PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Private Insurers to Cushion Federal Deposit Insurance","authors":"Thang Dang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2629660","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2629660","url":null,"abstract":"This research describes the views on the existed mechanism of the federal deposit insurance in the United States. It criticizes this deposit insurance system is so much involved with the circumvention from the government, exploiting deeply the government’s reserves that contributed by the U.S. taxpayers, possibly causing the conflicts of interests in the bank’s corporate governance, hardly ending the government’s bailouts in future’s crisis, and incidentally nationalizing of private banks. The herein analysis explains how the lack of a risk-reducing mechanism in the existed federal deposit insurance system nurtures the moral hazard in banking industry, critically contributes to the addressed problems. It further discusses on the government’s circumvention to the banking system through the federal deposit insurance likely illustrates a step the government made into the alliance of itself and the businesses. On the other hand, such circumvention also makes the banks extremely distinctive with extraordinary privileges despite fact the banks are generally the business entity like any and all other private entrepreneurs in the U.S. As a result, this research is aim at introducing a solution to not only protect the legitimate rights of depositors, but also to push the banks back to their private business environment, in equal to other business sectors. The solution further aims to prevent the depletion of American taxpayers’ money used by the government in rescuing banks. So this research’s first part briefly describes typical characters of the existed mechanism of the federal deposit insurance. The second part subjectively addresses the remained problems in the existed system deposit insurance. This research introduces in its third part a solution of having private insurers to cushion in federal deposit insurance, before allowing the insured depositors reach up the federal insurance funds, and making a buffer to the alliance of the government and the businesses.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130649436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Equitable Defenses Under Arizona Securities Law","authors":"Richard G. Himelrick","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2592779","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2592779","url":null,"abstract":"Nearly all states refuse to read nonstatutory, equitable defenses into their securities statutes. Early Arizona blue-sky cases also refused to consider equitable defenses. These state cases contrast with cases under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Because liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is implied, neither the elements of proof nor the defenses are statutorily defined. Consequently, it was left to the courts to judicially define the elements and defenses. On the other hand, express-liability statutes like A.R.S. §§ 44-1991(A) and 44-2001(A) define by their words the elements of proof. They likewise are accompanied by statutes that provide defenses like the statutes of limitation, reasonable care under § 44-2001(B), and failure to tender. After introducing the treatment of equitable defenses under state securities law, the article analyzes the Arizona Court of Appeals 2014 Caruthers decision. Caruthers broke with the near-uniform body of modern-state-securities law decisions that decline to recognize equitable defense to statutory claims.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"79 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134646383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Global Liquidity Regulation - Why Did it Take so Long?","authors":"C. Bonner, Paul Hilbers","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2553082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2553082","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this paper is to assess the history of global liquidity regulation until the revised Basel III proposals in 2013 and to analyze the interaction of capital regulation and banks' liquidity buffers. Our analysis suggests that regulating capital is associated with declining liquidity uffers. The interaction of liquidity regulation and monetary policy as well as the view that regulating capital also addresses liquidity risks were important factors hampering harmonized liquidity regulation. It appears that crisis-related supervisory momentum is an important factor behind most agreements on regulatory harmonization. In line with that, the drying up of funding and the subsequent liquidity problems during the 2007-08 financial crisis played a large role in the development of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR).","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120882934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Can Enforcement Actions on Engagement Auditors Improve Audit Quality?","authors":"Baolei Qi, Liuchuang Li, Ashok Robin, Rong Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2549041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2549041","url":null,"abstract":"A unique feature of Chinese auditing and one under consideration for adoption in the U.S. is regulatory oversight of individual auditors. This paper analyzes enforcement actions by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) against engagement auditors and investigates whether audit quality improves for sanctioned auditors. Our results indicate lower discretionary accruals for client firms following sanctions. Complementing this, and indicative of greater skepticism and independence by sanctioned auditors, we find that the probability of issuing a modified audit opinion increases following sanctions. We conjecture that audit quality increases because sanctions increases the likelihood of job loss and also damages reputations; consistent with this, we find evidence of job loss among some of the sanctioned auditors and of stock market losses for clients audited by sanctioned auditors. These adverse consequences appear to encourage sanctioned auditors to “clean up their act.” Finally, we examine one channel through which sanctions improve audit quality: we find evidence of a longer lag between fiscal year end and the date of the audit report, a metric interpreted in the literature as a measure of auditor effort. Thus, it appears that sanctions, by raising the specter of job and/or reputation loss, compel sanctioned auditors to increase effort in such a way that audit quality rises. Overall, our results indicate that governmental sanctions improve audit quality. This suggests that auditor incentives stemming from oversight mechanisms play a critical role in determining audit quality.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125696701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Assessment of the Impact and Challenges of Basel II Implementation on the Risk Management Practices In Nigerian Banks","authors":"Síkírù Sàlámì","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2569556","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2569556","url":null,"abstract":"Risk management plays an important role in ensuring the safety and survival of banking institutions. Basel II Accord is an international regulatory attempt aimed at strengthening the risk management practices in the internationally active banks. The Basel II Accord is the framework developed in 1999 by the Central Banks of G10 countries to regulate the risk management process in large internationally active banks in their domains and in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member countries. The framework was issued principally to address the issue of the minimum capital requirements that have to be kept aside by banks, to be able to face any economic stress, and for protecting the international financial system from financial crises that could lead to the collapse of banks. This research examines the impact and challenges of Basel II on the risk management practices in Nigerian banks, and the extent of progress the banks have made in implementing the Accord within the milieu of the Central Bank of Nigeria’s guidelines. The sample population comprised all the banking