International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols最新文献

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) Protection on a DAG DAG上的最大可提取值(MEV)保护

International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols Pub Date : 2022-08-01 DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2208.00940

D. Malkhi, Pawel Szalachowski

{"title":"Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) Protection on a DAG","authors":"D. Malkhi, Pawel Szalachowski","doi":"10.48550/arXiv.2208.00940","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2208.00940","url":null,"abstract":"Many cryptocurrency platforms are vulnerable to Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) attacks, where a malicious consensus leader can inject transactions or change the order of user transactions to maximize its profit. A promising line of research in MEV mitigation is to enhance the Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) consensus core of blockchains by new functionalities, like hiding transaction contents, such that malicious parties cannot analyze and exploit them until they are ordered. An orthogonal line of research demonstrates excellent performance for BFT protocols designed around Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAG). They provide high throughput by keeping high network utilization, decoupling transactions' dissemination from their metadata ordering, and encoding consensus logic efficiently over a DAG representing a causal ordering of disseminated messages. This paper explains how to combine these two advances. It introduces a DAG-based protocol called Fino, that integrates MEV-resistance features into DAG-based BFT without delaying the steady spreading of transactions by the DAG transport and with zero message overhead. The scheme operates without complex secret share verifiability or recoverability, and avoids costly threshold encryption.","PeriodicalId":174732,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124982296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 37

Presentation and Publication: Loss and Slippage in Networks of Automated Market Makers 报告与出版:自动做市商网络中的损失与滑动

International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols Pub Date : 2021-10-18 DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2021.13

D. Engel, M. Herlihy

引用次数: 4

Parasite Chain Detection in the IOTA Protocol IOTA协议中的寄生虫链检测

International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols Pub Date : 2020-04-28 DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.8

A. Penzkofer, B. Kusmierz, A. Capossele, William Sanders, Olivia Saa

{"title":"Parasite Chain Detection in the IOTA Protocol","authors":"A. Penzkofer, B. Kusmierz, A. Capossele, William Sanders, Olivia Saa","doi":"10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.8","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years several distributed ledger technologies based on directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) have appeared on the market. Similar to blockchain technologies, DAG-based systems aim to build an immutable ledger and are faced with security concerns regarding the irreversibility of the ledger state. However, due to their more complex nature and recent popularity, the study of adversarial actions has received little attention so far. In this paper we are concerned with a particular type of attack on the IOTA cryptocurrency, more specifically a Parasite Chain attack that attempts to revert the history stored in the DAG structure, also called the Tangle. \u0000In order to improve the security of the Tangle, we present a detection mechanism for this type of attack. In this mechanism, we embrace the complexity of the DAG structure by sampling certain aspects of it, more particularly the distribution of the number of approvers. We initially describe models that predict the distribution that should be expected for a Tangle without any malicious actors. We then introduce metrics that compare this reference distribution with the measured distribution. Upon detection, measures can then be taken to render the attack unsuccessful. We show that due to a form of the Parasite Chain that is different from the main Tangle it is possible to detect certain types of malicious chains. We also show that although the attacker may change the structure of the Parasite Chain to avoid detection, this is done so at a significant cost since the attack is rendered less efficient.","PeriodicalId":174732,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133043496","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 17

Tuning PoW with Hybrid Expenditure 混合支出调整PoW

International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols Pub Date : 2019-11-11 DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2021.3

Itay Tsabary, A. Spiegelman, Ittay Eyal

{"title":"Tuning PoW with Hybrid Expenditure","authors":"Itay Tsabary, A. Spiegelman, Ittay Eyal","doi":"10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2021.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2021.3","url":null,"abstract":"Proof of Work (PoW) is a Sybil-deterrence security mechanism. It introduces an external cost to a system by requiring computational effort to perform actions. However, since its inception, a central challenge was to tune this cost. Initial designs for deterring spam email and DoS attacks applied overhead equally to honest participants and attackers. Requiring too little effort did not deter attacks, whereas too much encumbered honest participation. This might be the reason it was never widely adopted. Nakamoto overcame this trade-off in Bitcoin by distinguishing desired from malicious behavior and introducing internal rewards for the former. This solution gained popularity in securing cryptocurrencies and using the virtual internally-minted tokens for rewards. However, in existing blockchain protocols the internal rewards fund (almost) the same value of external expenses. Thus, as the token value soars, so does the PoW expenditure. Bitcoin PoW, for example, already expends as much electricity as Colombia or Switzerland. This amount of resource-guzzling is unsustainable and hinders even wider adoption of these systems. In this work we present Hybrid Expenditure Blockchain (HEB), a novel PoW mechanism. HEB is a generalization of Nakamoto's protocol that enables tuning the external expenditure by introducing a complementary internal-expenditure mechanism. Thus, for the first time, HEB decouples external expenditure from the reward value. We show a practical parameter choice by which HEB requires significantly less external consumption compare to Nakamoto's protocol, its resilience against rational attackers is similar, and it retains the decentralized and permissionless nature of the system. Taking the Bitcoin ecosystem as an example, HEB cuts the electricity consumption by half.","PeriodicalId":174732,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131058568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

