{"title":"Industry equilibrium with sustaining and disruptive technology","authors":"Xiao Huang, Greys Sošić","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807473","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807473","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers a special type of technology evolution, referred to in the literature as disruptive technology vs. sustaining technology. In general, \"old\" products based on sustaining technology are perceived to be superior to the \"new\" ones based on disruptive technology. However, the latter have distinctive features that allow them to attract an exclusive set of customers. Examples include notebooks vs. netbooks, hard-disk drives vs. solid-state drives, laser printers vs. inkjet printers, etc. We set up a model with an established firm and an entrant firm that have heterogeneous product-offering capabilities: the established firm can offer either or both types of products, while the entrant firm can only offer the new products. Firms make capacity, pricing, and quantity decisions that maximize their ex-ante profit. Within this framework, we analyze deterministic games with perfect information and stochastic games with uncertain valuation of the disruptive technology. Equilibriums decisions are discussed under various market conditions as well as dedicated vs. flexible capacity assumptions. While over-investment and over-production may occur in a stochastic game with dedicated capacities, the equilibrium capacity decision seems to be more rational if the establish firm utilizes flexibly capacity or if the dedicated capacity can be converted ex-post at some expense.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131880299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pareto stability in matching marketplaces","authors":"Ning Chen","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807468","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807468","url":null,"abstract":"Motivated by online matching marketplaces such as social lending, we study markets where capacity-constrained bidders participate in multiple auctions that they have preferences over. While bidders have explicit preferences over auctions, we observe that the auctioneer side of the market has implicit preferences over bidders induced by the bids; this allows us to model these marketplaces in a matching framework with two-sided preferences. The problem of clearing the market leads naturally to the algorithmic question of computing Pareto-optimal stable matchings in a many-to-many setting with ties and incomplete lists. We will provide a fast algorithm for computing Pareto-stable assignments for this very general multi-unit matching problem with arbitrary preference lists on both sides, with running time that is polynomial in the number of agents in the market, rather than the sum of capacities of all agents.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"13 4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132424781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Social networks analysis: a game experiment","authors":"T. Ben-Zvi","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807490","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807490","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines how early business relationships in company networks may predict later performance and centrality. We define a way of classifying centrality trajectories in social networks, providing a method that can be used more generally to predict network change over time. Employing a game simulation, we show that there are strategies that correlate with eventual centrality and profit, and other strategies that correlate with poor performance.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132402631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Psychological games: theory & experiments","authors":"M. Dufwenberg","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807493","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807493","url":null,"abstract":"Belief-dependent motivation is important for understanding economic outcomes regarding e.g. anxiety & health, status & conformity, vengeance & wage rigidity, and guilt & contracts. The intellectual/mathematical home for describing belief-dependent motivation is an extension of traditional game theory labeled psychological game theory. My lecture will present this framework, as well as discuss how one can shed light on the empirical relevance of applications through experimental tests.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126953836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Procedural justice in bargaining games","authors":"Mikhael Shor","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807487","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807487","url":null,"abstract":"I consider several variants of dictator and ultimatum games in which the proposer not only offers an allocation of funds but also selects the rules that will govern that distribution. In the dictator/ultimatum choice game, the proposer first selects whether or not the receiver will have the power to reject the offer. Effectively, the proposer decides between playing a dictator and an ultimatum game. Whether a player is self-regarding or motivated by distributive concerns, the player should elect the dictator game as it enables full control over the allocation. Yet, a majority of subjects select the ultimatum game. Further, even those selecting the dictator game make substantially higher offers than those in a control dictator experiment. Additional experiments and surveys explore various explanations for these results. The additional experiments suggest that players' willingness to share decision-making power with other players is quite robust. I conclude that subjects have an innate preference for \"voice,\" a key component of procedural justice.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125776207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Matching mechanisms and their application to school choice","authors":"J. Sethuraman","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807478","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807478","url":null,"abstract":"The talk will be an overview of mechanisms for the one-sided matching problem, also called the house-allocation problem. This and related problems serve as useful models for many allocation problems that arise in practice: prominent recent examples include organizing kidney exchanges and assigning students to schools. We'll briefly discuss these applications, and discuss a recent result that establishes the equivalence of a broad class of mechanisms to the uniform lottery mechanism (also called the random priority mechanism).","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122167634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Subgame-perfection in positive recursive games","authors":"J. Flesch, G. Schoenmakers, J. Kuipers, K. Vrieze","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807415","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807415","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a class of n-player stochastic games with the following properties: (1) in every state, the transitions are controlled by one player, (2) the payoffs are equal to zero in every non-absorbing state, (3) the payoffs are non-negative in every absorbing state. We propose a new iterative method to analyze these games. With respect to the expected average reward, we prove the existence of a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in pure strategies, for every ε > 0. Moreover, if all transitions are deterministic, we obtain a subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium in pure strategies.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114735523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the complexity of equilibria in markets with additively separable utilities","authors":"X. Chen, Decheng Dai, Ye Du, S. Teng","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807467","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807467","url":null,"abstract":"We show that the problem of computing an approximate Arrow-Debreu market equilibrium is PPAD-hard, even when all traders use additively separable, piecewise-linear, and concave utility functions. We will also discuss the extension of this result to Fisher's model.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132871288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Taisuke Imai, Alec Smith, Stephanie W. Wang, Colin Camerer
{"title":"The power of foregone payoffs: a mousetracking study","authors":"Taisuke Imai, Alec Smith, Stephanie W. Wang, Colin Camerer","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807465","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807465","url":null,"abstract":"Behavior in two-player laboratory games has been observed to depend upon choices that the other player \"could have made,\" in violation of the principle of subgame perfection. Models of other-regarding preferences that only transform payoffs at end-nodes (e.g. inequality aversion) cannot explain this behavior, and various explanations (e.g. models of intention-based reciprocity) have been proposed. We explore the mechanisms by which foregone payoffs influence decision-making in a variety of two-player, two-stage games using mousetracking, a technology that allows us to observe which payoffs subjects attend to, and for how long, when making strategic decisions.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133988060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Game theory and operations management","authors":"Gérard P. Cachon","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807458","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807458","url":null,"abstract":"A firm is more than a black box production function described by its labor and capital inputs. Firms have capacity constraints that lead to inventory, shortages, queues and markdown prices. Consumers are aware of these messy details and they respond accordingly and strategically. Recent research in operations management, using tools from game theory, has concentrated on how such operational realities influence the dynamics of competition among firms. This talk will survey results from this literature and discuss opportunities for future directions.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"119 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114073102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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