{"title":"Distributive justice, best options and organ markets: a reply to Semrau.","authors":"Andreas Albertsen","doi":"10.1136/jme-2024-110561","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1136/jme-2024-110561","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>How important is it, morally speaking, that banning the sale of organs removes the best option available to would-be organ sellers? According to a widespread argument called the best option argument, this is very important. In a recent article I criticised such reasoning, drawing on considerations of distributive justice. Luke Semrau has argued that I have misunderstood the best option argument. In this article, I respond to Semrau's criticism and elaborate on my original argument.</p>","PeriodicalId":16317,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medical Ethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142682033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Autonomy versus exclusion in xenotransplantation trials.","authors":"Richard B Gibson","doi":"10.1136/jme-2024-110438","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1136/jme-2024-110438","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":16317,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medical Ethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142682032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Strengthening harm-theoretic pro-life views.","authors":"Julian I Kanu","doi":"10.1136/jme-2024-110222","DOIUrl":"10.1136/jme-2024-110222","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>A pro-life view can be called harm-theoretic if it claims abortion is impermissible because of the harm caused to the fetus. These positions are important in the abortion discussion because they allow pro-lifers to argue abortion is impermissible without claiming the fetus is a moral person. A major problem with harm-theoretic abortion views is that they fall victim to the contraception reductio. The contraception reductio was originally posed towards the Future like Ours argument for the impermissibility of abortion, but I show it is a problem for harm-theoretic positions in general. I argue that the currently proposed solutions aimed at solving the contraception reductio are unsatisfactory because they commit you to unnecessary controversial metaphysical positions, such as animalism and denying mereological universalism. Then, I give a new solution to the contraception reductio that avoids those metaphysical commitments. The main conclusion is that harm-theoretic views can avoid the contraception reductio by accepting a biological account of the harm of death.</p>","PeriodicalId":16317,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medical Ethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142622317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Johnna Wellesley, Dominic Wilkinson, Bryanna Moore
{"title":"Wish to die trying to live: unwise or incapacitous? The case of University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust versus 'ST'.","authors":"Johnna Wellesley, Dominic Wilkinson, Bryanna Moore","doi":"10.1136/jme-2024-110365","DOIUrl":"10.1136/jme-2024-110365","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The recent legal dispute about medical treatment for a 19-year-old patient, Sudiksha Thirumalesh, (known initially by the Court of Protection as 'ST') in A NHS Trust versus ST & Ors (2023) raised several challenging ethical issues. While Sudiksha's case bears similarities to other high-profile cases in England and Wales, there are key differences. Crucially, Sudiksha herself was part of the disagreement. She was alert, communicative and sought to advocate for herself. Furthermore, this case was framed in the courts as pivoting not on considerations of best interests but on a determination of decisional capacity. Sudiksha was deemed to lack capacity because she did not believe her doctors' view of her prognosis.While the legal questions in the case were central to a recent Court of Appeal decision (which overturned the original finding), in this commentary, we focus on the ethical questions therein. We start by describing Sudiksha's court case and the initial judgment. We then offer an ethical analysis of the relationship between false beliefs, values and the 'capacity' to make decisions, arguing for a need for particular care when judging patients to lack capacity based purely on 'false and fixed beliefs'. After briefly noting the legal basis for the appeal finding, we offer ethical implications for future cases. Although it appears that Sudiksha had decision-making capacity, this did not settle the ethical question of whether health professionals were obliged to continue treatment that they believed to have no prospect of success.</p>","PeriodicalId":16317,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medical Ethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142622376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pregnant women are often not listened to, but pathologising pregnancy isn't the solution.","authors":"Brad Partridge, Taryn Rebecca Knox","doi":"10.1136/jme-2024-109931","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1136/jme-2024-109931","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Smajdor and Rasanen (2024) argue that pregnant women are routinely denied appropriate treatment because pregnancy is seen as normal, and so they are denied 'patient status'. They claim that formally classifying pregnancy as a disease may lead to better treatment for pregnant women. In this response, we argue that pathologising pregnancy and classifying all pregnant women as 'diseased patients' won't reconfigure care in ways that benefit all women. Rather, it will likely only embolden the view that clinicians are entitled to exercise jurisdiction over pregnant women and beget the increased use of medical intervention where it is not necessarily needed.</p>","PeriodicalId":16317,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medical Ethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142605160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How ectogestation can impact the gestational versus moral parenthood debate.","authors":"James J Cordeiro","doi":"10.1136/jme-2024-110416","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1136/jme-2024-110416","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":16317,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medical Ethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142564338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"If not a right to children because of gestation, then not a duty towards them either.","authors":"Timothy F Murphy","doi":"10.1136/jme-2024-110390","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1136/jme-2024-110390","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":16317,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medical Ethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142564348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Acknowledging the dual-interest gestationalist approach.","authors":"Teresa Baron","doi":"10.1136/jme-2024-110372","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1136/jme-2024-110372","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":16317,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medical Ethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142558055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Case against compulsory vaccination: the failed arguments from risk imposition, tax evasion, 'social liberty', and the priority of life.","authors":"Uwe Steinhoff","doi":"10.1136/jme-2024-110236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1136/jme-2024-110236","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Arguments for mandatory or compulsory vaccination must justify the coercive infringement of bodily integrity via the injection of chemicals that permanently affect a body's inner constitution. Four arguments are considered. The allegedly libertarian argument declares unvaccinated persons a threat; accordingly, vaccination could take the form of justifiable defence of self and others. This argument conflates material and statistical threats. The harsh coercive measures permissible in defence against the former are not permissible in prevention of the latter. The argument from tax evasion claims that people can be permissibly coerced into bearing their fair financial burdens of community life and likens this to sharing burdens in the face of a viral threat. The argument fails to demonstrate that vaccination would be fair, permissible in spite of potential lethal side-effects, and sufficiently similar to taxation despite the categorical difference between temporary deprivation of money and permanent deprivation of one's original inner bodily constitution. The argument from 'social liberty' claims that the loss of freedom due to mandatory vaccination is only apparent, namely outweighed by corresponding gains in freedom. This argument conflates freedom as the absence of coercion with freedom as the presence of options for action. It fails to give the former its due weight and to demonstrate that persons may be coerced into increasing the options of others. The argument from the priority of life elevates the protection of life to an absolute value. This is unwarranted and leads to counterintuitive implications. Without better arguments, mandatory vaccination must be rejected.</p>","PeriodicalId":16317,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medical Ethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142545945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"(Un)equal treatment in the 'tobacco-free generation'.","authors":"Johannes Kniess","doi":"10.1136/jme-2024-110209","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1136/jme-2024-110209","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The idea of a 'tobacco-free generation' promises to make smoking a thing of the past by making cigarettes unavailable to birth cohorts in the future. If implemented, such a generational ban would lead to a society in which some individuals are allowed the freedom to smoke while others are not. This paper examines the ethical significance of this fact through the lens of 'relational egalitarianism', an approach to social justice that emphasises equal and respectful social relationships. It explores various dimensions in which a society can fail to live up to the idea of equal status, such as the denial of moral agency, discrimination, stigmatisation, the unequal recognition of interests and violations of political equality. While acknowledging the complexity of practical and ethical challenges, the paper maintains that the generational ban need not violate egalitarian commitments.</p>","PeriodicalId":16317,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medical Ethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142545943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}