Corporate Governance: Arrangements & Laws eJournal最新文献

{"title":"¿Concurso o rescate de entidades financieras? Un análisis de los costes y beneficios del proceso de recapitalización de la banca española (Bankruptcy or Bailout? A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Spanish Bank Bailout)","authors":"Aurelio Gurrea-Martínez","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2336545","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2336545","url":null,"abstract":"Spanish Abstract: El sistema bancario espanol ha sido sometido recientemente a un profundo proceso de reestructuracion que, entre otras medidas, ha implicado la recapitalizacion de numerosas entidades de credito, con la finalidad de restaurar la confianza y estabilidad en el sistema financiero. El presente trabajo tiene por objeto analizar los costes y beneficios del proceso de recapitalizacion de la banca espanola, en relacion con los que habria tenido el eventual concurso de acreedores de, al menos, algunas de las entidades rescatadas. En este sentido, creemos que el concurso de acreedores de aquellas entidades que, individualmente o en su conjunto, no provoquen un riesgo sistemico habria sido una solucion economicamente mas deseable que el rescate, teniendo en cuenta que esta solucion no habria supuesto ningun coste para los contribuyentes ni para las entidades solventes. En segundo lugar, esta solucion tampoco habria generado riesgo moral o incluso distorsion de la libre competencia entre entidades bancarias. En tercer lugar, el rescate de la banca espanola se ha realizado sin analizar debidamente si una determinada entidad deberia ser rescatada o, en su caso, liquidada, atendiendo a su viabilidad economica y al posible efecto contagio sobre el conjunto del sistema financiero. En cuarto lugar, la decision del rescate bancario no deberia haberse realizado por voluntad politica, como consecuencia del conflicto de intereses existente entre nuestros representantes democraticos y algunas de las entidades rescatadas (principalmente, cajas de ahorros), no solo por su participacion directa o indirecta en sus organos de gobierno, sino tambien por las ventajas financieras recibidas – y sin la debida transparencia – de algunas entidades rescatadas. En cualquier caso, creemos que, con independencia de que la decision del rescate se encuentre soportada por argumentos economicos como el mantenimiento de la confianza en el sistema financiero, el posible efecto sistemico generado por la caida de un banco, o la dificultad de identificar –y rescatar exclusivamente– a las entidades demasiado grandes para caer, todas las entidades rescatadas deberian haber quedado sometidas a un regimen de represion de la insolvencia similar o incluso mas riguroso que el previsto en la Ley Concursal, habida cuenta, ademas, de los superiores costes (o externalidades) generados al sistema por la insolvencia de una entidad financiera.English Abstract: The Spanish banking system has recently been subject to a deep restructuring process in order to clean up the balance-sheet of many financial institutions and thus to restore the stability of the financial system. Among other measures, this process has implied the bailout of many financial institutions. We analyse the costs and benefits of the Spanish bank bailout in relation to a hypothetical insolvency proceeding of, at least, some rescued banks. In this sense, we argue that the bankruptcy would have been a more efficient solution t","PeriodicalId":171263,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Arrangements & Laws eJournal","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134554675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Uninvited U.S. Investors? Economic Consequences of Involuntary Cross-Listings","authors":"P. Iliev, Darius P. Miller, Lukáš Roth","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1533603","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1533603","url":null,"abstract":"We study the economic consequences of a recent Securities and Exchange Commission securities regulation change that grants foreign firms trading on the U.S. over-the-counter (OTC) market an automatic exemption from the reporting requirements of the 1934 Securities Act. We document that the number of voluntary (sponsored) OTC cross-listings did not increase following the regulation change, suggesting that it did not achieve its intended purpose of increasing voluntary OTC cross-listings through a reduction in compliance costs. We do find that the design of the regulation allowed financial intermediaries to create an unprecedented number of involuntary (unsponsored) OTC ADRs: 1,700 unsponsored ADR programs for 920 firms were created for companies that had previously chosen not to cross-list in the United States. Our difference-in-differences analysis based on a matched sample approach documents that foreign firms forced into the U.S. capital markets experience a significant decrease in firm value, and we further show that the decrease in firm value is related to an increase in U.S. litigation risk. We also find that depositary banks’ propensity to involuntarily cross-list firms is positively related to banks’ expected fee revenue, and that banks chose firms that incur high costs when involuntarily cross-listed. Our results provide evidence that securities regulation can be exploited for private gain and result in costly unintended consequences.","PeriodicalId":171263,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Arrangements & Laws