PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)最新文献_第8页

Capital Adequacy Regulations in Hungary: Did It Really Matter? 匈牙利的资本充足率法规:真的重要吗?

PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3139103

Dóra Siklós

{"title":"Capital Adequacy Regulations in Hungary: Did It Really Matter?","authors":"Dóra Siklós","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3139103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3139103","url":null,"abstract":"The main purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it aims to estimate the effect of the tightening of regulatory capital requirements on the real economy during a credit upswing. Second, it intends to show whether applying a countercyclical capital buffer measure, as per the Basel III rules, could have helped decelerate FX lending growth in Hungary, mitigating the build-up of vulnerabilities in the run-up to the global financial crisis. To answer these questions, we use a Vector Autoregression-based approach to understand how shocks affected to capital adequacy in the pre-crisis period. Our results suggest that regulatory authorities could have slowed the increase in lending temporarily. They would not, however, have been able to avoid the upswing in FX lending by requiring countercyclical capital buffers even if such a tool had been available and they had reacted quickly to accelerating credit growth. Our results also suggest that a more pronounced tightening might have reduced FX lending substantially, but at the expense of real GDP growth. The reason is that an unsustainable fiscal policy led to a trade-off between economic growth and the build-up of new vulnerabilities in the form of FX lending.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125751908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

The Credit Rating Agencies: An Analysis Through the Lenses of Industrial Organization, Finance, and Regulation 信用评级机构:产业组织、金融和监管视角下的分析

PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-02-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2748718

L. White

引用次数: 0

Peltzman's Ineffective Theory of Regulation 佩尔兹曼的无效管制理论

PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-02-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2733454

Hak Choi

引用次数: 0

Short-Selling Bans and Bank Stability 卖空禁令与银行稳定性

PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2710371

Alessandro Beber, Daniela Fabbri, M. Pagano

引用次数: 12

The Intended and Unintended Consequences of Financial-Market Regulations: A General Equilibrium Analysis 金融市场监管的预期和非预期后果:一般均衡分析

PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-01-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2721730

A. Buss, B. Dumas, R. Uppal, G. Vilkov

引用次数: 22

Game Changers: The Players, Practices, and Federal Actions Behind the Evolution of the Private Fund Industry in the United States 游戏改变者:美国私募基金业演变背后的参与者、实践和联邦行动

PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-01-04 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2711072

Conor Marrinan

引用次数: 0

Regulatory Lags, Liberalization and Vulnerability to Banking Crises 监管滞后、自由化和银行危机脆弱性

PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-11-25 DOI: 10.1111/REGO.12115

Ana Carolina Garriga

引用次数: 6

The Volcker Rule: A Brief Political History 《沃尔克规则:政治史简史

PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-08-01 DOI: 10.1093/CMLJ/KMV036

K. Krawiec, Guangya Liu

{"title":"The Volcker Rule: A Brief Political History","authors":"K. Krawiec, Guangya Liu","doi":"10.1093/CMLJ/KMV036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CMLJ/KMV036","url":null,"abstract":"Today, more than five years after Dodd-Frank was first signed into law, uncertainty surrounds many aspects of the Volcker Rule’s application and ultimate impact on financial markets and bank stability. Many more years will likely pass before that uncertainty is resolved. We demonstrate through a quantitative and qualitative analysis that these difficulties were presaged by the Volcker Rule’s political history. The Volcker Rule -- originally rejected by Congressional lawmakers and economists within the Obama administration as unworkable -- arose as a political concession designed to quiet critics who contended that Dodd-Frank did not do enough to control risky bank activity. But deep divisions about the proper scope of the rule persisted even as the statute was signed into law, ensuring that these debates continued into the rulemaking phase. Efforts to influence the Volcker Rule at the agency level began immediately after presidential signing and persisted until enactment of the final rule. Those expressing an opinion on the rule included affected industry members, academics, public interest groups, private individuals, and state and foreign governments, among others. Systematic analyses of meeting logs and comment letters reveal that much of this activity involved the market making exemption. Specifically, commenters disputed how broadly the exemption should be interpreted and applied, the extent to which limitations on banks’ abilities to make markets would reduce market liquidity, and the likely costs of any such reduction, should it occur.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128555984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

Does Dodd-Frank Affect OTC Transaction Costs and Liquidity? Evidence from Real-Time CDS Trade Reports 多德-弗兰克法案影响场外交易成本和流动性吗?来自实时CDS交易报告的证据

PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-06-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2443654

Yee Cheng Loon, Z. Zhong

引用次数: 78

Is Voluntary Profiling Welfare Enhancing? 自愿侧写福利会否加强?

PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-06-15 DOI: 10.25300/MISQ/2017/41.1.02

Byungwan Koh, Srinivasan Raghunathan, B. Nault

{"title":"Is Voluntary Profiling Welfare Enhancing?","authors":"Byungwan Koh, Srinivasan Raghunathan, B. Nault","doi":"10.25300/MISQ/2017/41.1.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25300/MISQ/2017/41.1.02","url":null,"abstract":"Although consumer profiling advocates tout benefits from personalization, consumer advocacy groups oppose profiling in online markets because of concerns about privacy and price discrimination. Policies such as opt-out or opt-in that provide consumers the option to voluntarily participate in profiling are the favored compromise. We compare voluntary profiling to no profiling and show that voluntary profiling leads to some counterintuitive results. Consumers that do not participate in profiling and some that participate are worse off under voluntary profiling. Neither social welfare nor aggregate consumer surplus is necessarily higher under voluntary profiling; even when voluntary profiling leads to an increase in social welfare, it may come at the expense of consumer surplus. If the seller cannot price discriminate and charge only a uniform price for everyone or the seller can only charge different prices based on the consumer's participation status, then aggregate consumer surplus under voluntary profiling is higher and a reduction in privacy cost has a positive impact on all consumers as well as the seller. However, when personalized pricing is possible, reducing privacy cost alone may reduce aggregate consumer surplus. The primary reason for these results is that voluntary profiling allows the seller to identify high valuation consumers that have no incentive to participate and set a higher price for them (compared to no profiling) while simultaneously benefitting from the profile information of low valuation consumers that participate. However, a positive privacy cost mitigates the participation incentives of even low valuation consumers and hence sellers' ability to engage in price discrimination.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117285331","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 22