PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"The New Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency","authors":"Kathryn Judge","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3462633","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3462633","url":null,"abstract":"Mechanisms of market inefficiency are some of the most important and least understood institutions in financial markets today. A growing body of empirical work reveals a strong and persistent demand for “safe assets,” financial instruments that are sufficiently low risk and opaque that holders readily accept them at face value. The production of such assets, and the willingness of holders to treat them as information insensitive, depends on the existence of mechanisms that promote faith in the value of the underlying assets while simultaneously discouraging information production specific to the value of those assets. Such mechanisms include private arrangements, like securitization structures that repackage cash flows from debt instruments to produce new financial instruments that are less risky and more opaque than the underlying debt, and public ones, like the rules allowing many money market mutual funds to use a net asset value of $1.00. This essay argues that recognizing these mechanisms of market inefficiency as such is a critical first step in devising policy interventions that achieve desired aims. This runs counter to the instincts of many market regulators, like the Securities and Exchange Commission, and academics who have often assumed that markets should be structured to promote information generation and efficiency. \u0000 \u0000The essay further shows, however, that defenders of the information-insensitive paradigm have failed to provide a robust institutional account of how those mechanisms can remain robust across different states of the world or the government support required if they cannot. When an adverse shock or other signal raises questions about the value of the assets underlying an information-insensitive instrument, market participants can refuse, en masse, to treat those instruments as safe. Unless the government or some other actor can provide credible information about the value of the underlying assets or financial support that renders such information irrelevant, widespread market dysfunction can follow. When that happens, the very mechanisms of market inefficiency that had enabled a market to develop can exacerbate dysfunction. Following Ronald Gilson and Reineer Kraakman’s admonishment that institutions always matter, this essay calls for the development of rich institutional accounts of how the mechanisms of market inefficiency work, when and how they can fail, and what these dynamics reveal about the role regulators should play in these domains.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126115214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Anticipatory FinTech Regulation: On Deploying Big Data Analytics to Predict the Direction, Impact and Control of Financial Technology","authors":"J. Bagby, D. Reitter","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3456844","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3456844","url":null,"abstract":"Financial Technologies (FinTech) lie at the heart of disruptive innovation comprising critical infrastructure for much of modern business practice and national security. Modern FinTech sectors are data driven – startup finance, commodities and investment instrumentation, payment systems, trading platforms, exchange markets, market failure regulation, underwriting and syndication, risk assessment and management, advisory services, commercial banking, transaction settlement through financial intermediaries, corporate disclosure and governance, and currencies. This paper demonstrates that most FinTech innovations, scholarship and public policy development are significantly informed by big data analysis balancing: (1) FinTech innovation incentives, (2) market failure forensics, and (3) public policy development. FinTech almost always deserves a wary eye – experience reveals that many FinTech mechanisms externalize social costs of their design flaws, opacity/obscurity and malfunctioning. Some FinTechs appear intended to skirt regulation suffering regulatory lag, the delay following the first appearance of novel FinTechs and the later development, assessment, and deployment of reliable regulatory mechanisms. FinTech policy issues span from the traditional regulation of financial markets, through systemic costs of FinTech intellectual property (IP) concerns and ultimately to national security risks imposed by the financial system’s centrality among critical infrastructures.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121732612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Embedded Supervision: How to Build Regulation into Blockchain Finance","authors":"Raphael A. Auer","doi":"10.24149/gwp371","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24149/gwp371","url":null,"abstract":"The spread of distributed ledger technology (DLT) in finance could help to improve the efficiency and quality of supervision. This paper makes the case for embedded supervision, ie a regulatory framework that provides for compliance in tokenised markets to be automatically monitored by reading the market's ledger, thus reducing the need for firms to actively collect, verify and deliver data. After sketching out a design for such schemes, the paper explores the conditions under which distributed ledger data might be used to monitor compliance. To this end, a decentralised market is modelled that replaces today's intermediary-based verification of legal data with blockchain-enabled data credibility based on economic consensus. The key results set out the conditions under which the market's economic consensus would be strong enough to guarantee that transactions are economically final, so that supervisors can trust the distributed ledger's data. The paper concludes with a discussion of the legislative and operational requirements that would promote low-cost supervision and a level playing field for small and large firms.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123669830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Meeting the Liquidity Challenge in Resolution: the US Approach (Presentation Slides)","authors":"R. Herring","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3517596","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3517596","url":null,"abstract":"This presentation addresses the liquidity problem a failing bank faces and how resolution procedures can contribute to the mitigate this problem and the risk of contagion. The Orderly Liquidation Procedures in Dodd-Frank are discussed.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"52 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120904626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Financial Openness and Capital Inflows to Emerging Markets: In Search of Robust Evidence","authors":"Diego A. Cerdeiro, A. Komáromi","doi":"10.5089/9781513509839.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513509839.001","url":null,"abstract":"We reassess the connection between capital account openness and capital flows in an empirical framework that is grounded in theory and makes use of previously unexplored variation in the data. We demonstrate how our theory-consistent regressions may overcome some ubiquitous measurement problems in the literature by relying on interaction terms between financial openness and traditional push-pull factors. Within our proposed framework, we ask: what can be said robustly about the effect of capital account restrictions on capital flows? Our results warrant against over-interpreting the existing cross-country evidence as we find very few robust relationships between capital account restrictiveness and various types of capital inflows. Countries with a higher degree of financial openness are more susceptible to some, but by no means all, push and pull factors. Overall, the results are still consistent with a complex set of tradeoffs faced by policymakers, where the ability to shield the domestic economy from volatile capital flow cycles must be weighed against the sources of exogenous risks and potential long run growth effects.