalId":174732,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols","volume":"97 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128043655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Simone Bottoni, Anwitaman Datta, Federico Franzoni, E. Ragnoli, Roberto Ripamonti, Christian Rondanini, Gokhan Sagirlar, Alberto Trombetta
{"title":"1DLT: Rapid Deployment of Secure and Efficient EVM-Based Blockchains","authors":"Simone Bottoni, Anwitaman Datta, Federico Franzoni, E. Ragnoli, Roberto Ripamonti, Christian Rondanini, Gokhan Sagirlar, Alberto Trombetta","doi":"10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.3","url":null,"abstract":"Limited scalability and transaction costs are some of the critical issues that hamper a wider adoption of distributed ledger technologies (DLTs). That is particularly true for the Ethereum [58] blockchain, which, so far, has been the ecosystem with the highest adoption rate. Several solutions have been attempted in the last few years, most of which adopt the approach to offload transactions from the blockchain mainnet, a.k.a. Level 1 (L1), to a separate network. Such solutions are collectively known as Level 2 (L2) systems. While improving scalability, the adoption of L2 introduces additional drawbacks: users have to trust that the L2 system has correctly performed transactions or, conversely, high computational power is required to prove transactions’ correctness. In addition, significant technical knowledge is needed to set up and manage such an L2 system. To tackle such limitations, we propose 1DLT 1 : a novel system that enables rapid deployment of an Ethereum Virtual Machine based (EVM-based) blockchain that overcomes those drawbacks. 2012 ACM","PeriodicalId":174732,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129454529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Impact of Ethereum Throughput and Fees on Transaction Latency During ICOs","authors":"M. Spain, Sean Foley, V. Gramoli","doi":"10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.9","url":null,"abstract":"The Ethereum blockchain has gained popularity for its ability to implement Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), whereby a buyer enters a market order agreement with a seller in order to purchase cryptographic tokens at an agreed price. The popularity of ICOs in 2017 has created an increasingly adversarial environment among potential buyers, who compete for what is often a fixed supply of tokens offered for a limited period of time. \u0000We study the impact of a series of ICOs in order to understand the relationship between transaction fees, throughput and latency in Ethereum. Our analysis considers the effects on both Ethereum’s service providers, known as miners, and users who issue transactions in the network. Our results show that while buyers incentivise miners generously to include their transactions during ICOs, the latency of these transactions is predominantly determined by the levels of supply and demand in the network.","PeriodicalId":174732,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116968115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Smart Contract Oracle for Approximating Real-World, Real Number Values","authors":"William George, Clément Lesaege","doi":"10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.6","url":null,"abstract":"A key challenge of smart contract systems is the fact that many useful contracts require access to information that does not natively live on the blockchain. While miners can verify the value of a hash or the validity of a digital signature, they cannot determine who won an election, whether there is a flood in Paris, or even what is the price of ether in US dollars, even though this information might be necessary to execute prediction market, insurance, or financial contracts respectively. \u0000A number of promising projects and research developments have provided a better understanding of how one might construct a decentralized, binary oracle - namely an oracle that can respond by one of two possibilities, typically \"yes\" or \"no\", even while not requiring the interaction of a trusted third party. In this work, we extend these ideas to construct a general-purpose, decentralized oracle that can estimate the value of a real-world quantity that is in a dense totally ordered set, such as R. In particular, this proposal can be used to estimate real number valued quantities, such as required for a price oracle. We will establish a number of desirable properties about this proposal. Particularly, we will see that the precision of the output is tunable to users' needs.","PeriodicalId":174732,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124732542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Best Before? Expiring Central Bank Digital Currency and Loss Recovery (Extended Abstract)","authors":"C. Kahn, M. Oordt, Yu Zhu","doi":"10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2021.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2021.7","url":null,"abstract":"Many central banks are considering issuing digital cash substitutes. An important property of physical cash payments is resilience —for example, imperviousness to power outages and independence of electronic/network coverage. These properties also make cash payments important in remote communities. Policy makers are considering building similar offline payment functionality into digital cash substitutes, while their digital nature allows for novel features that could make them more desirable than physical cash. This paper analyzes the possibility of introducing an expiry date for offline digital currency balances to automate personal loss recovery. Our results show this functionality could have a substantial positive impact on consumer demand for offline digital currency balances. We also examine the welfare effects of adjustments to the expiry date: small increases from the optimum cause little damage, but small decreases from the optimal expiry date can have a large negative impact. More information sharing between consumers and the central bank can improve loss recovery but has an ambiguous impact on social welfare.","PeriodicalId":174732,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124030980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When Nakamoto Meets Nash: Blockchain Breakthrough Through the Lens of Game Theory (Invited Talk)","authors":"Ittai Abraham","doi":"10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.2","url":null,"abstract":"We discuss the deep connections between Blockchain Technology, Computer Science and Economics. The talk surveys the ways the Blockchain disruption raises fundamental challenges that have a deep game theoretic nature. We focus on four major open questions: 1. The need for a game theoretic endogenous theory of the utility of Money Systems that can model friction, fairness, and trust. 2. The need to incentivize trust in both consensus and execution. A need for a game theoretic theory of Consensus and analogue to Byzantine Fault Tolerance. A need for a game theoretic framework for scalable validation. 3. The challenge of incentivizing fairness and chain quality. Can we use notions of robust equilibrium to provide better notions of fairness? 4. The open question of how Blockchains can incentivise welfare. The need for a theory of Blockchains as public goods. 2012 ACM Subject Classification Theory of computation → Algorithmic game theory; Theory of computation → Distributed algorithms","PeriodicalId":174732,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126810804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}