全能银行和股票风险溢价

ERN: Formal & Relational Contracts Between Firms (Topic) Pub Date : 2010-07-04 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.1634661

S. Banerji, P. Basu

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引用次数: 7

摘要

商业银行和投资银行的统一是否因借款人的道德风险而增加了金融市场的风险?在一个包含道德风险和未保险风险的简单跨期模型中，我们认为，如果金融合约写得恰当，金融市场的一体化可以产生更大的风险分担安排，并可以消除贷款人和借款人之间由于信息不对称而产生的股权风险溢价。

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Universal Banking and Equity Risk Premium

Did the unification of commercial and investment banking heighten risk in financial markets due to moral hazard of borrowers? In a simple intertemporal model with moral hazard and uninsured risk, we argue that if financial contracts are properly written, the integration in financial markets could give rise to greater risk sharing arrangement and could eliminate the equity risk premium attributed to informational asymmetry among the lenders and the borrowers.

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ERN: Formal & Relational Contracts Between Firms (Topic)

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