National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies最新文献

{"title":"Defense Partnerships: Documenting Trends and Emerging Topics for Action","authors":"Samuel Bendett","doi":"10.21236/ada622066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21236/ada622066","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract : Public-public and public-private and partnerships (P4s) are time-proven effective solutions for delivering public services at reasonable costs when deployed and managed properly. Various U.S. agencies1 and international organizations all have longstanding successful P4 initiatives and projects. Recently, Department of Defense (DOD) leaders have expressed increased interest in implementing P4s throughout their organizations.2 As DOD is faced with evolving roles and missions in an unpredictable and complex world amid fiscal constraints, the expertise and involvement of the private sector and other public organizations will be essential. 3 P4s could be ideal tools intended to further policy objectives, enhance U.S. operational capabilities, reduce costs, gain access to nonmilitary expertise or assets, or build greater capacity in partners. 4 While the need for P4s is fairly well articulated, there are still serious hurdles to their implementation, with a general lack of explicit guidance, best practices, and frameworks for implementing P4s consistently, optimally, or at an enterprise level within and across DOD. P4s can be extremely diverse from one another in terms of formality, structure, objective, complexity, stakeholders, and scope of activity elements that make enterprise-level consistency difficult. This leaves P4 practitioners and organizations in a unique situation, one in which creativity, collaboration, and alternate approaches are expressly encouraged to achieve a variety of project objectives, while bound by legal, political, mission, and financial frameworks that have not yet been established, approved, or tested on an enterprise scale.","PeriodicalId":165909,"journal":{"name":"National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126849808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Toward the Printed World: Additive Manufacturing and Implications for National Security","authors":"Connor McNulty, Neyla Arnas, T. A. Campbell","doi":"10.21236/ada577162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21236/ada577162","url":null,"abstract":"Additive manufacturing (AM)--commonly referred to as \"three-dimensional\" or \"3D\" printing--is a prospective game changer with implications and opportunities that affect not just the Department of Defense (DOD) but the economy as a whole. The technology allows the \"art to part\" fabrication of complex objects from a computer model without part-specific tooling or human intervention. (1) AM has already impacted a variety of industries and has the potential to present legal and economic issues with its strong economic and health-care benefits. Because of its remarkable ability to produce a wide variety of objects, AM also can have significant national security implications. The purpose of this paper is to provide a general introduction to these issues for nontechnical readers through a survey of the recent history and the current state of technology. Included in this paper is a brief review identifying key individuals and organizations shaping developments as well as projected trends. AM refers to the production of a three-dimensional object through the layer-by-layer addition of material according to a geometrical computer model. AM contrasts with other forms of manufacturing that require either the removal or alteration of material to produce a completed object. For example, a 3D printer could build a crescent wrench by adding a layer of material and stacking another layer on top of that one and fusing them together, repeating the process until the wrench is complete. There are distinct benefits to objects produced in this manner. Considering the above example, if a customer wanted a wrench to be fashioned with a grip unique to his hand, he could scan his hand by computer and modify the existing design accordingly before the 3D printer begins production. Additionally, since the wrench is not assembled from preexisting parts, it would be a complete entity--unable to break into component parts as there is only one \"part.\" Since the wrench is made by additive manufacturing as opposed to conventional \"subtractive manufacturing\"--taking a block of raw material and removing excess until the finished product remains--the process as a whole is more efficient and less wasteful. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Another major benefit of AM is the fact that complexity is \"free.\" In conventional manufacturing, increasing design complexity entails increased costs. AM allows for complexity to increase independently of cost. By AM's very nature of layer-by-layer additions, one can optimize in advance via 3D software a given engineering component's strength, durability, and other material properties. For example, in the aerospace industry, one typically desires high strength but low weight. Weight savings translate into savings on fuel consumption. Traditional subtractive manufacturing is fundamentally limited in its ability to remove material from the interiors of aerospace components to optimize these conflicting parameters. With AM, however, one can design a part to have ","PeriodicalId":165909,"journal":{"name":"National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133122183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Defeating Global Networks: The need for a Strategic Targeting Organization","authors":"Robert M. Brassaw","doi":"10.21236/ada476635","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21236/ada476635","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract : The National Military Strategy clearly articulates the diverse global threats that face the United States, but the Department of Defense (DOD) has not implemented a process to deal with these adversaries effectively. Current threats involving transnational and nonstate actors operate across the areas of responsibility (AOR) of multiple combatant commands. In order to deal with these threats, there must be a single DOD entity empowered to globally integrate and prioritize targeting. Combatant commanders are assigned a wide range of missions, such as conducting Global Strike, waging the war on terror, supporting counternarcotics operations, and countering weapons proliferation. In some of these