eJournal","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127878152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Does Banking Competition Affect Innovation?","authors":"Jess Cornaggia, Yifei Mao, X. Tian, B. Wolfe","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2017928","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2017928","url":null,"abstract":"We exploit the deregulation of interstate bank branching laws to test whether banking competition affects innovation. We find robust evidence that banking competition reduces state-level innovation by public corporations headquartered within deregulating states. Innovation increases among private firms that are dependent on external finance and that have limited access to credit from local banks. We argue that banking competition enables small, innovative firms to secure financing instead of being acquired by public corporations. Therefore, banking competition reduces the supply of innovative targets, which reduces the portion of state-level innovation attributable to public corporations. Overall, these results shed light on the real effects of banking competition and the determinants of innovation.","PeriodicalId":171263,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Arrangements & Laws eJournal","volume":"19 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120903597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Investor Education and Protection Fund (IEPF)","authors":"R. Tripathy","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2308987","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2308987","url":null,"abstract":"Whether you are a small time investor or an active one, it is very important to have thorough financial literacy, how to invest, where to invest, how much to invest etc. Being aware about investing helps the investors to fully appreciate opportunities and associated risks, take informed decisions, understand the intricacies of financial markets (means to understand the financial market in a very complicated or detailed form) and participate actively in the economic growth of the Country by converting savings into investments. Keeping all this in mind, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of India established the Investor Education and Protection Fund (IEPF) under Section 205C of the Companies Act, (1956) with an aim to generate more awareness among the investors and thus protect them. IEPF is regulated under securities and exchange board of India (investor protection and education fund) regulation, 2009.Investor Education and Protection Fund (IEPF) is for promotion of investors’ awareness and protection of the interests of investors. The IEPF accounts for unclaimed funds from dividends, matured deposits, matured debentures or share application money, which is transferred to the Government by companies if they are not claimed for seven years. The fund shall be utilized for the purpose of protection of investors and promotion of investor education and awareness. The IEPF is managed by a Committee that consists of the Secretary, Company Affairs, as well as members from RBI, SEBI and experts on investor protection. The committee shall consider investor education and protection activities keeping in view the purpose of utilization of fund. Meeting of the committee shall be convened at least once in 3 months by the convener to in his absence, by any member nominated by the convener, on his behalf. The board shall ensure maintenance of proper and separate accounts and other relevant records in relation to the fund.Investors Education and grievances aim is to create a stock market that is fairer, more free and above all, one that better serves the interest of investors. Educated & empowered investors always allow the market forces to play their role to shape a fairer and efficient competitive market. Therefore, it is the non-government organization to equip small investors with the necessary information and understanding about the intricacies of the functioning of the stock market so that they can ensure guaranteed and safe investment avenues.","PeriodicalId":171263,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Arrangements & Laws eJournal","volume":"262 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124257391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Rise of the IntercontinentalExchange and Implications of Its Merger with NYSE Euronext","authors":"Latoya Brown","doi":"10.5195/JLC.2013.60","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/JLC.2013.60","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the impending merger between the IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) and NYSE Euronext against the backdrop of the current structure of the global financial services industry. The paper concludes that the merger embodies what the financial services industry is becoming and captures the model that will allow exchanges to remain competitive in today’s marketplace: mega-exchanges with broader asset classes and electronic platforms. As technology and globalization threaten their vitality, exchanges will need to continue reinventing and adapting. Increasingly over the last decade they have done so by merging and by moving, at least a part of, their operations on screen. ICE is a good model for other exchanges to follow. It has been able to establish itself as a market leader in a relatively short period of time - 13 years - and has done so by exploiting electronic trading. In arriving at its ultimate conclusion, the paper looks at ICE’s beginnings and its impressive growth, and discusses the implications