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116638426","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Bidding with Securities under Risk Aversion: The Role of Steepness as Insurance","authors":"Andres Fioriti, Allan Hernandez-Chanto","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3430117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3430117","url":null,"abstract":"In a security-bid auction, the stochastic revenue of the project being auctioned is used as an asset to securitize the winner's payment to the seller. De Marzo et al. (2005) show that in an environment with risk-neutral seller and bidders, steeper securities increase the seller's expected revenue but do not affect the efficiency of the auction. We introduce risk-averse bidders to analyze the insurance role of steepness and its implications for revenue, efficiency and bidders' endogenous participation. Steeper securities provide more insurance because they allow bidders to smooth payoffs across realizations: asking for lower payments when revenue realizations are low and for higher payments when realizations are high. We show that such insurance levels the field for more risk-averse bidders, inducing them to bid more aggressively and improving the revenue and the allocative efficiency of the auction. In addition, we present two results that are novel to the auction literature. We show that if bidders are homogeneously and sufficiently risk-averse (i) a call option is the only security that guarantees Pareto efficiency; and (ii) steeper securities attract more entry when bidders do not know their signals and entry is costly. <br>","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123470172","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"On the Relation between Financial Reporting Quality and Country Attributes: Research Challenges and Opportunities","authors":"Helena Isidro, D. Nanda, Peter D. Wysocki","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3427028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3427028","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We provide new evidence on the codependence among the many country attributes previously linked to financial reporting quality. First, we show that the synchronicity of 21 changing country attributes spikes surrounding mandatory IFRS adoption. Thus, while IFRS adoption “explains” increased reporting quality, this finding disappears after including other changing country determinants of reporting quality. Second, a single underlying factor distills the numerous reporting quality measures used in the international literature. Finally, we document that four underlying country factors largely subsume the individual explanatory power of 72 candidate country attributes in explaining reporting quality levels across countries. We conclude with implications and suggestions for future research on international reporting quality.\u0000 JEL Classifications: F30; G15; K22; M41.\u0000 Data Availability: Data used in this paper are from publicly available sources and/or are drawn directly from data tabulated in published research papers.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"114 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116469961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Unlimited FDIC Insurance and the Implications for Corporate Cash","authors":"Anna‐Leigh Stone","doi":"10.1142/s2010139220400017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2010139220400017","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the cash management practices of firms during the period of increased FDIC insurance on noninterest-bearing accounts. While the Transaction Account Guarantee Program and Dodd–Frank Act were intended to help banks by preventing deposit withdrawals, they also seem to have contributed to a change in cash management practices given that cash increased at public firms during this time as well. In addition, the increase seems to be driven by financially unconstrained firms, firms not at risk of default, firms with an investment grade bond rating, and firms with low cash flow variation. An analysis of aggregate data shows that a similar increase was not observed for private firms.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"192 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129270146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Credit Default Swaps and Corporate Bond Trading","authors":"R. Czech","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3422897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3422897","url":null,"abstract":"Using regulatory data on CDS holdings and corporate bond transactions, I provide evidence for a liquidity spillover effect from CDS to bond markets. Bond trading volumes are larger for investors with CDS positions written on the debt issuer, in particular around rating downgrades. I use a quasi-natural experiment to validate these findings. I also provide causal evidence that CDS mark-to-market losses lead to fire sales in the bond market. I instrument for the prevalence of mark-to-market losses with the fraction of non-centrally cleared CDS contracts of an individual counterparty. The monthly corporate bond sell volumes of investors exposed to large mark-to-market losses are three times higher than those of unexposed counterparties. Returns decrease by more than 100 bps for bonds sold by exposed investors, compared to same-issuer bonds sold by unexposed investors. My findings underline the risk of a liquidity spiral in the credit market.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129427873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Impact of Higher Capital Buffers on Banks’ Lending and Risk-Taking: Evidence from the Euro Area Experiments","authors":"Giuseppe Cappelletti, Aurea Ponte Marques, Paolo Varraso, Žymantas Budrys, Jonas Peeters","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3412762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3412762","url":null,"abstract":"We study the impact of higher bank capital buffers, namely of the Other Systemically Important Institutions (O-SII) buffer, on banks' lending and risk-taking behaviour. The O-SII buffer is a macroprudential policy aiming to increase banks' resilience. However, higher capital requirements associated with the policy may likely constrain lending. While this may be a desired effect of the policy, it could, at least in the short-term, pose costs for economic activity. Moreover, by changing the relative attractiveness of different asset classes, a higher capital requirement could also lead to risk-shifting and therefore promote the build-up (or deleverage) of banks' risk-taking. Since the end of 2015, national authorities, under the EBA framework, started to identify banks as O-SII and impose additional capital buffers. The identification of the O-SII is mainly based on a cutoff rule, ie. banks whose score is above a certain threshold are automatically designated as systemically important. This feature allows studying the effects of higher capital requirements by comparing banks whose score was close to the threshold. Relying on confidential granular supervisory data, between 2014 and 2017, we find that banks identified as O-SII reduced, in the short-term, their credit supply to households and financial sectors and shifted their lending to less risky counterparts within the non-financial corporations. In the medium-term, the impact on credit supply is defused and banks shift their lending to less risky counterparts within the financial and household sectors. Our findings suggest that the discontinuous policy change had limited effects on the overall supply of credit although we find evidence of a reduction in the credit supply at the inception of the macroprudential policy. This result supports the hypothesis that the implementation of the O-SII's framework could have a positive disciplining effect by reducing banks' risk-taking while having only a reduced adverse impact JEL Classification: E44, E51, E58, G21, G28","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123499048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}