mission areas, the combatant commander's geographic boundaries are insufficient to delineate where one commander's responsibilities end and another's begin. Therefore, it is imperative that DOD adapts to cover the seams created where global networks form that can threaten U.S. interests. Current doctrine is insufficient to address these complex networks, which link adversary states, terrorists, narcotics dealers, international criminal organizations, financiers, weapons proliferators, and individual nonstate actors.","PeriodicalId":165909,"journal":{"name":"National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129547542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept","authors":"R. Kugler","doi":"10.21236/ada421905","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21236/ada421905","url":null,"abstract":"Key Points The phrase \"dissuasion of potential adversaries from pursuing threatening military competition and ambitions\" initially appeared in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report as one of four key strategic goals abroad; the other three are assuring allies and friends, deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests, and decisively defeating adversaries who commit aggression. The term also was endorsed in the U.S. National Security Strategy, published in late 2002. Despite this clear articulation, the Bush administration has yet to clarify how the concept will be applied to defense plans and strategy. Dissuasion can be an effective complement to deterrence. It offers a potent concept for handling geopolitical situations in which U.S. relationships with key countries fall short of overt rivalry but can deteriorate if strategic and military competition takes hold. Dissuasion also will have to be integrated into American diplomacy in sensitive regions where the goal is to constrain potential rivals without provoking them into becoming adversaries or forming hostile coalitions. For the Department of Defense, dissuasion requires adaptation of military missions and transformation of capabilities. For example, it underscores the need to keep large U.S. forces in Asia for strategic reasons that go beyond deterring war on the Korean Peninsula. There and elsewhere, it may necessitate adjustments in the U.S. overseas military presence, power-projection capabilities, defense transformation, and alliance military relationships. ********** Some analysts want to downplay dissuasion or set it aside entirely because of its ambiguity. But ignoring this emerging idea would be short sighted. Despite its haziness, the term goes to the heart of new-era geopolitics in several key regions, including Asia. If the United States can learn how to dissuade skillfully, its strategic effectiveness in troubled regions will improve significantly. When the idea of deterrence first appeared 50 years ago, it too was ambiguous. During the Cold War, however, it acquired a role of central importance once it was equipped with a full-fledged strategic theory. The same may hold true for dissuasion in the early 21st century--but only if it too is equipped with the full set of analyses and calculations needed to bring it to life. During the Cold War, the French often used the term dissuasion as synonymous with deterrence. The new U.S. defense strategy, however, employs the term differently in broader ways that reflect its usage in the English language. One dictionary defines dissuasion as the \"act of advising or urging somebody not to do something: e.g., she dissuaded him from leaving home.\" (In this sense, it is an antonym of persuasion, which promotes a course of action.) In strategic terms, dissuasion can be defined as an effort by the United States to convince a country or coalition to refrain from courses of action that would menace our interests and goals or otherwise e","PeriodicalId":165909,"journal":{"name":"National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116660233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Defense White Papers in the Americas: A Comparative Analysis","authors":"J. Cope, L. L. Denny","doi":"10.21236/ada422004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21236/ada422004","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract : In preparation for the October 2000 Defense Ministerial of the Americas (DMA) in Manaus Brazil and at the request of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) studied the global trend toward the creation of Defense White Papers. The study aimed to understand the nature of these documents in order to prepare the U.S. delegation to discuss the tendency in Latin America and the Caribbean during the DMA. The INSS study team found no agreement about what constitutes a 'white paper' other than each is a consensus statement on a topic. The team examined 15 defense documents worldwide and interviewed participants in the development process and independent analysts.","PeriodicalId":165909,"journal":{"name":"National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114846398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"U.S.-Saudi Relations: Rebuilding the Strategic Consensus","authors":"Joseph McMillan","doi":"10.21236/ADA406064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA406064","url":null,"abstract":"Key Points The United States inevitably will look to Saudi Arabia to play a critical role in any effective campaign against global terrorism. For Saudi Arabia to fulfill expectations, the United States must revitalize a strategic relationship that was under serious strain before the attacks on September 11. Managing this relationship has always presented unusual challenges. In particular, the Saudi Kingdom's unique history and status in the Islamic world create risks that close military cooperation with the United States could damage the House of Saud's political and religious legitimacy. These challenges were met in 1990 by a common understanding of the threat, shared strategic objectives, and careful accommodation of each other's sensitivities. However, the factors that made the Desert Storm coalition work have deteriorated, while the political environment has evolved to make military cooperation more difficult. Restoring the relationship will require: addressing grievances that have grown over a decade of American presence in Saudi Arabia; prioritizing what Washington needs from Riyadh; reaching an understanding on the strategic basis of the bilateral relationship and the future of the region; structuring decisions to avoid forcing the Saudi regime to take sides against America; overhauling U.S. military presence in the Kingdom to ensure improved coordination; renewing diplomatic efforts on the Israeli-Palestinian front; and articulating a positive American vision for the region--one that is open to political and economic change. The preponderance of Saudi citizens among the September 11 terrorists and President George Bush's ensuing announcement of a war against global terrorism have again placed the spotlight on the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia. Even before September 11, U.S.