of the merger by examining how issues of globalization, demutualization, fragmentation, regulation, and antitrust factor in. The paper also discusses the quandaries of the US regulatory framework (including how it is viewed internationally) and the possibility that the ICE-NYX merger will compel consolidation between the SEC and the CFTC.","PeriodicalId":171263,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Arrangements & Laws eJournal","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126746374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the Securities Act of 1933","authors":"Rick Grossmann","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2307710","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2307710","url":null,"abstract":"With its 2010 decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. (“Morrison”), the Supreme Court swept aside decades of lower court precedent governing the adjudication of cases involving alleged transnational securities fraud in United States courts. The Court in Morrison sought to clarify when relief under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is available to plaintiffs in securities cases with cross-border aspects. But Morrison’s repercussions are more far-reaching, extending to other securities-related statutes and even into other areas of law. This paper examines Morrison’s relationship with and application to the Securities Act of 1933 and the federal regulatory scheme it imposed. Part I reviews the Court’s decision in Morrison, summarizes subsequent interpretations by the lower courts of Morrison’s new transactional test for determining whether a plaintiff in a transnational securities fraud case can bring a Section 10(b) claim, and touches on Congress’ partial (and arguably ineffective) attempt to overrule Morrison legislatively. Part II discusses dicta in Morrison concerning the Securities Act, the implication of which is that the same transactional test should apply to claims brought under the Securities Act; this implication, it is argued, rests on a selective and misleading reading of the Securities Act. Part III reviews decisions in private and enforcement actions applying Morrison to Securities Act claims. Part IV takes an in-depth look at Morrison in relation to Section 12 of the Securities Act, contending that the courts have not applied Morrison to this provision correctly (probably leading to erroneous outcomes in at least some cases), but also challenging whether Morrison’s transactional test undermines the fundamental investor protection function of the Securities Act. Finally, Part V explains why Regulation S, a safe harbor from registration with the SEC for offshore offers and sales of securities, remains valid after Morrison, despite some commentators’ views to the contrary.","PeriodicalId":171263,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Arrangements & Laws eJournal","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124029840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Prededucibilità Dei Crediti Sorti 'In Funzione' Della Procedura Concorsuale (Advance Payment of Claims Arisen from Insolvency Proceedings)","authors":"Gianpaolo Ciervo","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2390158","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2390158","url":null,"abstract":"Italian Abstract: Analisi della disciplina dei crediti prededucibili di cui all'art. 111 e 182-quater l. fall. alla luce della sentenza Cass., n. 8533, 08.04.2013. English Abstract: Analysis of artt. 111 and 182-quater Italian Bankruptcy Code in consideration of the judgment of Cass., n. 8533, 08.04.2013.","PeriodicalId":171263,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Arrangements & Laws eJournal","volume":"89 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126218101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Thirty Years of Shareholder Rights and Firm Valuation","authors":"M. Cremers, Allen Ferrell","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1413133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1413133","url":null,"abstract":"This paper introduces a new hand-collected dataset tracking restrictions on shareholder rights at approximately 1,000 firms over 1978-1989. In conjunction with the 1990-2006 IRRC data, we track firms’ shareholder rights over thirty years. Most governance changes occurred during the 1980s. We find a robustly negative association between restrictions on shareholder rights (using the G-Index as a proxy) and Tobin’s Q. The negative association only appears after the judicial approval of antitakeover defenses in the 1985 landmark Delaware Supreme Court decision of Moran v. Household. This decision was an unanticipated, exogenous shock that increased the importance of shareholder rights.","PeriodicalId":171263,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Arrangements & Laws eJournal","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114824948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Does the Absolute Priority Rule Still Apply to Individual Chapter 11 Debtors Post-BAPCPA","authors":"A. Mendenhall","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2071490","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2071490","url":null,"abstract":"Section 1129(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code codifies a principle known as the 'absolute priority rule.' The absolute priority rule requires that creditors be provided for in full before holders of equity can receive or retain any property under a plan of