{"title":"A perceptual cue-based mechanism for automatic assignment of thematic agent and patient roles.","authors":"Sofie Vettori, Catherine Odin, Jean-Rémy Hochmann, Liuba Papeo","doi":"10.1037/xge0001657","DOIUrl":"10.1037/xge0001657","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Understanding social events requires assigning the participating entities to roles such as agent and patient, a mental operation that is reportedly effortless. We investigated whether, in processing visual scenes, role assignment is accomplished automatically (i.e., when the task does not require it), based on visuospatial information, without requiring semantic or linguistic encoding of the stimuli. Human adults saw a series of images featuring the same male and female actors next to each other, one in an agentlike (more dynamic/leaning forward) and the other in a patientlike (static/less dynamic) posture. Participants indicated the side (left/right) of a target actor (i.e., the woman). From trial to trial, body postures changed, but the roles, defined by the type of posture, sometimes changed, sometimes not. We predicted that if participants spontaneously saw the actors as agent and patient, they should be slower to respond when roles switched from trial <i>n</i>-1 to trial <i>n</i>, than when they stayed the same (role switch cost). Results confirmed this hypothesis (Experiments 1-3). A role switch cost was also found when roles were defined by another visual relational cue, the relative positioning (where one actor stands relative to another), but not when actors were presented in isolation (Experiments 4-6). These findings reveal a mechanism for automatic role assignment based on encoding of visual relational information in social (multiple-person) scenes. Since we found that roles in one trial affected the processing of the subsequent trial despite variations in postures and spatial relations, this mechanism must be one that assigns entities in a scene, to the <i>abstract</i> categories of agent and patient. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":" ","pages":"787-798"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142818182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The \"plus polar self\": A reinterpretation of the self-prioritization effect as a polarity correspondence effect.","authors":"Marcel Pauly, Dirk Wentura","doi":"10.1037/xge0001713","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001713","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>We suggest that the polarity correspondence principle (PCP; Proctor & Cho, 2006) can explain the self-prioritization effect (SPE), that is, that matching responses for self-labels and self-assigned shapes are faster than matching responses for other labels and other-assigned shapes. According to PCP, one can argue that self-label, self-shape, and the \"yes, match\" responses are all + polar (hence full correspondence is given), whereas other label and other shape are both-polar, which does not correspond to the + polarity of the \"yes\" response. Our argument is based on a structural analogy of the self-matching task with an experiment by Seymour (1969)-a pillar of the PCP-who conducted an experiment where participants determined if the location of a dot (above or below a rectangle) matched the word (\"above\" or \"below\") presented within the rectangle. Faster reactions occurred in above-above matching trials than in below-below or nonmatching trials. We replicated this finding (Experiment 1A) and showed the close analogy to the self-matching task by replicating the SPE with a single \"other\" category. In Experiment 2, we showed that the SPE disappears if participants are instructed to respond with \"no\" to matches. Experiment 3 replicated Experiment 2 with two instead of one \"other\" category (which is more common in SPE research). Again, the SPE in the \"yes\" condition significantly exceeded the one in the \"no\" condition. However, the latter SPE was still significant, suggesting that part of the SPE might be due to the PCP, but a small self-related effect remains. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"154 3","pages":"672-685"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143364680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Individual differences in the dynamics of attention control.","authors":"Nash Unsworth, Ashley L Miller","doi":"10.1037/xge0001695","DOIUrl":"10.1037/xge0001695","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Individual differences in the dynamics of attention control were examined in two studies. Participants performed mouse tracker versions of Stroop (Studies 1 and 2) and flankers (Study 2), along with additional measures of attention control and working memory to better examine individual differences in how conflict resolution processes unfold over time. Attention control abilities were related to the amount of attraction to the incorrect response and the time to move toward the correct response on incongruent trials in the Stroop task. In the flanker task, attention control abilities were not related to the amount of attraction to the incorrect response but were related to the time to move toward the correct response on incongruent trials. Mouse tracker measures in both Stroop and flankers demonstrated acceptable psychometric properties and tended to load moderately on an attention control factor along with other attention control tasks. These results are consistent with the notion that conflict resolution processes in Stroop and flankers likely reflect both overlapping and distinct (i.e., restraining and constraining attention) processes that are related to broader attention control abilities. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":" ","pages":"829-851"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142818239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Psychological mechanisms underlying the biased interpretation of numerical scientific evidence.","authors":"Clint McKenna, David Dunning","doi":"10.1037/xge0001704","DOIUrl":"10.1037/xge0001704","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Do people use their statistical expertise selectively to reach preferred conclusions when evaluating scientific evidence, with those more expert showing more preferential bias? We investigated this motivated numeracy account of evidence evaluation but came to a different account for biased evaluation. Across three studies (<i>N</i> = 2,799), participants interpreted numerical data from gun control intervention studies. In Studies 1 and 2, participants reached accurate conclusions more frequently from scientific data when those data aligned with their political preferences than when they did not, an attitude congeniality effect. This bias was unrelated to numerical ability (i.e., numeracy) and cognitive effort, although each variable predicted correct reasoning independently. Probing further, we found that attitude congeniality did not prompt people to discover valid statistical rationales for their more frequent correct conclusions. Rather, people came to right conclusions more often but for wrong reasons, suggesting why numerical ability need not be related to the congeniality effect. In Study 2, we showed this pattern was not due to forced guessing. In Study 3, we showed that the rationales, whether right or wrong, carried some weight over multiple scenarios, indicating that participants were not just expressive responding-that is, simply stating preferred conclusion regardless of the data. Statistical training did not reduce attitude congeniality biases. We suggest that people engage in \"expressive rationalization\" rather than \"rationality\" to reach preferred conclusions, finding convenient rationales for preferred conclusions that need not be valid, even though they can lead to conclusions that are. