{"title":"Joint Information Warfare: An Information-Age Paradigm for Jointness","authors":"D. Kuehl","doi":"10.21236/ADA385599","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Conclusions * Current concepts of \"jointness\" that focus on integrating the operations of DOD's four military Services are too narrow for Information Warfare and Information Operations (IW/IO). * National information power and the broad needs of national security in the dynamics of the information age necessitate a more inclusive understanding of what is meant by \"joint\". * \"Joint IW/IO\" must incorporate the actions and involvement of numerous non-DOD organizations and activities, to include elements of the private sector. Although their actions will not be directed by DOD, active elements in Joint IW/IO must at least coordinate their actions, even if that coordination is informal, in order to be effective. * This concept of \"Joint IW/IO\" should be reflected in DOD policy and military doctrines Jointness and the Information Age The passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 generated a new emphasis on \"jointness\". Current concepts of jointness and joint operations are defined as \"activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of more than one Service [emphasis added] of the same nation participate.\" The blending of the operations and capabilities of the military Services, however, is no longer sufficient for information warfare/information operations (IW/IO) and the needs of national security in the information age. The impacts and implications of the information revolution are so widespread that they necessitate a broader, more inclusive concept incorporating all of the various elements of national information power. The Services and Information Warfare All of the Services are responding in some manner to the challenges of the information age and the imperatives of information warfare. The Marines, while uncertain about the broader theories of IW, are deeply involved in exploring the means by which they can attain \"command dominance\" over their adversaries. While acknowledging and leveraging the recent dramatic technological advances in information and communication systems, the Marines' focus is clearly on the human dimension of conflict, with the objective of maximizing human and operational flexibility instead of relying on technology to minimize friction. The Army, also cautious about the broader theories of IO, has no such qualms about the technological opportunities of the future, and the Army's vision for the next century, incorporated in \"Force XXI\" and based on digitization of the battlefield, is heavily, perhaps critically, dependent on the technologies of the information age. The Army is investigating the means and implications of these concepts and capabilities, and its Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA), located at Fort Belvoir and associated with its Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), is one of the Army's focal points for this effort. Another is its Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) at Fort Monroe, which recently issued the Army's first doctrinal manual in this area, Field Manual (FM) 100-6, \"Information Operations.\" (The exact meaning of \"information operations\" varies according to the user, and while the term is used by DOD, the Army, and the Air Force, it means something different to all three.) The Navy has possibly more personnel engaged in \"nuts and bolts\" IW/IO than any other Service and has (perhaps more than any other Service) for decades practiced some of the elements of Command and Control Warfare (C2W), defined as \"the military strategy that implements information warfare on the battlefield.\" While still exploring the broader ramifications of IO, the Navy is exercising and practicing IW/C2W increasingly in its daily operations. While the Naval Information Warfare Activity (NIWA) at Fort Meade is a geographical reflection of the Navy's long history of cryptology, the Fleet Information Warfare Center (FIWC) at Little Creek Amphibious Base near Norfolk and Atlantic Fleet HQ, and its several branches around the country, are heavily involved in developing and refining concepts for fleet IW/C2W operations. …","PeriodicalId":165909,"journal":{"name":"National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1997-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA385599","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Abstract
Conclusions * Current concepts of "jointness" that focus on integrating the operations of DOD's four military Services are too narrow for Information Warfare and Information Operations (IW/IO). * National information power and the broad needs of national security in the dynamics of the information age necessitate a more inclusive understanding of what is meant by "joint". * "Joint IW/IO" must incorporate the actions and involvement of numerous non-DOD organizations and activities, to include elements of the private sector. Although their actions will not be directed by DOD, active elements in Joint IW/IO must at least coordinate their actions, even if that coordination is informal, in order to be effective. * This concept of "Joint IW/IO" should be reflected in DOD policy and military doctrines Jointness and the Information Age The passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 generated a new emphasis on "jointness". Current concepts of jointness and joint operations are defined as "activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of more than one Service [emphasis added] of the same nation participate." The blending of the operations and capabilities of the military Services, however, is no longer sufficient for information warfare/information operations (IW/IO) and the needs of national security in the information age. The impacts and implications of the information revolution are so widespread that they necessitate a broader, more inclusive concept incorporating all of the various elements of national information power. The Services and Information Warfare All of the Services are responding in some manner to the challenges of the information age and the imperatives of information warfare. The Marines, while uncertain about the broader theories of IW, are deeply involved in exploring the means by which they can attain "command dominance" over their adversaries. While acknowledging and leveraging the recent dramatic technological advances in information and communication systems, the Marines' focus is clearly on the human dimension of conflict, with the objective of maximizing human and operational flexibility instead of relying on technology to minimize friction. The Army, also cautious about the broader theories of IO, has no such qualms about the technological opportunities of the future, and the Army's vision for the next century, incorporated in "Force XXI" and based on digitization of the battlefield, is heavily, perhaps critically, dependent on the technologies of the information age. The Army is investigating the means and implications of these concepts and capabilities, and its Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA), located at Fort Belvoir and associated with its Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), is one of the Army's focal points for this effort. Another is its Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) at Fort Monroe, which recently issued the Army's first doctrinal manual in this area, Field Manual (FM) 100-6, "Information Operations." (The exact meaning of "information operations" varies according to the user, and while the term is used by DOD, the Army, and the Air Force, it means something different to all three.) The Navy has possibly more personnel engaged in "nuts and bolts" IW/IO than any other Service and has (perhaps more than any other Service) for decades practiced some of the elements of Command and Control Warfare (C2W), defined as "the military strategy that implements information warfare on the battlefield." While still exploring the broader ramifications of IO, the Navy is exercising and practicing IW/C2W increasingly in its daily operations. While the Naval Information Warfare Activity (NIWA) at Fort Meade is a geographical reflection of the Navy's long history of cryptology, the Fleet Information Warfare Center (FIWC) at Little Creek Amphibious Base near Norfolk and Atlantic Fleet HQ, and its several branches around the country, are heavily involved in developing and refining concepts for fleet IW/C2W operations. …