{"title":"Credit Default Swaps and Corporate Bond Trading","authors":"R. Czech","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3422897","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Using regulatory data on CDS holdings and corporate bond transactions, I provide evidence for a liquidity spillover effect from CDS to bond markets. Bond trading volumes are larger for investors with CDS positions written on the debt issuer, in particular around rating downgrades. I use a quasi-natural experiment to validate these findings. I also provide causal evidence that CDS mark-to-market losses lead to fire sales in the bond market. I instrument for the prevalence of mark-to-market losses with the fraction of non-centrally cleared CDS contracts of an individual counterparty. The monthly corporate bond sell volumes of investors exposed to large mark-to-market losses are three times higher than those of unexposed counterparties. Returns decrease by more than 100 bps for bonds sold by exposed investors, compared to same-issuer bonds sold by unexposed investors. My findings underline the risk of a liquidity spiral in the credit market.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"12","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3422897","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Abstract
Using regulatory data on CDS holdings and corporate bond transactions, I provide evidence for a liquidity spillover effect from CDS to bond markets. Bond trading volumes are larger for investors with CDS positions written on the debt issuer, in particular around rating downgrades. I use a quasi-natural experiment to validate these findings. I also provide causal evidence that CDS mark-to-market losses lead to fire sales in the bond market. I instrument for the prevalence of mark-to-market losses with the fraction of non-centrally cleared CDS contracts of an individual counterparty. The monthly corporate bond sell volumes of investors exposed to large mark-to-market losses are three times higher than those of unexposed counterparties. Returns decrease by more than 100 bps for bonds sold by exposed investors, compared to same-issuer bonds sold by unexposed investors. My findings underline the risk of a liquidity spiral in the credit market.