institutions in Nigeria, including commercial banks, mortgage banks, finance houses and merchant banks. A random sample of 15 commercial banks was taken from which sampling units of 60 respondents with risk and control functions were purposively selected from each of the sampled banks. What informed the choice of the commercial banks as the sample source was because the Central Bank of Nigeria appeared to have considered the commercial banks as the centre focus of Basel II implementation for a start. Four hypotheses were formulated to validate the observations that necessitated the study. All the hypotheses were tested at 0.05 level of significance using the ANOVA, regression and t-test models. The following findings were made from the study after testing the hypotheses formulated for the study: All the Nigerian banks face almost the same sets of challenges in implementing Basel II requirements; the Basel II Accord caused significant change in capital measurement and allocation; the Accord has improved the risk management practices in Nigerian banks, and Nigerian banks have made some progress in Basel II implementation project. At the end of the research, it was recommended that the Central Bank of Nigeria increase the level of awareness on Basel Accord; that the CBN should immediately enforce the Basel II regulations on all operators in the banking industry rather than focusing on commercial banks; that the banks should enlighten their Boards and senior management staff on the implications of Basel Accord on the banks’ businesses, and finally that the banks should find smarter ways to raise further capital in response to Basel II requirement.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"270 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114058738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Retention Requirements and Incentives for Controlling Inefficient Risk-Taking -- Bridging Banking, Securitization and Capital Requirements","authors":"Rose Neng Lai, Robert Van Order","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2528579","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2528579","url":null,"abstract":"This paper models incentives for risk-taking by managers of banks or securitization deals. Of particular interest are risk-retention rules for producers of structured securitization deals, which have been mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act; the model can also be applied to bank managers. We show how incentives can be set up so that problems of asymmetric information can co-exist with socially optimal risk-taking. The role of holding an equity piece as an incentive tool has been over-emphasized; the best “skin in the game” incentive structure for management is to hold securities of all levels of risk, including the safest piece. As a device for protecting against bank runs, the best incentive tools require tilting the incentive structure toward the safest pieces, but not by much.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115897675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Did the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Have the Desired Effect? Evidence from the Marginal Value of Corporate Cash Holdings","authors":"G. S. Bhabra, J. Rooney","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2729589","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2729589","url":null,"abstract":"We examine whether passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 did in fact have the intended effect of reducing agency conflicts or did it alter managerial incentives in ways that could be detrimental to firm value. Our findings for the full sample suggest a decrease in firm value and the marginal value of cash collectively suggesting that either the provisions imposed by SOX resulted in significant compliance costs and/or lead to an increase in risk aversion of managers resulting in costs of lost opportunity. There is, however, evidence of a significant variation in the ability of the various provisions to constrain incentives of managers with some leading to reduced agency conflicts while others having the perverse effect of increasing both managerial risk aversion as well as imposing excessive costs of compliance.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132658325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Activating the Covered Bonds Market in Poland – The Need for Regulatory Improvements","authors":"A. Tułodziecka, Agnieszka Nierodka","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2841687","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2841687","url":null,"abstract":"The institutional framework for the functioning of covered bonds (list zastawny - L.Z.) in Poland was established already in 1997 and first issues took place in 2000; by 2013, L.Z. accounted for a few percent of property market funding, mostly with respect to commercial property. The latest liquidity limits introduced by the requirements of Basel III and of the Capital Requirements Directive / Regulation (CRD / CRR4) will persuade banks to show greater interest in long-term funding instruments to some extent, but in order to improve the L.Z. system in Poland more comprehensively, further changes to the legal environment are necessary so as to achieve significantly better ratings compared to unsecured bonds. The adjustment of the mortgage banking business model that assumes a synergy between the credit policy and the policy for funding mortgage portfolios with L.Z. within groups will also be of essential importance. The direction of systemic solutions represented by the Polish L.Z. and the quality of the collateral provided by safe assets are commensurate with the expectations of investors who tend to be wary following the sub-prime crisis. The key issue will be to achieve a larger issuance scale as well as to ensure market liquidity. The authors of this analysis express their opinion on success factors in the Polish market environment.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"110 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114362199","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Optimal Bankruptcy Code: A Fresh Start for Some","authors":"Grey Gordon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2494888","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2494888","url":null,"abstract":"What is the optimal consumer bankruptcy law? I examine this question in the context of an incomplete markets lifecycle model with a planner who can choose state-contingent bankruptcy costs. I develop two key theoretical characterizations. First, the optimal policy has a bang-bang property: The planner either gives a household a \"fresh start\" or forbids it from filing. Second, it is optimal for the planner to always allow bankruptcy if the household cannot repay or would prefer an outside option. Consequently, a natural borrowing limit economy - an economy where bankruptcy is never allowed - is suboptimal. Quantitatively, the optimal policy results in large amounts of debt and default with ex-ante welfare gains, relative to a no-borrowing economy, as large as 12.8% of lifetime consumption. While the optimal policy is complicated, a simple cutoff rule allowing bankruptcy when a household's debt is 2.6 times its endowment results in a welfare gain of 12.2%.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125647358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Investors’ Protection in India: Regulatory Framework and Investors’ Rights, Obligations & Grievances","authors":"Sankalp Jain","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2462944","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2462944","url":null,"abstract":"Investors are the backbone of the securities market. They not only determine the level and magnitude of activities in the securities market but also in the economy as a whole. The growth in the numbers of investors in India is pretty encouraging. The trends reveal that in addition to FIIs and Institutional Investors, small investors are also gradually beginning to regain the confidence in the capital markets that had been shaken consequent to the stock market scams during the past decades. It is imperative for the healthy growth of the corporate sector that this confidence is maintained.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122821226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}