National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies最新文献

{"title":"Joint Information Warfare: An Information-Age Paradigm for Jointness","authors":"D. Kuehl","doi":"10.21236/ADA385599","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA385599","url":null,"abstract":"Conclusions * Current concepts of \"jointness\" that focus on integrating the operations of DOD's four military Services are too narrow for Information Warfare and Information Operations (IW/IO). * National information power and the broad needs of national security in the dynamics of the information age necessitate a more inclusive understanding of what is meant by \"joint\". * \"Joint IW/IO\" must incorporate the actions and involvement of numerous non-DOD organizations and activities, to include elements of the private sector. Although their actions will not be directed by DOD, active elements in Joint IW/IO must at least coordinate their actions, even if that coordination is informal, in order to be effective. * This concept of \"Joint IW/IO\" should be reflected in DOD policy and military doctrines Jointness and the Information Age The passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 generated a new emphasis on \"jointness\". Current concepts of jointness and joint operations are defined as \"activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of more than one Service [emphasis added] of the same nation participate.\" The blending of the operations and capabilities of the military Services, however, is no longer sufficient for information warfare/information operations (IW/IO) and the needs of national security in the information age. The impacts and implications of the information revolution are so widespread that they necessitate a broader, more inclusive concept incorporating all of the various elements of national information power. The Services and Information Warfare All of the Services are responding in some manner to the challenges of the information age and the imperatives of information warfare. The Marines, while uncertain about the broader theories of IW, are deeply involved in exploring the means by which they can attain \"command dominance\" over their adversaries. While acknowledging and leveraging the recent dramatic technological advances in information and communication systems, the Marines' focus is clearly on the human dimension of conflict, with the objective of maximizing human and operational flexibility instead of relying on technology to minimize friction. The Army, also cautious about the broader theories of IO, has no such qualms about the technological opportunities of the future, and the Army's vision for the next century, incorporated in \"Force XXI\" and based on digitization of the battlefield, is heavily, perhaps critically, dependent on the technologies of the information age. The Army is investigating the means and implications of these concepts and capabilities, and its Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA), located at Fort Belvoir and associated with its Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), is one of the Army's focal points for this effort. Another is its Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) at Fort Monroe, which recently issued the Army's first doctrinal manual in this area, Field Manual (FM) 100-6, \"I","PeriodicalId":165909,"journal":{"name":"National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1997-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122479988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Information Warfare: An Old Operational Concept With New Implications","authors":"Abe Singer, S. Rowell","doi":"10.21236/ada385668","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21236/ada385668","url":null,"abstract":"Conclusions The new balance of information and energy (as well as the degree of coupling between them) is changing the conduct of warfare. Expect to see much more intensive use of deception, stealth and redundancy as well as much smaller and stealthier platforms in order to neutralize the impact of highly accurate PGMs. Taken in aggregate, these changes call for fundamentally different approaches to the design and development of weapon systems, which, in turn, will inevitably lead to basic changes in strategy, tactics and doctrine. Key assets of the national civilian infrastructure may, under certain circumstances, become highly lucrative military centers of gravity for an adversary, blurring the traditional dividing line between the combatant and civilian domains. Even more disturbing is the nature of this critical vulnerability--involving asymmetry of forces, arduous tracing of information warfare attacks, and the bypassing of the military. These conditions, and their interrelationships, may radically alter the role of the military as well as our definition of war. A Fundamental Question Information warfare has recently captured the attention of the news media. Numerous articles on the subject have appeared in the popular press--a cover story in Time, a major article in Scientific American, and many op-ed pieces in major newspapers. Yet information warfare is virtually as old as warfare itself. For example, Joshua used information warfare (as feigning tactics) three thousand four hundred years ago in the capture of 'Ay; the Greek city--states conducted information warfare (in the form of deception) two hundred years later in their conflict with Troy; and during the Absalom Rebellion three thousand years ago, King David succeeded in overloading Absalom's decision-making process with unnecessary information--precipitating the reversal of a critical military decision--thus saving David from virtually certain destruction and assuring ultimate victory. So what's new about information warfare? Is it just the latest buzz word? Is it merely the consolidation of a large set of incremental increases in the role of information in warfare during the last three decades--primarily in the areas of precision guided munitions (PGM) as well as in command, control, communications and intelligence--or is it the leading edge of a step--function change having enormous implications on how wars will be fought in the future? Many unbiased, analytical thinkers are skeptical about any dramatic change. Unfortunately, current literature on information warfare contributes to this skepticism. An examination of the open literature on information warfare shows that recent attempts to address this issue suffer from two major shortcomings. Authors either (1) get involved in attempts to predict technology, thus incurring a loss of credibility with many readers (history is replete with examples of how technology predictions can make fools of some of the brightest minds), or (2) th","PeriodicalId":165909,"journal":{"name":"National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1996-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116577883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Export Controls: Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Technologies","authors":"P. Sullivan","doi":"10.21236/ada385720","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21236/ada385720","url":null,"abstract":"Conclusions * In December 1995, in The Hague suburb of Wassenaar, the United States and its allies and former adversaries, including Russia, agreed to establish an export control arrangement to deal with post-Cold War security risks arising from transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. The objective is to promote greater transparency and responsibility and as well as restraint in such transfers. * At their Dec. 13, 1996 meeting the 33 member states of the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) noted that they have now begun work on the basis of the Ainitial elements,\" the WA's principles and procedures, which were agreed to in July. * Although WA members have national policies against selling arms or sensitive dual-use items for military end-uses in \"states of serious concern,\" key members oppose measures that would diminish their freedom of action. Thus the WA does not formally identify the \"states of serious concern\" (Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Libya). Furthermore, the requirements to exchange information on transfers to non-members are limited in scope and timeliness. Most importantly, the WA failed to secure agreement on notification prior to transferring arms to regions of instability (Middle East and South Asia) or on disclosure of dual-use transfers to purported civilian end-users in states of concern. Thus, the WA lacks the tools needed to meaningfully implement its objectives. Origins At the 1993 Vancouver summit meeting, President Boris Yelstin complained to President Bill Clinton that the Coordinating Committee on Export Controls (COCOM) was a \"relic of the Cold War.\" (Formed in 1949, COCOM consisted of NATO, Japan and Australia. The members agreed to prevent exports of militarily significant, including dual-use, technology to Commu-nist countries.) Promising a fresh appraisal, Clinton also pressed Yeltsin to cooperate with U.S. export control efforts, including stopping Russia's arms transfers to Iran. This led to COCOM's termination in March 1994, Russia's agreement not to enter new arms sales contracts with Iran, and it culminated in the multilateral Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) agreements in December 1995 and July 1996. The agreement to establish the WA, based in Vienna, was concluded after extended and contentious bilateral and multilateral negotiations. The result is a bare bones framework espousing the high-minded principles, but little of the muscle, sought by United States. However, at U.S. insistence, the initial guidelines are subject to further elaboration and definition. The WA may follow the pattern set by the nonproliferation export control regimes which were born under similar modest circumstances, but have since grown incrementally (albeit with much room for additional improvement). As with those regimes, the key ingredient for growth will be continued U.S. leadership. The Initial Elements On the positive side, the WA is the first global mechanism for controlling transfers of conventional arms and related","PeriodicalId":165909,"journal":{"name":"National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1996-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128839749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}