PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"The Impact of the Mandatory Corporate Governance Disclosures on the Banking Growth in UAE: Islamic versus Conventional Banks","authors":"Haitham Nobanee, N. Ellili","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2970035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2970035","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to measure the degree of mandatory corporate governance disclosure and examine its impact on the bank’s growth using annual data for listed banks on the UAE financial markets during the period 2003-2013. Our empirical results show that the degree of mandatory corporate governance disclosure of conventional banks is significantly higher than the Islamic banks. In addition, the degree of mandatory corporate governance disclosure is significantly and positively related to the growth of deposits for both Islamic and conventional UAE listed banks","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128694547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How Are Small Banks Faring Under Dodd-Frank?","authors":"Hester M. Peirce, I. Robinson, Thomas Stratmann","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2435206","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2435206","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents the results of the Mercatus Center’s Small Bank Survey, which include responses from approximately 200 banks across 41 states with less than $10 billion in assets each, serving mostly rural and small metropolitan markets. The initial analysis suggests that Dodd-Frank significantly affects small banks and their customers. A large majority of respondents viewed Dodd-Frank as more burdensome than the Bank Secrecy Act, and the participating banks reported substantially increased compliance costs in the wake of new regulations. These costs include hiring new compliance personnel, increased reliance on outside compliance experts, additional resources allocated to compliance, and more time spent by noncompliance employees on compliance. The increased regulatory burdens have led small banks to reconsider their product and service offerings, including considering whether to stop providing residential mortgages. Many small bank customers, who will have difficulty locating convenient alternatives, will feel the indirect effects of Dodd-Frank.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128412802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"International Banking Standards, Private Law and the European Union","authors":"J. Wouters, J. Odermatt","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2457773","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2457773","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past decades, but especially since the 2008 global financial crisis, there has been a proliferation as well as an intensification of international regulatory processes regarding the activities of banks: this goes from the work of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision on prudential supervisory standards to the activities of the OECD-based Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on money laundering, the negotiations within the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s General Agreement on Services (GATS) regarding financial services, and the more recent work of the Group of 20 (G20) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) on issues as diverse as credit rating agencies and systemically important financial institutions. In all of these bodies, the European Union (EU) is involved, though often on a different institutional basis, going from full membership to observer status; some bodies count all EU Member States among their members whereas others are more limited in membership. This contribution looks into the role which the EU plays in this area of standard setting for international banking activities, in particular those norms that can broadly be characterized as ‘regulatory private law’, thereby bringing together both dimensions of ‘EU external relations law’ and ‘private law’. First of all, it is explored how the EU engages in practice within the international banking standard setting processes concerned. It then turns to the impact of international banking standards on internal EU law- and policy-making in a number of chosen areas. The paper attempts to assess the influence which the EU exercises – partly through exporting its own regulatory agenda/acquis - on international law- and policymaking in this area.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123481683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Why Governments Intervene: Exploring Mixed Motives for Public Policies on CSR","authors":"J. Knudsen, Dana L. Brown","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2430805","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2430805","url":null,"abstract":"Why are national governments increasingly adopting policies on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)? Government CSR policies have been explained either as a means of substituting or supporting (mirroring) domestic political-economic institutions and policies, or as a means for government to promote international competitiveness of domestic businesses. Both sets of explanations see governments as driving CSR policies to meet particular national government goals. Support is found for the thesis that CSR policies are often related to international competitiveness, yet our findings suggest that government goals in this regard are not necessarily pre-defined.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128694996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"FVA, The Fake Debate: Why Are They Still Debating?","authors":"Christian Kamtchueng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2464910","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2464910","url":null,"abstract":"Funding Valuation Adjustment (FVA) has been introduced as the CVA and DVA after the default of Lehman Brother. After the subprime crisis, the basis spread was not negligible anymore, credit and liquidity risk became the first concern. In addition, regulators put in place reforms, which associate capital reserve for each of these new risks. It became natural to adjust the so called fair premium (price associated to risk neutral measure).In fact the debate is still opened, the industry is divided concerning its definition and its price adjustment status. The risk is real, academicians can argue but the fact is that default occur and occurred because of liquidity issues (in fact credit and liquidity are very linked to each other, as demonstrated in The Fear Pricing Theory: Credit and Liquidity Adjustment).In one hand, we have for non cleared trade a risk associated to unknown (risky) cashflow, in the other hand we have to answer to the margin call.We first introduce the problem and industry views, then in an objective maner we define FVA thanks to the analogy with the MLVA (Market Liquidity Valuation Adjustment) and establish the consequences of our approach in term of modeling and risks.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"265 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133956888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Power to Ban Short-Selling: The Beginning of a New Era for EU Agencies?","authors":"V. Babis","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2420011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2420011","url":null,"abstract":"This case note discusses Case C-270/12 United Kingdom v European Parliament and Council [2014] (not yet reported), regarding certain powers of the European Securities and Markets Authority under the Short-Selling Regulation.