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":" ","pages":"686-710"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142828767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yeray Mera, Ariana Modirrousta-Galian, Gemma Thomas, Philip A Higham, Tina Seabrooke
{"title":"Erring on the side of caution: Two failures to replicate the derring effect.","authors":"Yeray Mera, Ariana Modirrousta-Galian, Gemma Thomas, Philip A Higham, Tina Seabrooke","doi":"10.1037/xge0001707","DOIUrl":"10.1037/xge0001707","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>It has been claimed that deliberately making errors while studying, even when the correct answers are provided, can enhance memory for the correct answers, a phenomenon termed the derring effect. Such deliberate erring has been shown to outperform other learning techniques, including copying and underlining, elaborative studying with concept mapping, and synonym generation. To date, however, the derring effect has only been demonstrated by a single group of researchers and in a single population of participants. This article presents two independent, preregistered replication attempts of the derring effect. In Experiment 1, participants studied 36 term-definition concepts in a within-subjects, laboratory study. On error-correction trials, participants were presented with a term-definition concept and were asked to generate an incorrect definition before correcting it. Error-correction trials were compared with copy trials, where participants simply copied the term-definition concepts and underlined the key concepts. Experiment 2 was an online study in which participants studied trivia facts using a similar protocol. Memory for the studied facts was then tested either immediately (Experiments 1 and 2) or after 2 days (Experiment 1). Unlike the original demonstrations of the derring effect, cued-recall performance did not significantly differ between the error-correction and copy conditions, and the Bayes factors provided moderate support for the null hypothesis in both experiments. We discuss potential explanations for our findings and consider them in relation to key theories and the broader literature on the role of errors in learning. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":" ","pages":"658-671"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142971010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Anthony Yacovone, Briony Waite, Tatyana Levari, Jesse Snedeker
{"title":"Let them eat ceke: An electrophysiological study of form-based prediction in rich naturalistic contexts.","authors":"Anthony Yacovone, Briony Waite, Tatyana Levari, Jesse Snedeker","doi":"10.1037/xge0001677","DOIUrl":"10.1037/xge0001677","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>It is well-established that people make predictions during language comprehension--the nature and specificity of these predictions, however, remain unclear. For example, do comprehenders routinely make predictions about which words (and phonological forms) might come next in a conversation, or do they simply make broad predictions about the gist of the unfolding context? Prior EEG studies using tightly controlled experimental designs have shown that form-based prediction can occur during comprehension, as N400s to unexpected words are reduced when they resemble the form of a predicted word (e.g., <i>ceke</i> when expecting cake). One limitation, however, is that these studies often create environments that are optimal for eliciting form-based prediction (e.g., highly constraining sentences, slower-than-natural rates of presentation). Thus, questions remain about whether form-based prediction can occur in settings that more closely resemble everyday comprehension. To address this, the present study explores form-based prediction during naturalistic spoken language comprehension. English-speaking adults listened to a story in which some of the words had been altered. Specifically, we experimentally manipulated whether participants heard the original word from the story (<i>cake</i>), a form-similar nonword (<i>ceke</i>), or a less-similar nonword (<i>vake</i>). Half of the target words were predictable given their context, and the other half were unpredictable. Consistent with the prior work, we found reduced N400s for form-similar nonwords (<i>ceke</i>) relative to less-similar nonwords (<i>vake</i>)-but only in predictable contexts. This study demonstrates that form-based prediction can emerge in naturalistic contexts, and therefore, it is likely to be a common aspect of language comprehension in the wild. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":" ","pages":"711-738"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11802317/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142828712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yi-Fei Hu, Joseph Heffner, Apoorva Bhandari, Oriel FeldmanHall
