{"title":"配对机制及其在择校中的应用","authors":"J. Sethuraman","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807478","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The talk will be an overview of mechanisms for the one-sided matching problem, also called the house-allocation problem. This and related problems serve as useful models for many allocation problems that arise in practice: prominent recent examples include organizing kidney exchanges and assigning students to schools. We'll briefly discuss these applications, and discuss a recent result that establishes the equivalence of a broad class of mechanisms to the uniform lottery mechanism (also called the random priority mechanism).","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Matching mechanisms and their application to school choice\",\"authors\":\"J. Sethuraman\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/1807406.1807478\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The talk will be an overview of mechanisms for the one-sided matching problem, also called the house-allocation problem. This and related problems serve as useful models for many allocation problems that arise in practice: prominent recent examples include organizing kidney exchanges and assigning students to schools. We'll briefly discuss these applications, and discuss a recent result that establishes the equivalence of a broad class of mechanisms to the uniform lottery mechanism (also called the random priority mechanism).\",\"PeriodicalId\":142982,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2010-05-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807478\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807478","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Matching mechanisms and their application to school choice
The talk will be an overview of mechanisms for the one-sided matching problem, also called the house-allocation problem. This and related problems serve as useful models for many allocation problems that arise in practice: prominent recent examples include organizing kidney exchanges and assigning students to schools. We'll briefly discuss these applications, and discuss a recent result that establishes the equivalence of a broad class of mechanisms to the uniform lottery mechanism (also called the random priority mechanism).
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