International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols最新文献_第2页

The Stability and the Security of the Tangle 缠结的稳定性和安全性

International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols Pub Date : 2018-04-04 DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.8

Quentin Bramas

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引用次数: 30

Digital Currencies as Types (Invited Talk) 数字货币分类(特邀演讲)

International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.3

Timothy A. K. Zakian

引用次数: 0

Interest Rate Rules in Decentralized Finance: Evidence from Compound 分权金融中的利率规则:来自复利的证据

International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.5

Amit Chaudhary, R. Kozhan, Ganesh Viswanath-Natraj

引用次数: 1

Fundamentals of the MakerDAO Governance Token MakerDAO治理令牌的基本原理

International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2021.11

R. Kozhan, Ganesh Viswanath-Natraj

引用次数: 1

To Infinity and Beyond: Financing Platforms with Uncapped Crypto Tokens (Extended Abstract) 无限及超越:无上限加密代币融资平台(扩展摘要)

International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2021.9

Rowena Gan, Gerry Tsoukalas, Serguei Netessine

引用次数: 0

Revisiting the Liquidity/Risk Trade-Off with Smart Contracts (Short Paper) 用智能合约重新审视流动性/风险权衡(短文)

International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.10

V. Danos, J. Krivine, Julien Prat

{"title":"Revisiting the Liquidity/Risk Trade-Off with Smart Contracts (Short Paper)","authors":"V. Danos, J. Krivine, Julien Prat","doi":"10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.10","url":null,"abstract":"Real-time financial settlements constrain traders to have the cash on hand before they can enter a trade [3]. This prevents short-selling and ultimately impedes liquidity. We propose a novel trading protocol which relaxes the cash constraint, and manages chains of deferred payments. Traders can buy without paying first, and can re-sell while still withholding payments. Trades naturally arrange in chains which contract when deals are closed and extend when new ones open. Default risk is handled by reversing trades. In this short note we propose a class of novel financial instruments for zero-risk and zerocollateral intermediation. The central idea is that bilateral trades can be chained into trade lines. The ownership of an underlying asset becomes distributed among traders with positions in the trade line. The trading protocol determines who ends up owning that asset and the overall payoffs of the participants. Counterparty risk is avoided because the asset itself serves as a collateral for the entire chain of trades. The protocol can be readily implemented as a smart contract on a blockchain. Additional examples, proofs, protocol variants, and game-theoretic properties related to the order-sensitivity of the games defined by trade lines can be found in the extended version of this note [1]. Therein, one can also find the definition and game-theoretic analysis of standard trade-lines with applications to trust-less zero-collateral intermediation. 2012 ACM Subject Classification Information systems → Online banking","PeriodicalId":174732,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127540268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Proof of Behavior (Short Paper) 行为证明(短文)

International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.11

Paul-Marie Grollemund, P. Lafourcade, Kevin Thiry-Atighehchi, Ariane Tichit

引用次数: 0

Some Economics of Fintech (Invited Talk) 金融科技经济学(特邀演讲)

International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.1

J. Tirole

引用次数: 0

Distributed Computing Meets Game Theory: Fault Tolerance and Implementation with Cheap Talk (Invited Talk) 分布式计算与博弈论:容错与实现(特邀演讲)

International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2021.1

Joseph Y. Halpern

{"title":"Distributed Computing Meets Game Theory: Fault Tolerance and Implementation with Cheap Talk (Invited Talk)","authors":"Joseph Y. Halpern","doi":"10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2021.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2021.1","url":null,"abstract":"Traditionally, work in distributed computing has divided the agents into “good guys” and “bad guys”. The good guys follow the protocol; the bad guys do everything in their power to make sure it does not work. By way of contrast, game theory has focused on “rational” agents, who try to maximize their utilities. Here I try to combine these viewpoints. Specifically, following the work of Abraham et al. [2], I consider (k, t)-robust protocols/strategies, which tolerate coalitions of rational players of size up to k and up to t malicious players. I focus in particular on the problem that economists have called implementing a mediator. That is, can the players in the system, just talking among themselves (using what economists call “cheap talk”) simulate the effects of the mediator (see, e.g., [3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11]). In computer science, this essentially amounts to multiparty computation [7, 9, 12]. Ideas from cryptography and distributed computing allow us to prove results on how many agents are required to implement a (k, t)-robust mediator just using cheap talk. These results subsume (and, in some cases, correct) results from the game theory literature. The results of Abraham et al. [2] were proved for what are called synchronous systems in the distributed computing community; this is also the case for all the results in the economics literature cited above. In synchronous systems, communication proceeds in atomic rounds, and all messages sent during round r are received by round r+1. But many systems in the real world are asynchronous. In an asynchronous setting, there are no rounds; messages sent by the players may take arbitrarily long to get to their recipients. Markets and the internet are best viewed as asynchronous. Blockchain implementations assume partial synchrony, where there is an upper bound on how long messages take to arrive. The partial synchronous setting already shows some of the difficulty of moving away from synchrony: An agent i can wait to take its action until it receives a message from j (on which its action can depend). This cannot happen in a synchronous setting. Abraham, Dolev, Geffner, abnd Halpern [1] extend the results on implementing mediators to the asynchronous setting. 2012 ACM Subject Classification Theory of computation → Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design","PeriodicalId":174732,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols","volume":"45 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120993070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Blockchain and Privacy (Invited Talk) 区块链与私隐(特邀讲座)

International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2021.12

Catherine Tucker

引用次数: 0