{"title":"Banking Deregulation and Credit Supply: Distinguishing the Balance Sheet and the Competition Channels","authors":"Yongqiang Chu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2437089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2437089","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies how interstate banking deregulation affects credit supply, focusing on distinguishing the balance sheet and bank competition channels. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that interstate banking deregulation affects credit supply, not only by legally impacted commercial banks, but also by non-legally impacted non-bank lenders. Controlling for lender-year fixed effects to isolate the balance sheet effect, I find that credit supply by the same lender varies with interstate banking restrictions in different states. Overall, the results suggest that the impact of interstate banking deregulation is mostly driven by the bank competition channel.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"189 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121638890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introducing Islamic Banking in New Markets","authors":"Yousuf Azim Siddiqi","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2973166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2973166","url":null,"abstract":"A mini book on how to introduce Islamic banking in New Markets and highlighting myths, hurdles and thump-rules of Islamic finance. Also it contains brief description of the retail and corporate banking products used in major markets of Islamic banking.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122010415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Regulation by Settlement","authors":"Matthew C. Turk","doi":"10.17161/1808.25708","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17161/1808.25708","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores a recent development at the intersection of administrative law and financial regulation: the explosion in enforcement actions brought by federal agencies against financial institutions, and the exclusive resolution of those cases via settlement agreements that preclude meaningful judicial review. It argues that those practices have given rise to a distinct new form of policymaking, “regulation by settlement,” which has significant implications for both areas of the law. \u0000Regulation by settlement has two defining features. First, by pursuing settlements that target certain areas of the financial system on a comprehensive basis, agencies are able to leverage those agreements in a manner that effectively establishes novel legal standards of general applicability. Settlements are now a tool for setting policy in financial regulation. Second, the procedural posture of those settlements allows agencies to engage in a uniquely freewheeling style of policymaking, which sidesteps nearly all of the constraints that administrative law applies to more conventional forms of agency action. \u0000The article closes by considering normative issues raised by regulation by settlement, including questions concerning its consistency with rule of law values and efficiency from a cost-benefit perspective. It also reviews potential reforms, such as subjecting settlements to greater judicial scrutiny or presidential oversight. The broader contribution to the literature is to show how a richer understanding of the regulatory process can be gained by analyzing its public law and business law aspects in parallel.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"84 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114134781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Regulatory Space: A Comparison of Treaty Texts","authors":"Tomer Broude, Yoram Z. Haftel, A. Thompson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2944846","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2944846","url":null,"abstract":"The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, signed in February of 2016, is an ambitious effort to set high standards on a ‘mega-regional’ level. This paper examines the TPP’s investment provisions with a focus on their most controversial dimension: the extent to which they constrain the ‘state regulatory space’ (SRS) of host states. We embrace the text-as-data approach by coding the TPP and other investment agreements among TPP parties on designed features related to SRS. The challenges presented by this coding exercise demonstrate some of the advantages of manual coding over automated methods when nuance and interpretation are required. With our data, we first compare the TPP to other agreements and find that it scores relatively high on SRS, although it falls within the range of existing agreements and does not seem to chart new territory in this regard. We then investigate which existing agreements are most similar to and dissimilar from the TPP with respect to SRS. Using regression analysis, we consider a number of factors to explain this variation and find that the TPP is most similar to agreements involving the United States, to agreements among Western Hemispheric countries, to other free trade agreements with investment chapters, and to more recent agreements. However, different factors seem to matter if we look only at provisions related to investor-state dispute settlement versus substantive provisions, implying that it is important to distinguish between the substantive and procedural dimensions of treaties.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"02 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127213301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rediscovering Macro-Prudential Regulation: The National Banking Era from the Perspective of 2015","authors":"Charles W. Calomiris, M. Carlson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2921259","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2921259","url":null,"abstract":"We review the bank regulatory and supervisory practices of the National Banking Era and argue that their primary focus was both micro- and macro-prudential. Regulatory limits on real estate lending and large required cash holdings focused on systemic risk issues and successfully limited serious banking system solvency problems. The careful scrutiny of banks’ assets and operations revealed in Examiner Reports, as well as disclosure requirements, and Examiners’ due diligence about the network of reserves held by National Banks, also ensured that depositors and stockholders had ready access to reliable information, which also helped to promote public confidence in systemic stability. We summarize the content of Examiner Reports, including information about the examination process, bank ownership, corporate governance, the composition and quality of loans, dividend payments, and different types of funding. We sample urban locations outside the East, permitting comparison of practices within similar environments across different regions.