-Saudi relations were approaching a crossroads. Despite long odds, America forged a successful military and political coalition with the Saudis during the Gulf war, but over the last several years bilateral ties have been seriously strained. Both sides have been inclined --and for the most part able--to keep these strains hidden from public view, but in the process the United States seems to have lost sight of the unique problems the Saudis face in working with America. As the United States comes to grips with the aftermath of September 11, it is no longer possible to sweep these issues under the rug, as has been illustrated by the very public controversy over use of Prince Sultan Air Base by U.S. forces for operations against the Al Qaeda terrorist network. At one level, the contretemps over the reported Saudi refusal to allow the United States to operate out of Saudi Arabia arose from a front-page story in The New York Times, which stated that a senior Air Force general had been dispatched to run the air war from Prince Sultan Air Base. To judge from subsequent reports, the steps reported in The New York Times were taken without top-level consultation with the S","PeriodicalId":165909,"journal":{"name":"National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies","volume":"95 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125268426","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"East Asia and the Pacific","authors":"James J. Przystup, Ronald N. Montaperto","doi":"10.18356/77d9e638-en","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18356/77d9e638-en","url":null,"abstract":"Overview. The United States has enduring economic, political, and strategic interests in the AsiaPacific region. The region accounts for 25 percent of the global economy and nearly $600 billion in annual two-way trade with the United States. Asia is vital to American prosperity. Politically, over the past two decades, democracy has taken root in and spread across the region. Former authoritarian regimes in the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan have been transformed into vibrant democracies. For over a century, U.S. strategic interests have remained constant: access to the markets of the region, freedom of the seas, promotion of democracy and human rights, and precluding domination of the region by one power or group of powers. While major war in Europe is inconceivable for at least a generation, the prospects for conflict in Asia are far from remote. The region includes some of the world’s largest and most modern armies, nucleararmed major powers, and several nuclear-capable states. Hostilities that could involve the United States could arise at a moment’s notice on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. The Indian subcontinent is also a major flashpoint. In each of these areas, war has the potential for nuclear escalation. At the same time, lingering turmoil in Indonesia, the world’s fourth largest country, threatens stability in Southeast Asia and global markets. China is facing momentous social and economic changes, the consequences of which are not yet clear; meanwhile, Taiwan’s future remains an unresolved and sensitive political issue for China’s leadership. The modernization of China’s conventional and nuclear forces continues to move ahead, while transparency on force structure and budgeting continues to lag behind Western standards. At present, Beijing reluctantly tolerates Asia’s de facto security architecture, the U.S. bilateral alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, which support the U.S. forward-deployed presence. Indonesia is important to U.S. regional interests and military strategy. The largest nation in Southeast Asia, stretching 5,000 miles from east to west, the Indonesian archipelago straddles the critical sea lanes of communication that run from the Persian Gulf to Northeast Asia. The combination of size, location, population, and resources has made Indonesia the center of gravity in Southeast Asia and the acknowledged leader of the subregion. Indonesia’s stability is critical in turn to the stability of Southeast Asia and a matter of vital interest to U.S. allies, Australia, the Philippines, and Japan, as well as to friendly Singapore. This paper will focus on four key areas that require early attention by the Bush administration— East Asia and the Pacific","PeriodicalId":165909,"journal":{"name":"National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131126599","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Protection for Humanitarian Relief Operations","authors":"M. Dziedzic","doi":"10.21236/ada385801","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21236/ada385801","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract : Internal strife over the past decade has often involved the deliberate targeting of civilians for violent attack. A result of the deliberate attacks on civilians is that humanitarian relief workers and their charges increasingly require protection. Effective humanitarian protection will normally require a combined response from military, constabulary (armed police), and police organizations--both indigenous and international. Protecting internally displaced persons is the most daunting challenge because this usually requires military intervention, for which an international mandate is rarely possible and almost never timely enough. In dealing with refugees, the best approach is to maximize reliance on indigenous capabilities, especially police, to minimize the use of foreign military forces, and to tailor international civilian support to the circumstances.","PeriodicalId":165909,"journal":{"name":"National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128333398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Radiological Dispersal Devices. Assessing the Transnational Threat","authors":"James L. C. Ford","doi":"10.21236/ada386044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21236/ada386044","url":null,"abstract":"Conclusions * The Defense Science Board Summer Study report recognizes a \"new and ominous trend--a transnational threat with a proclivity towards much greater levels of violence.