ERN: Formal & Relational Contracts Between Firms (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"State-Business Relations and Access to External Financing: Evidence from Russia","authors":"Andrey Tkachenko","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3789573","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3789573","url":null,"abstract":"Contractual relations of firms with a state may give lenders a positive signal and facilitate access to debt. This paper studies the impact of public procurement contract on firms access to debt using an extensive survey of Russian manufacturing firms combined with accounting and procurement data. It shows that earnings from state-to-business contracts increase the short-term debt twice larger than revenue from private contracts. The long-term debt is not affected by public contracts differently compared to private contracts. The debt sensitivity to public contracts is four times larger for politically connected firms, though it is still positive and significant for non-connected firms. The paper concludes that political connection does not entirely suppress the beneficial access to debt the public contracts create.","PeriodicalId":152605,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Formal & Relational Contracts Between Firms (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126441807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Strategy and the Hybrid Structure of Ecosystems","authors":"L. Pietrewicz","doi":"10.29119/1641-3466.2020.149.40","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29119/1641-3466.2020.149.40","url":null,"abstract":"Purpose: Despite the recent surge of interest in the concept of business ecosystem its nature remains poorly understood, with various conceptualizations developed in separate streams of literature. The aim of the paper is to develop an integrated perspective on ecosystems that would help managers better understand changing organizational landscape and inform strategic decision making.<br><br>Design/methodology/approach: The paper is built on a narrative conflict between the conceptualizations of business ecosystem as either firm environment or governance structure, and on discrepancy in treatment of coordination and other strategic interactions. We first map out the conceptual landscape of the topic, comparing ecosystems with alternative arrangements (industries, and markets and hierarchies, respectively). Then we introduce and apply the concept of strategic interactions as a novel theoretical perspective to design an integrated framework of business ecosystems. <br><br>Findings: Firm-level strategic interactions (competition, cooperation and coordination) taking place in the ecosystem (viewed as a form of environment) can and should get into strategic interactions with ecosystem-level coordination mechanisms (ecosystem as a governance structure), affecting on the one hand competitiveness of individual members of the ecosystem and the whole structure, and, on the other, boundaries of the ecosystem. <br><br>Research limitations/implications: Propositions concerning the interface between firm-level strategic interactions and ecosystem-level governance open up new lines of inquiry for management and organizational scholars and computer scientists, and invite their cooperation, e.g. in algorithmic governance. <br><br>Practical implications: Richer understanding of the nature of ecosystems helps managers make better informed strategic decisions concerning the nature of relations with other organizations. <br><br>Originality/value: The paper presents new theoretical arguments on the hybrid nature of ecosystems. It emphasizes an increased role of coordination in strategy and ecosystem development and calls for its wider coverage by strategy scholars.","PeriodicalId":152605,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Formal & Relational Contracts Between Firms (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126394788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Debt Contracting on Management","authors":"Brian W. Akins, David De Angelis, M. Gaulin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2757508","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2757508","url":null,"abstract":"This paper shows that lenders can influence firms’ governance outside of payment and technical default states by exerting ex-ante control over managerial turnover via retention and selection decisions. Examining private loan agreements, we find 8.5% of firms have change of management restriction (CMR) clauses. CEO turnover analysis suggests CMRs are binding. We find lenders include CMRs to mitigate human capital risk and creditor-shareholder conflicts of interest. CMRs provide a way to contract on soft information and retain management with creditor-friendly style. Finally, CMRs are associated with lower yields, indicating they are in place to protect lenders, not to entrench management.","PeriodicalId":152605,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Formal & Relational Contracts Between Firms (Topic)","volume":"117 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133844126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Reciprocity Game","authors":"Linfeng Chen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3320944","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3320944","url":null,"abstract":"This paper shows that reciprocity comes from the desire to cooperate in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game. Before playing the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game, players choose the reciprocity level and commit to it, and the reciprocity level is public information. There are T equilibria if the prisoner's dilemma game is repeated for T periods, and each equilibrium is associated with different levels of cooperation. Further, if players choose their reciprocity levels sequentially, then the most cooperative equilibrium will be the unique equilibrium. However, reciprocity does not matter for the one-period game and the infinitely repeated game.","PeriodicalId":152605,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Formal & Relational Contracts Between Firms (Topic)","volume":"15 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120903383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Effort and Compensation in Relational Contracts","authors":"Desmond Lo, Heikki Rantakari","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3113510","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3113510","url":null,"abstract":"To generate downstream sales, manufacturers often spend both effort and compensation when working with their dealers. Existing theories are inconclusive about the interdependent role of the two kinds of instruments in motivating dealer effort; that is, whether they are substitutes or complements. There is little empirical evidence to inform their relations either. We first examine the conditions that determine the interdependencies among monetary compensation – both formal and informal – and manufacturer effort in a game-theoretical framework. We show that monetary compensation and manufacturer effort are complementary instruments in motivating dealer effort if the manufacturer’s effort is primarily about monitoring. They become substitutes when the manufacturer’s effort is primarily productive and thus provides indirect compensation. We then empirically illustrate some of these novel predictions in the distribution channel of the leading manufacturer of a computer accessory and its sixty dealerships in China. In particular, evidence from company archival and survey data shows complementarity between informal compensation and manufacturer effort in motivating dealer effort. This result appears to hold only when the dealers are situated in highly relational contexts. Theoretical and managerial implications are drawn from our analyses.","PeriodicalId":152605,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Formal & Relational