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123431961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Primer on the Evolution and Complexity of Bank Regulatory Capital Standards","authors":"James R. Barth, S. Miller","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2919407","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2919407","url":null,"abstract":"Bank regulators consider minimum capital standards essential for promoting well-functioning banking systems. Despite their existence, however, such standards have been insufficient to prevent periodic disruptions in the banking sectors of various countries. The most recent disruption was the global banking crisis of 2007–2009. After the crisis, bank capital requirements have increased and become more complex. Clearly, capital requirements are important as a first line of defense in ensuring safer and sounder banking industries. \u0000 \u0000Given the importance of capital requirements, this paper explains and documents: \u0000 \u0000(1) the extent to which capital requirements have evolved, becoming higher and more complex, and \u0000 \u0000(2) how all the regulatory capital ratios that now exist to account for differences among banks, such as asset size and business model, do not provide equally valuable information about whether a bank is adequately capitalized. \u0000 \u0000A simple minimum regulatory capital ratio will likely promote a more stable banking system.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131771890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"2016 Amendment of the Czech Significant Market Power Act of 2009","authors":"Petr Frischmann, V. Šmejkal","doi":"10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2016.9.14.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2016.9.14.11","url":null,"abstract":"The Significant Market Power Act (SMPA) adopted in 2009 regulates the assessment of, and the prevention of, the abuse of market power in the sale of agricultural and food products. The Act generated many controversies from the outset, survived legislative proposals for its abolition, to be finally amended in 2016. However, this kind of legislation failed to solve most of the problems and even managed to create additional controversies. The new amendment formally simplified the actual wording of the SMPA by transposing its numerous earlier appendixes, which contained an exemplary list of prohibited forms of SMP abuse, to the actual text of the Act. It also improved transparency and clarity with respect to its earlier vague and ambiguous terminology. At the same time, the amendment seriously modified the scope and principal philosophy of the SMPA by removing the previously required “substantial detriment to economic competition” as the pre-condition of the applicability of the Act. However, since the enforcement of the SMPA falls into the scope of the activities of the Czech Office for Protection of Economic Competition (in Czech Úřad pro ochranu hospodářské soutěže, UOHS), the concerns and doubts of the business community continue to grow whether this form of regulation is appropriate after the modification of the concept.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"136 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122781600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Volcker Rule and Market-Making in Times of Stress","authors":"Jack Bao, Maureen O'Hara, Xing (Alex) Zhou","doi":"10.17016/FEDS.2016.102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2016.102","url":null,"abstract":"Focusing on downgrades as stress events that drive the selling of corporate bonds, we document that the illiquidity of stressed bonds has increased after the Volcker Rule. Dealers regulated by the Rule have decreased their market-making activities while non-Volcker-affected dealers have stepped in to provide some additional liquidity. Furthermore, even Volcker-affected dealers that are not constrained by Basel III and CCAR regulations change their behavior, inconsistent with the effects being driven by these other regulations. Since Volcker-affected dealers have been the main liquidity providers, the net effect is that bonds are less liquid during times of stress due to the Volcker Rule.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115277162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mutual Funds and the Regulatory Capture of the SEC","authors":"Stewart L. Brown","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2854312","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2854312","url":null,"abstract":"Regulatory agencies are created to act in the public interest but often end up acting in the interests of those regulated. This is known as regulatory capture. The mutual fund industry is the custodian of massive levels of wealth of the investing public and is regulated by the Securities Exchange Commission (“the SEC”). Mutual fund assets are currently in the neighborhood of $16 trillion and these assets generate revenues in excess of $100 billion per year for the firms that manage mutual funds. The investment management industry is incentivized to influence the regulators by whatever means available to maximize profits for their owners. This paper documents how the investment management industry has captured the SEC in certain key policy areas. As a result, the industry is able to siphon off billions of dollars per year in excessive and often hidden fees. Absent political considerations and industry interference, an uncaptured Commission focused on the best interested of investors could unilaterally rectify the worst abuses associated with excessive advisory and distribution fees.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114155540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Australian Prudential Regulation before and after the Global Financial Crisis","authors":"P. Docherty, R. Bird, Timo Henckel, G. Menzies","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2819819","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2819819","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reviews the nature of Australian bank prudential regulation before and after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). It provides a detailed conceptual framework for understanding the functions of banks and deposit-takers, the theory of what can go wrong with the operation of these institutions, and the logic of prudential regulation. It traces developments in Australian prudential regulation from the introduction of the formal capital-based framework in the 1980s to the implementation of the Basel III regime after the GFC. The paper concludes that i) the introduction of the Financial Claims Scheme was a clear and welcome change compared with pre-GFC arrangements; ii) the introduction of the Basel III liquidity regime constituted a more fundamental modification, best characterised as a significant refinement to the riskbased calculation of capital than as a fundamental change to regulatory philosophy; iii) the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) had been practising macroprudential regulation well before the GFC even though Australia’s adoption of Basel III’s macroprudential apparatus appears on the surface to constitute a genuine innovation in prudential regulation; and iv) the importance of financial stability as a policy objective and the nature of macroprudential regulation raise questions about the wisdom of having split monetary policy and prudential regulation functions in 1998, and a revisit of this question and a reassessment of institutional structures are called for.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126623278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}