On Fairness in Committee-based Blockchains 关于基于委员会的区块链的公平性

International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols Pub Date : 2019-10-22 DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.4

Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Antonella del Pozzo, M. Potop-Butucaru, S. Piergiovanni

引用次数: 9

Cryptocurrency Egalitarianism: A Quantitative Approach 加密货币平均主义:一种定量方法

International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols Pub Date : 2019-07-04 DOI: 10.4230/OASICS.TOKENOMICS.2019.7

Dimitris Karakostas, A. Kiayias, Christos Nasikas, Dionysis Zindros

{"title":"Cryptocurrency Egalitarianism: A Quantitative Approach","authors":"Dimitris Karakostas, A. Kiayias, Christos Nasikas, Dionysis Zindros","doi":"10.4230/OASICS.TOKENOMICS.2019.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4230/OASICS.TOKENOMICS.2019.7","url":null,"abstract":"Since the invention of Bitcoin one decade ago, numerous cryptocurrencies have sprung into existence. Among these, proof-of-work is the most common mechanism for achieving consensus, whilst a number of coins have adopted \"ASIC-resistance\" as a desirable property, claiming to be more \"egalitarian,\"S where egalitarianism refers to the power of each coin to participate in the creation of new coins. While proof-of-work consensus dominates the space, several new cryptocurrencies employ alternative consensus, such as proof-of-stake in which block minting opportunities are based on monetary ownership. A core criticism of proof-of-stake revolves around it being less egalitarian by making the rich richer, as opposed to proof-of-work in which everyone can contribute equally according to their computational power. In this paper, we give the first quantitative definition of a cryptocurrency's emph{egalitarianism}. Based on our definition, we measure the egalitarianism of popular cryptocurrencies that (may or may not) employ ASIC-resistance, among them Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, and Monero. Our simulations show, as expected, that ASIC-resistance increases a cryptocurrency's egalitarianism. We also measure the egalitarianism of a stake-based protocol, Ouroboros, and a hybrid proof-of-stake/proof-of-work cryptocurrency, Decred. We show that stake-based cryptocurrencies, under correctly selected parameters, can be perfectly egalitarian, perhaps contradicting folklore belief.","PeriodicalId":174732,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124512797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 13

An Empirical Study of Speculative Concurrency in Ethereum Smart Contracts 以太坊智能合约中投机并发的实证研究

International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols Pub Date : 2019-01-05 DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.4

V. Saraph, M. Herlihy

引用次数: 45

Atomic Appends: Selling Cars and Coordinating Armies with Multiple Distributed Ledgers 原子附录:用多个分布式账本销售汽车和协调军队

International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols Pub Date : 2018-12-20 DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.5

Antonio Fernández, Chryssis Georgiou, N. Nicolaou

{"title":"Atomic Appends: Selling Cars and Coordinating Armies with Multiple Distributed Ledgers","authors":"Antonio Fernández, Chryssis Georgiou, N. Nicolaou","doi":"10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.5","url":null,"abstract":"The various applications using Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLT) or blockchains, have led to the introduction of a new `marketplace' where multiple types of digital assets may be exchanged. As each blockchain is designed to support specific types of assets and transactions, and no blockchain will prevail, the need to perform interblockchain transactions is already pressing. \u0000In this work we examine the fundamental problem of interoperable and interconnected blockchains. In particular, we begin by introducing the Multi-Distributed Ledger Objects (MDLO), which is the result of aggregating multiple Distributed Ledger Objects -- DLO (a DLO is a formalization of the blockchain) and that supports append and get operations of records (e.g., transactions) in them from multiple clients concurrently. Next, we define the AtomicAppends problem, which emerges when the exchange of digital assets between multiple clients may involve appending records in more than one DLO. Specifically, AtomicAppend requires that either all records will be appended on the involved DLOs or none. We examine the solvability of this problem assuming rational and risk-averse clients that may fail by crashing, and under different client utility and append models, timing models, and client failure scenarios. We show that for some cases the existence of an intermediary is necessary for the problem solution. We propose the implementation of such intermediary over a specialized blockchain, we term Smart DLO (SDLO), and we show how this can be used to solve the AtomicAppends problem even in an asynchronous, client competitive environment, where all the clients may crash.","PeriodicalId":174732,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols","volume":"108 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126896999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 8

A Puff of Steem: Security Analysis of Decentralized Content Curation 一阵风:去中心化内容管理的安全性分析

International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols Pub Date : 2018-10-03 DOI: 10.4230/OASICS.TOKENOMICS.2019.3

A. Kiayias, B. Livshits, Andrés Monteoliva Mosteiro, O. Litos

引用次数: 17

B-CoC: A Blockchain-based Chain of Custody for Evidences Management in Digital Forensics B-CoC:基于区块链的数字取证证据管理监管链

International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols Pub Date : 2018-07-26 DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.12

Silvia Bonomi, M. Casini, Claudio Ciccotelli

引用次数: 34