reorganization. The absolute priority rule ensures that a plan of reorganization will not be used to allow equity to benefit at the cost of higher-priority unsecured debt. A small number of insiders, whether representatives of management or major creditors, can often use the reorganization process to gain an unfair advantage if left unchecked. This problem is magnified in chapter 11 cases with individual debtors. Chapter 11, as it was originally conceived, was never intended to be used by individual debtors. Courts have struggled to find the proper balance in applying many of chapter 11’s corporate oriented provisions – including the absolute priority rule – to living, breathing human beings, i.e., individual debtors. In 2005, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ('BAPCPA'). BAPCPA amended chapter 11 by expanding the bankruptcy estate in individual chapter 11 cases to include post-commencement property and earnings. Due to the poor drafting of certain BAPCPA amendments, the exception language in § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) is susceptible to two different interpretations. The first, popularly termed the 'broad view,' would abrogate the absolute priority rule in individual chapter 11 cases. The second, termed the 'narrow view,' would have the absolute priority rule apply only to an individual debtor’s pre-petition property. This article argues that the principles of statutory construction favor the narrow view. First, this interpretation is supported by a plain reading of the text of the statute. Second, the narrow view is supported by the overall context of the Bankruptcy Code. The legislative history involved is sparse at best and is generally not helpful in determining Congress’s intent on the issue. As a result, the preexisting bankruptcy practice – the narrow view – should prevail.","PeriodicalId":171263,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Arrangements & Laws eJournal","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132997533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Arquitectura Contractual De Los Derivados OTC. Una Propuesta Alternativa (Structuring OTC Derivatives Contracts: An Alternative Proposal)","authors":"J. Solana","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2766591","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2766591","url":null,"abstract":"Spanish Abstract: El presente trabajo tiene por objeto identificar algunos de los problemas derivados de la importacion del modelo ISDA Master Agreement al ordenamiento juridico espanol a traves del CMOF. Concretamente, el trabajo se centra en analizar y cuestionar el verdadero alcance del principio de unidad contractual sobre el que se construye el ISDA Master Agreement.Tanto la doctrina como la jurisprudencia espanolas parecen haber asumido de manera incondicional que el proposito de la Estipulacion 1.1.2o del CMOF es reflejar la voluntad de las Partes de que todas las Operaciones de derivados OTC que suscriban constituiran un solo contrato. Esta es, igualmente, la interpretacion que impera en otros ordenamientos, especialmente en Estados Unidos. Sin embargo, las diferencias estructurales y materiales del ordenamiento espanol respecto del de otros Estados, especialmente aquellos de base common law, permite cuestionar la idoneidad de una importacion literal del principio de unidad contractual.Con el objetivo de ilustrar los problemas que esta implementacion puede provocar en el ordenamiento espanol he dividido el presente trabajo en tres Capitulos. Los dos primeros atacan los fundamentos basicos del principio de unidad contractual, a saber: la naturaleza del CMOF como un “contrato marco” y la ausencia de autonomia contractual de las Operaciones suscritas por las Partes. El segundo Capitulo incluye, asimismo, un analisis de la naturaleza juridica del contrato derivado tipo swap en le contexto del Derecho espanol. El Capitulo Tercero presenta una interpretacion alternativa de este principio a partir de las conclusiones alcanzadas en los dos Capitulos anteriores. El trabajo se cierra con una recapitulacion de las conclusiones mas importantes.English abstract: This work aims to identify some of the problems arising from the import of the ISDA Master Agreement into the Spanish legal system through the CMOF standard agreement. In particular, the work examines the extent to which the single agreement principle on which the ISDA Master Agreement is conceived may be upheld under Spanish law.Courts and academic commentators in Spain seem to agree that Section 1.1.2o of the CMOF reflects the will of the parties to have all their OTC derivatives transactions documented under one single agreement. This is also the prevalent view in other legal systems, e.g. in the U.S. However, the specific chracteristics of the Spanish legal system, particularly in comparison to common law systems, raise some concerns about the literal import of the single agreement principle.The work is divided into three chapters. The first two chapters explore the fundamental principles underlying the noition of a single agreement, i.e.: the legal nature of the CMOF as a \"master agreement\" (first chpater) and the lack of contractual autonomy of the financial transactions from the CMOF (second chapter). The second chapter also examines the legal nature of a swap contract under Spanish law","PeriodicalId":171263,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Arrangements & Laws eJournal","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121881484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}