ERN: Formal & Relational Contracts Between Firms (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Determining Which Orders to Outsource in the Vehicle Routing Problem with Order Outsourcing","authors":"Sybren Huijink, G. Kant, R. Peeters","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2673523","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2673523","url":null,"abstract":"In practice, many package transportation companies lower their costs by hiring outside carriers to serve orders that cannot be served efficiently by their own trucks. The problem which takes the order outsource option into account is the Vehicle Routing Problem with Private Fleet and Common Carrier. In this variant of the Vehicle Routing Problem, orders are either delivered by an outside carrier, the common carrier, which receives an order specific fee or by the own fleet, the private fleet, such that the total costs, which is the sum of the outside carrier costs and the delivery costs of the own fleet, is minimized. This paper analyses and compares several methods that estimate which orders to outsource. Additionally, a comparison is presented on VRP instances, which is, to the best of our knowledge, the first time that this is done. We present a new estimation method which outsourcing decision leads to the lowest costs and it leads to a better estimation of the VRP costs.","PeriodicalId":152605,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Formal & Relational Contracts Between Firms (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128481906","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Long-Term Contracting: The Role of Private Information in Dynamic Supply Risk Management","authors":"Long Gao","doi":"10.1111/POMS.12347","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/POMS.12347","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the critical role of evolving private information in managing supply risk. The problem features a dyadic channel where a dominant buyer operates a multiperiod inventory system with lost sales and fixed cost. He replenishes from a supplier, whose private state of production is vulnerable to random shocks and evolves dynamically over time. We characterize the optimal inventory policy with a simple semi-stationary structure; it distorts order quantity for limiting information rent only in the initial period; the optimal payment compensates for production cost in every period but concedes real information rent only in the initial period. These properties allow us to derive an easy-to-implement revenue sharing contract that facilitates ex ante strategic planning and ex post dynamic execution. The work advances our understanding on when and how to use private information in dynamic risk management.","PeriodicalId":152605,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Formal & Relational Contracts Between Firms (Topic)","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133751067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Geography of Contract in the Global Financial Services Industry","authors":"G. Clark, Ashby H. B. Monk","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2179107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2179107","url":null,"abstract":"Contract is crucial for governing the relationships between asset owners and the many types of agents that underpin the production of financial services. In this paper, we distinguish between discrete contracts for financial services and asset management contracts that are better described as relational in the sense that they are open-ended and subject to renegotiation between the parties. Emphasis is placed upon the significance of risk and uncertainty in financial markets and the ways in which the parties to contracts adapt to these conditions. This provides the backdrop for understanding three different types of contractual arrangements apparent in the investment management industry, bringing to the fore the significance of the choice-of-jurisdiction when writing contracts for investment services. We explain how and why the UK is a favoured destination for European institutions just as offshore jurisdictions, such as the Cayman Islands may be the favoured ‘home’ jurisdictions for certain types of UK and global investment managers. Arguably, at the heart of the relationship between asset owners and asset managers is a fundamental choice: between discrete contracts for services that promise certainty of costs and benefits and relational contracts which provide mechanisms for coping with financial risk and uncertainty. At issue is the market power of asset owners and asset managers in determining which type of contract is chosen and which jurisdiction is the favoured location for formalising these relationships.","PeriodicalId":152605,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Formal & Relational Contracts Between Firms (Topic)","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131806757","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Universal Banking and Equity Risk Premium","authors":"S. Banerji, P. Basu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1634661","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1634661","url":null,"abstract":"Did the unification of commercial and investment banking heighten risk in financial markets due to moral hazard of borrowers? In a simple intertemporal model with moral hazard and uninsured risk, we argue that if financial contracts are properly written, the integration in financial markets could give rise to greater risk sharing arrangement and could eliminate the equity risk premium attributed to informational asymmetry among the lenders and the borrowers.","PeriodicalId":152605,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Formal & Relational Contracts Between Firms (Topic)","volume":"244 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123013589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Towards Sustainable Offshore Outsourcing: A Case Study of Quebec Manufacturing Firms Outsourcing to China","authors":"M. Mohiuddin, Zhan Su, Albert Su","doi":"10.7835/JCC-BERJ-2010-0040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7835/JCC-BERJ-2010-0040","url":null,"abstract":"The offshore-outsourcing choice is viewed as a source of factory closures and job losses in many developed countries including Canada. The current exploratory paper using qualitative case study methods presents experiences from four Canadian companies based in the province of Quebec. It shows that offshore outsourcing is an important business strategy that can create overall firm-level competitiveness through the generation of more revenues, higher profits, better customer satisfaction, and increased investments in R&D and core competency development.","PeriodicalId":152605,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Formal & Relational Contracts Between Firms (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117185711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Relazioni di Canale e Strategie di Acquisto delle Imprese Commerciali. Potere e Stabilità nella Grande Distribuzione Britannica (Channel Relationships and Buying Strategies of Large Retailers)","authors":"F. Musso","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2543162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2543162","url":null,"abstract":"Italian Abstract: Questo lavoro mette in luce le modalita con cui si svolgono i rapporti fra le imprese della grande distribuzione e le varie tipologie di fornitori, che si differenziano al variare della dimensione e della struttura competitiva del mercato di appartenenza. L’esempio delle grandi imprese commerciali britanniche, che nonostante l’elevato potere contrattuale non attivano comportamenti opportunistici ma, anzi, sfruttano tale potere per costruire relazioni improntate alla cooperazione nel lungo periodo, mostra quanto importante sia lo sviluppo di una nuova cultura nei rapporti verticali. In questo, la gestione delle attivita di approvvigionamento dell’impresa commerciale risulta un momento chiave. L’adozione di scelte strategiche e strutturali nell’ambito della funzione acquisti in coordinamento con le altre funzioni aziendali, permette infatti di soddisfare due esigenze: quella di differenziare le relazioni in base ai diversi fornitori senza pero modificare l’orientamento di base alla stabilita e alla collaborazione, e quella di massimizzare i benefici dell’interazione verticale, favorendo la continuita fra le attivita di interfaccia a monte (marketing di acquisto) con quelle a valle (marketing di vendita), attraverso il rafforzamento dei collegamenti fra i due momenti decisionali. English Abstract: This work highlights the ways in which relationships between large retailers and suppliers develop themselves depending on various types of suppliers. Suppliers differentiate among each other on the basis of size, the competitive structure of the market to which they belong. The case of British large retailers is analysed. These retailers, despite their high bargaining power, do not turn on opportunistic behavior, but rather, they use this power to build relationships based on cooperation in the long run. This demonstrates how important is the development of a new culture in vertical relationships. In this culture, the management of procurement activities is a key moment. The adoption of strategic choices and structural framework of the purchasing function in coordination with other corporate functions, makes it possible to satisfy two requirements: to differentiate relationships according to different types of providers, without changing the basic orientation to the stability and collaboration, and the maximization of benefits from the vertical interaction.","PeriodicalId":152605,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Formal & Relational Contracts Between Firms (Topic)","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126266219","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}