Export Controls: Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Technologies

Abstract

Conclusions * In December 1995, in The Hague suburb of Wassenaar, the United States and its allies and former adversaries, including Russia, agreed to establish an export control arrangement to deal with post-Cold War security risks arising from transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. The objective is to promote greater transparency and responsibility and as well as restraint in such transfers. * At their Dec. 13, 1996 meeting the 33 member states of the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) noted that they have now begun work on the basis of the Ainitial elements," the WA's principles and procedures, which were agreed to in July. * Although WA members have national policies against selling arms or sensitive dual-use items for military end-uses in "states of serious concern," key members oppose measures that would diminish their freedom of action. Thus the WA does not formally identify the "states of serious concern" (Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Libya). Furthermore, the requirements to exchange information on transfers to non-members are limited in scope and timeliness. Most importantly, the WA failed to secure agreement on notification prior to transferring arms to regions of instability (Middle East and South Asia) or on disclosure of dual-use transfers to purported civilian end-users in states of concern. Thus, the WA lacks the tools needed to meaningfully implement its objectives. Origins At the 1993 Vancouver summit meeting, President Boris Yelstin complained to President Bill Clinton that the Coordinating Committee on Export Controls (COCOM) was a "relic of the Cold War." (Formed in 1949, COCOM consisted of NATO, Japan and Australia. The members agreed to prevent exports of militarily significant, including dual-use, technology to Commu-nist countries.) Promising a fresh appraisal, Clinton also pressed Yeltsin to cooperate with U.S. export control efforts, including stopping Russia's arms transfers to Iran. This led to COCOM's termination in March 1994, Russia's agreement not to enter new arms sales contracts with Iran, and it culminated in the multilateral Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) agreements in December 1995 and July 1996. The agreement to establish the WA, based in Vienna, was concluded after extended and contentious bilateral and multilateral negotiations. The result is a bare bones framework espousing the high-minded principles, but little of the muscle, sought by United States. However, at U.S. insistence, the initial guidelines are subject to further elaboration and definition. The WA may follow the pattern set by the nonproliferation export control regimes which were born under similar modest circumstances, but have since grown incrementally (albeit with much room for additional improvement). As with those regimes, the key ingredient for growth will be continued U.S. leadership. The Initial Elements On the positive side, the WA is the first global mechanism for controlling transfers of conventional arms and related (including dual-use) technologies and promoting greater transparency and responsibility in transfers of these items to "prevent destabilizing accumulations." The WA has a Munitions List and Dual-Use List of controlled goods and technologies that borrow from COCOM's control lists and serve as the basis of participants' national control systems to prevent unauthorized transfers and re-transfers. The WA is intended to complement and reinforce non-proliferation regimes, without duplication. It does so in at least three ways: First, by covering goods and technologies that, for the most part, are not covered by other regimes; second, by requiring that members adhere to those regimes and to other non-proliferation norms; and, third, by requiring members to establish effective export controls on items covered by nonproliferation regimes, as well as those on the WA's lists. The WA does not have a COCOM-style proscribed countries list-indeed, targeting specific states or groups of states is expressly disclaimed. …