用智能合约重新审视流动性/风险权衡(短文)

V. Danos, J. Krivine, Julien Prat
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引用次数: 0

摘要

实时金融结算限制交易者在进入交易之前必须手头有现金[3]。这阻止了卖空,最终阻碍了流动性。我们提出了一种新的交易协议,它放松了现金约束,并管理了延迟支付链。交易员可以不先付款就买进,也可以在不付款的情况下再卖出。交易自然以链条排列,交易结束时收缩,新交易开始时扩展。违约风险是通过反向交易来处理的。在这篇简短的文章中,我们提出了一类新的零风险和零抵押中介金融工具。其核心思想是,双边贸易可以被链接到贸易线路上。标的资产的所有权在拥有交易头寸的交易者之间进行分配。交易协议决定了谁最终拥有该资产以及参与者的总体收益。交易对手风险得以避免,因为资产本身可以作为整个交易链的抵押品。该协议可以很容易地作为区块链上的智能合约实现。与贸易线定义的博弈的顺序敏感性相关的其他示例、证明、协议变体和博弈论性质可以在本说明的扩展版本中找到[1]。其中,我们还可以找到标准贸易线的定义和博弈论分析,并将其应用于无信任的零抵押中介。2012 ACM学科分类信息系统→网上银行
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Revisiting the Liquidity/Risk Trade-Off with Smart Contracts (Short Paper)
Real-time financial settlements constrain traders to have the cash on hand before they can enter a trade [3]. This prevents short-selling and ultimately impedes liquidity. We propose a novel trading protocol which relaxes the cash constraint, and manages chains of deferred payments. Traders can buy without paying first, and can re-sell while still withholding payments. Trades naturally arrange in chains which contract when deals are closed and extend when new ones open. Default risk is handled by reversing trades. In this short note we propose a class of novel financial instruments for zero-risk and zerocollateral intermediation. The central idea is that bilateral trades can be chained into trade lines. The ownership of an underlying asset becomes distributed among traders with positions in the trade line. The trading protocol determines who ends up owning that asset and the overall payoffs of the participants. Counterparty risk is avoided because the asset itself serves as a collateral for the entire chain of trades. The protocol can be readily implemented as a smart contract on a blockchain. Additional examples, proofs, protocol variants, and game-theoretic properties related to the order-sensitivity of the games defined by trade lines can be found in the extended version of this note [1]. Therein, one can also find the definition and game-theoretic analysis of standard trade-lines with applications to trust-less zero-collateral intermediation. 2012 ACM Subject Classification Information systems → Online banking
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