\" The report states that transnational groups have both access to, as well as the motivation to use, weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Military and civil defense planners are increasingly concerned about possible state and non-state use of radiological dispersal devices (RDD) against U.S. forces and population centers abroad and at home. * Practically any state or non-state actor can build and detonate RDDs as technological barriers have fallen and radiological materials have become more plentiful. However, weapons design experts contend that the physical threat from these RDDs may be overstated. * The psychological and political effects of RDD use are not well understood and are potentially more significant than the lethality effects of such use. * While RDDs may not be well suited as \"military weapons\" in the classic sense, the use of RDDs could be powerfully coercive and could trigger enormous political reactions within host countries or among allies in a coalition. These reactions could produce major strategic consequences for the military campaign. * With protective and decontamination equipment, and training, U.S. forces should be able to withstand the physical effects of most RDDs. At home, U.S. civil defense planners--including first responders being trained under the Nunn-Lugar-Dominici initiative--must also be prepared to deal with the RDD threat. Radiological Dispersal Devices Defined The Department of Defense (DOD) defines an RDD as, \"any device, including any weapon or equipment, other than a nuclear explosive device, specifically designed to employ radioactive material by disseminating it to cause destruction, damage, or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material.\" Almost any radioactive material can be used to construct an RDD, including fission products, spent fuel from nuclear reactors, and relatively low-level materials, such as medical, industrial and research waste. Weapons grade materials (i.e., highly enriched uranium or plutonium) are not needed although they could be used. An RDD is designed to scatter radioactive debris over a wide area, thereby contaminating it and possibly causing casualties through radiation sickness, as well as denying its use to military forces or others for some period of time. According to a recent DOD report, the RDD threat is threefold: the blast and fragmentation effects from the conventional explosive, the radiation exposure from the radioactive material used, and the fear and panic that its use would spread among the target group or population. This paper examines this threat and differentiates the physical from the psychological--and therefore political--impact on a targeted population. Background The possibility of employing radioactive materials as a weapon was first considered during W","PeriodicalId":165909,"journal":{"name":"National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123966967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Defining Information Power","authors":"D. Kuehl","doi":"10.21236/ada386009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21236/ada386009","url":null,"abstract":"Conclusions * All of the various elements and components of national information power, from Command and Control Warfare (C2W) through Military Information Warfare (IW) to Strategic Information Operations (IO) build upon each other to provide the fullest use of information as an element of national power. * The existing DOD definition of IW is dysfunctional: a better concept is to consider IW as \"those offensive and defensive warfighting actions in or via the information environment to control or exploit it.\" * The existing DOD definition of IO is also dysfunctional: a better concept is to consider IO as \"the range of military and government operations to protect and exploit the information environment.\" * Together they provide national information power, \"the broadest range of military, governmental and civilian information capabilities that enable national-level exploitation and dominance of the information realm.\" Changing Definitions The seemingly endless series of changes in the official DOD definition of information warfare--a different one in each of the three years the School of Information Warfare & Strategy has existed--reflects the lack of conceptual certainty about what IW is and where it fits into the range of elements of national power. The fact that there is no universally-accepted understanding of IW is certainly no surprise, given its newness; for comparison, ask a group of military officers to define \"strategic airpower\" or \"maneuver warfare\" and you'll get a variety of answers, even though these have been exercised for most of this century. The intent of this paper is to suggest an approach that leads to an understanding of not just IW, but how it fits into the full range of national information power. Command and Control Warfare: C2W The Joint Chiefs of Staff published the Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 30 in March 1993, defining and establishing guidelines for Command and Control Warfare, or C2W, which is perhaps best understood as the \"strategy that implements IW on the battlefield.\" This is IWOs basic building block, its foundation in a sense, and it incorporates a range of operations the military understands quite well. The five elements or pillars of C2W are Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Operational Security (OPSEC), Deception, Electronic Warfare (EW), and physical destruction of vital C2 nodes. Because the first three of these have been recognizable elements of warfare since biblical times, the question that immediately comes to mind is \"what\"s new about C2W?\" The answer involves several words, including \"stovepipes,\" \"synergies,\" and \"integration.\" Stovepipe activities have largely been conducted by small and isolated groups of little known and frequently less well-regarded specialists, so there was little coordinated effort to integrate them into a unified whole and build on the synergies between them. This approach forfeited much of the advantage that could have been gained by integrating these operations, such as the","PeriodicalId":165909,"journal":{"name":"National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1997-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130341346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}