{"title":"Goals bias face perception.","authors":"Yi-Fei Hu, Joseph Heffner, Apoorva Bhandari, Oriel FeldmanHall","doi":"10.1037/xge0001717","DOIUrl":"10.1037/xge0001717","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Faces-the most common and complex stimuli in our daily lives-contain multidimensional information used to infer social attributes that guide consequential behaviors, such as deciding who to trust. Decades of research illustrates that perceptual information from faces is processed holistically. An open question, however, is whether goals might impact this perceptual process, influencing the encoding and representation of the complex social information embedded in faces. If an individual were able to factorize information so that each dimension is separately represented, it might enable flexibility. Having a goal, for example, might mean that only goal-relevant dimensions are leveraged to inform behavior. Whether people are able to build such factorized representations remains unknown, largely due to natural correlations between social attributes. We overcome these confounds using a new statistical face model that orthogonalizes perceived facial attractiveness and trustworthiness. Across three experiments (<i>N</i> = 249), we observe that only in some contexts can humans successfully factorize multidimensional social information. When there is a clear goal of assessing another's trustworthiness, people successfully decompose these social attributes. The more an individual factorizes, the more they entrust money to others in a subsequent trust game. However, when the goal is to assess attractiveness, irrelevant information about trustworthiness is so potent that it biases how attractive someone is perceived-a trustworthiness \"halo effect.\" In contrast, in goal-agnostic environments, we do not find any evidence of factorization; instead, people encode multidimensional social information in an entwined and holistic fashion that distorts their perceptions of social attributes. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":" ","pages":"644-657"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142971014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Heida Maria Sigurdardottir, Inga María Ólafsdóttir
{"title":"Objects, faces, and spaces: Organizational principles of visual object perception as evidenced by individual differences in behavior.","authors":"Heida Maria Sigurdardottir, Inga María Ólafsdóttir","doi":"10.1037/xge0001688","DOIUrl":"10.1037/xge0001688","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>What are the diagnostic dimensions on which objects differ visually? We constructed a two-dimensional object space based on such attributes captured by a deep convolutional neural network. These attributes can be approximated as stubby/spiky and animate-/inanimate-looking. If object space contributes to human visual cognition, this should have a measurable effect on object discrimination abilities. We administered an object foraging task to a large, diverse sample (<i>N</i> = 511). We focused on the stubby animate-looking \"face quadrant\" of object space given known variations in face discrimination abilities. Stimuli were picked out of tens of thousands of images to either match or not match with the coordinates of faces in object space. Results show that individual differences in face perception can to a large part be explained by variability in general object perception abilities (o-factor). However, additional variability in face processing can be attributed to visual similarity with faces as captured by dimensions of object space; people who struggle with telling apart faces also have difficulties with discriminating other objects with the same object space attributes. This study is consistent with a contribution of object space to human visual cognition. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":" ","pages":"607-623"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142686989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Partitioned prosociality: Why giving a large donation bit by bit makes people seem more committed to social causes.","authors":"Rebecca L Schaumberg, Stephanie C Lin","doi":"10.1037/xge0001705","DOIUrl":"10.1037/xge0001705","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Donating money to worthy social causes is one of the most impactful and efficient forms of altruism, but skepticism often clouds perceptions of donors' motives for giving. We propose a solution that reduces this skepticism: Instead of giving a single large donation, donors can partition their donations into multiple, smaller ones. Ten preregistered studies with 3,816 participants supported this idea. The positive effect of partitioned giving was robust to the number and size of the partitions and the method of displaying the partitions. Moreover, this effect emerged when the actual effort to give in partitions was held constant and donors precommitted to giving in partitions. The effect arose because the number of donations seems to act as a heuristic, signaling that the donor has more frequent impulses to give and a greater desire to be connected to the social cause. Accordingly, the effect was enhanced when donors gave on nonconsecutive days rather than consecutive days and diminished when they gave their multiple donations on a single day compared with on different days. This effect emerged across both joint and separate evaluations of partitioned versus lump-sum giving, indicating that people think donors who give in partitions should be judged more positively than those who give in one lump sum. Overall, this work shows that how donors structure their donations affects judgments of their motives for giving, thereby providing new insights into how people evaluate prosocial behavior. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":" ","pages":"739-758"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142828747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Is personal identity intransitive?","authors":"Julian De Freitas, Lance J Rips","doi":"10.1037/xge0001711","DOIUrl":"10.1037/xge0001711","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>There has been a call for a potentially revolutionary change to our existing understanding of the psychological concept of personal identity. Apparently, people can psychologically represent people, including themselves, as multiple individuals at the same time. Here, we ask whether the intransitive <i>judgments</i> found in these studies truly reflect the operation of an intransitive <i>concept</i> of personal identity. We manipulate several factors that arbitrate between transitivity and intransitivity and find most support for transitivity: In contrast to the prior work, most participants do not make intransitive judgments when there is any reason to favor one individual over another. People change which single individual they personally identify with, depending on which individual competes more strongly or weakly for identity, rather than identifying with both individuals. Even when two individuals are identical and therefore both entitled to be the same person, we find that people make more transitive judgments once they understand the practical commitments of their responses (Experiment 4) and report not being able to actually imagine two perspectives simultaneously when reasoning about the scenario (Experiment 5). In short, we suggest that while people may make intransitive judgments, these do not reflect that they psychologically represent identity in an intransitive manner. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":" ","pages":"775-786"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142818241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}