Contracts Between Firms (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128388760","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Pluralistic Perspective to Overcome Major Blind Spots in Research on Interorganizational Relationships","authors":"Fabrice Lumineau, Nuno Oliveira","doi":"10.5465/ANNALS.2016.0033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5465/ANNALS.2016.0033","url":null,"abstract":"Interorganizational relationships have attracted much scholarly attention in the last two decades. Despite the significant advances made in this field, the literature still largely relies on assumptions that overlook core features of interorganizational relationships. We build on the organizational research on pluralism to evaluate and identify opportunities to extend the literature on interorganizational relationships. Drawing on a synthesis of the last 20 years of research (1996–2016) on interorganizational relationships, we discuss four major “blind spots” concerning (1) the assumption of symmetry between parties or the focal party’s perception is taken to reflect the whole relationship (single-party focus), (2) the assumption of uniform relationships between parties (single-valence focus), (3) the assumption of an interorganizational phenomenon within one level of analysis (single-level focus), and (4) the assumption of universal time (focus on a single conceptualization of time). Through an analysis of exemplary studies, we discuss how and when overcoming each of these blind spots provides novel insights to revisit theoretical mechanisms concerning the functioning of interorganizational relationships. We also identify a coherent set of strategies to address each blind spot. We advance the literature by articulating a pluralistic perspective to guide future research into core questions about interorganizational relationships.","PeriodicalId":152605,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Formal & Relational Contracts Between Firms (Topic)","volume":"1036 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116267816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Teaching an Old Dog a New Trick: Reserve Price and Unverifiable Quality in Repeated Procurement","authors":"G. Albano, B. Cesi, A. Iozzi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3057659","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3057659","url":null,"abstract":"In procurement markets, unverifiable quality provision may be obtained either by direct negotiation or by competitive processes which discriminate firms on the basis of their past performance. However, discrimination is not allowed in many institutional contexts. We show that a non-discriminatory competitive process with a reserve price may allow the buyer to yield an efficient allocation of the contract and to implement the level of quality desired by the buyer. Quality enforcement arises out of a relational contract whereby the buyer threatens to set a `low' reserve price in future competitive tendering processes if any contractor fails to provide the required quality. We study an infinitely repeated procurement model with many firms and one buyer imperfectly informed on the firms' cost, in which, in each period, the buyer runs a standard low-price auction with reserve price. We study the cases of players using grim trigger strategies, analysing both the case of a committed and uncommitted buyer. We find that a competitive process with reserve price is able to elicit the desired level of unverifiable quality provided that the buyer's valuation of the project is not too high and the value of quality is not too low; under these conditions, the buyer can credibly threaten the firms to set, in case a contractor fails to deliver the required quality level, a reserve price so low that no firm is willing to participate to the tender. A committed buyer can elicit the desired quality level for a wider range of preference parameters.","PeriodicalId":152605,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Formal & Relational Contracts Between Firms (Topic)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127471816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Human Resource Outsourcing: Threat or Opportunity?","authors":"V. Rao","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2912846","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2912846","url":null,"abstract":"Outsourcing is the name of the game in 21st century. Companies that want to be lean and competitive, need to aggressively pursue outsourcing. The flight of key functions to low-cost nations has happened in a big way in the past and is going to continue in future also. Like a coin has two sides, Outsourcing can prove to be a pain in the neck if not addressed properly It can be a game changing strategy for companies that are on the move. It may prove to be suicidal for companies that are unable to address key challenges posed by outsourcing - when pursued in an aggressive manner.","PeriodicalId":152605,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Formal & Relational Contracts Between Firms (Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116764512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"An Empirical Analysis of Self-Enforcement Mechanisms: Evidence from Hotel Franchising","authors":"R. Kosová, Giorgo Sertsios","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2777535","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2777535","url":null,"abstract":"The relational contracts literature suggests that a principal can improve contract self-enforceability by specifying initial requirements that increase the agent’s ex post rents. Initial requirements specified in hotel franchise agreements—size and quality tier of the hotel—offer a unique empirical setting to test this. Using proprietary data on 5,547 new franchised hotels and their revenues, we find that hotels far away from their franchisor’s headquarters are larger, more likely to belong to a high quality tier, and generate higher revenues ex post. This supports the idea that the agent’s ex post rents can serve as a substitute to the principal’s monitoring intensity in the mitigation of agency problems. Our findings shed light on how formal contract terms can influence informal (relational) contracts between business partners. This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.","PeriodicalId":152605,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Formal & Relational Contracts Between Firms (Topic)","volume":"459 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115544533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Systematic Literature Review on Relational Properties in Business-to-Business","authors":"Miika Kumpulainen, M. Seppänen, A. Suominen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2818921","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2818921","url":null,"abstract":"This paper conducts a systematic literature review and reports the result in details. The focus is on the transaction cost economics and how TCE manifests in the literature when addressing the relational properties in the business-to-business context. Starting from 1196 journal papers, the initial set includes 203 papers fulfilling the inclusion criterion, of which 10 journal papers address the TCE theory. The ATLAS.ti software tool is used in qualitative data. The findings show strong marketing literature presence when the inclusion criterion needs that the relational properties and behavior are addressed in the business-to-business context. Interestingly, TCE appearance is such low however its well-recognized status as one of the main paradigms. The further research may deepen the synthesis on the relational properties and their effect on the business performance.","PeriodicalId":152605,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Formal & Relational Contracts Between Firms (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126903587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}