International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols最新文献_第4页

The Demand for Programmable Payments: Extended Abstract (Extended Abstract) 可编程支付的需求:扩展抽象(Extended Abstract)

International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.8

C. Kahn, Maarten R. C. van Oordt

引用次数: 0

Secure Computation with Non-Equivalent Penalties in Constant Rounds 常轮非等价惩罚的安全计算

International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2021.5

Takeshi Nakai, Kazumasa Shinagawa

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引用次数: 1

Consistency of Automated Market Makers 自动做市商的一致性

International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.4

V. Danos, Weijia Wang

引用次数: 1

VeriOSS: Using the Blockchain to Foster Bug Bounty Programs VeriOSS:利用区块链促进漏洞赏金计划

International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.6

Andrea Canidio, Gabriele Costa, Letterio Galletta

引用次数: 3

Detecting and Quantifying Crypto Wash Trading (Extended Abstract) Crypto Wash交易的检测与量化(扩展摘要)

International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2021.10

L. Cong, Xi Li, Ke Tang, Yang Yang

引用次数: 0

F1 Fee Distribution F1费用分配

International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.10

D. Ojha, Christopher Goes

引用次数: 3

Commit-Reveal Schemes Against Front-Running Attacks (Extended Abstract) 针对前端攻击的提交-披露方案(扩展摘要)

International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.7

Andrea Canidio, V. Danos

引用次数: 1