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127376504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Disciplining the Neoliberal Bank: Credit Risk Regulation and the Financialization of Loan Management","authors":"C. Baud, Eve Chiapello","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2417396","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2417396","url":null,"abstract":"This paper seeks to contribute to thinking on the role of public authorities in the regulation of economic affairs in the context of neoliberal financialized capitalism. It is based on examination of changes regarding the requirements for credit risks from the Basel I accords (1988) to the Basel II and III accords (2004-2010). The shift on this question in the Basel Accords is much more than a simple tidy-up. The literature shows that the reform of the Basel requirements for credit risk was the product of a neoliberal political agenda carried by lobbies representing market actors. Our study of the instruments used to assess credit risk and to define the associated capital requirements under Basel II and III shows that the regulatory framework effectively delegates management of the security of the financial system to the actors in the system. Yet, our study also stresses that the autonomy won through this move towards self-regulation is associated with the implementation of new types of constraints. In our case, these new constraints are taking the form of an impressive system of monitoring and control of internal risk management practices. This system is then coupled with financial incentives, in a way that has been carefully designed to lead the banks to adopt specific “financialized” practices. Michel Foucault argued in his classes on neoliberalism that neoliberalism requires, not withdrawal of the State as in traditional liberalism, but a transformation of practices by the State, which on the contrary actively intervenes to produce the right conditions for a market, and help markets to emerge and operate whenever possible. Among the necessary conditions for construction of these markets, he also stressed the importance of producing subjects (through the intermediary of biopolitics) able to act in a world made up of markets, and that the form of behaviour expected of these subjects is that of the enterprise, leading to extension of this form to all sorts of actors who used to operate in different ways (nonprofit organizations, salaried individuals, etc). Our case allows to go beyond this analysis and show that when the market agents are enterprises, they too must be subjected to active production and a conformation process, and that it cannot be just any type of enterprise; it too must go through a subjectification process that also brings a range of power techniques into play. The case consequently shows the concurrent development of liberty and discipline for enterprises in neoliberal regimes. It also offers an opportunity for close examination of the nature of the disciplinarization that goes hand in hand with neoliberal financialized capitalism. In this perspective, it especially stresses three intertwined processes: the regulator’s construction of financial incentives, the imposition of working methods and the rise of a bureaucracy of control. Finally, methodologically, this study underlines the value of approaching these issues by an in-","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130571218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Margin Squeeze in a Regulatory Environment: An Application to Differentiated Product Markets","authors":"Marc Petulowa, Claudia Saavedra","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2236258","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2236258","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses the effects of banning pricing policies that lead to margin squeezes when the upstream good is imperfectly regulated. The analysis relies on a modelling with a vertically integrated upstream monopolist that faces competition by an unintegrated downstream competitor. It shows that for differentiated goods in the downstream market, a margin squeeze can be observed as the competitive outcome rather than exclusionary conduct. If upstream market regulation is non-constraining, a margin squeeze ban induces the vertically integrated firm to increase its own downstream price (this is, a price umbrella), but also to review its upstream pricing behavior and reduce the upstream price charged to the retail competitor. This \"decreasing rivals' costs effect\" (DRC-effect) allows the integrated firm to maximise its profits given the constraint on the downstream price, and allows the downstream competitor to set a lower retail price. However, when constraining upstream regulation and a ban are implemented jointly, the DRC-effect vanishes and downstream prices may to rise, leading to a decrease of consumer surplus. This analysis tends to back up the American way of handling margin squeezes in a regulated environment.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121585129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Impact of Capital Requirements on Bank Lending","authors":"Jonathan Bridges, D. Gregory, Mette E. Nielsen, S. Pezzini, Amar Radia, Marco Spaltro","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2388773","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2388773","url":null,"abstract":"We estimate the effect of changes in microprudential regulatory capital requirements on bank capital ratios and bank lending. We do so by running panel regressions using a rich new data set, exploiting variation in individual bank capital requirements in the United Kingdom from 1990-2011. There are two key results. First, regulatory capital requirements affect the capital ratios held by banks – following an increase in capital requirements, banks gradually rebuild the buffers that they initially held over the regulatory minimum. Second, capital requirements affect lending with heterogeneous responses in different sectors of the economy – in the year following an increase in capital requirements, banks, on average, cut (in descending order based on point estimates) loan growth for commercial real estate, other corporates and household secured lending. The response of unsecured household lending is smaller and insignificant over the first year as a whole. Loan growth mostly recovers within three years. While estimated over a different policy regime and at the individual bank level, these results may contain some insights into how changing capital requirements might affect lending in a macroprudential regime. However, during the transition to higher global regulatory standards, the effects of changes in capital requirements may be different. For example, increasing capital requirements might augment rather than reduce lending for initially undercapitalised banks.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130249771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Alarm System for Credit Losses Impairment","authors":"Yahia Salhi, Pierre-E. Thérond","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2378374","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2378374","url":null,"abstract":"The recent fi nancial crisis has lead the IASB to settle new reporting standards for fi nancial instruments. The extended ability to measure some debt instruments at amortized cost is associated with a new impairment losses mechanism: Expected Credit Losses. In this paper, after a brief description of the principles elaborated by IASB for IFRS 9, we propose a methodology using CDS market prices in order to monitor signi cant changes in creditworthiness of fi nancial instruments and subsequent credit losses impairment. This methodology is implemented in detail to a real world dataset. Numerical tests are drawn to assess the eff ectiveness of the procedure.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127605180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}