PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Scorecards, Rankings and Gateways: Remuneration and Conduct in Financial Services","authors":"Elizabeth Sheedy, Le Zhang, Dominik Steffan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3317344","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3317344","url":null,"abstract":"The financial services industry typically provides performance pay to staff – a practice that has been linked to misconduct. This lab-in-the-field, real-effort experiment with 318 finance professionals investigates the impact of performance pay on behaviour, in an environment where compliance with policy is imperfectly monitored. For the first time we examine the remuneration structures which have been proposed by the industry and its regulators to mitigate misconduct: the balanced scorecard and the compliance gateway. Relative to fixed remuneration, both these remuneration structures produce significantly worse compliance outcomes. \u0000 \u0000The study also examines the role of relative performance information which is found to boost productivity. Peer feedback has no significant impact on the proportion of participants choosing to comply with policy, but for those who sometimes violate policy, peer feedback reduces the compliance rate. Membership of a professional association has no significant impact on the proportion choosing to comply throughout, but for those who sometimes violate policy, members have higher compliance rates than non-members. Perceptions of peer compliance predict actual compliance behaviour in all treatments, highlighting the importance of social norms or culture for behavioural outcomes.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114304804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Has Regulatory Capital Made Banks Safer? Skin in the Game vs Moral Hazard","authors":"Ernest Dautović","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3332501","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3332501","url":null,"abstract":"The paper evaluates the impact of macroprudential capital regulation on bank capital, risk taking behaviour, and solvency. The identication relies on an exogenous policy change in bank-level capital requirements across systemically important banks in Europe. A one percentage point hike in capital requirements leads to anaverage CET1 capital level increase of 13 percent improving their loss absorption capacity.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115636937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Requisites for Development of a Regulated Secondary Market in Digital Assets","authors":"S. Johnstone","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3379623","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3379623","url":null,"abstract":"The component parts of a more complete market system in digital assets are steadily being assembled. The initial focus on the primary market has increasingly expanded to the secondary market. Cryptoexchanges are a particular subject of interest given their growing predominance and the exchange-like or intermediary-like roles they may undertake at various times. \u0000 \u0000This paper considers the pathway issues for the development of a regulated secondary market in digital assets. It explores the conditions necessary to develop a regulatory framework that does not also serve to reshape and confine the possibilities offered by cryptographic consensus technology. \u0000 \u0000To achieve core regulatory objectives, what regulation attaches to will need to be sensitive to the characteristics of different centralized and decentralized cryptoexchange models as well as the digital assets traded on them. The problem of establishing accountability and anchoring locus in relation to decentralized cryptoexchanges is considered. How the common characteristics of digital assets impact on the ability to develop secondary market regulation that meaningfully meets policy objectives is reviewed. \u0000 \u0000The potentially discriminating effect of imposing regulatory oversight on an industry in which different models of operation are still emerging must be carefully weighed. It is suggested that development of the regulatory framework should be model-neutral, form-independent and remain focused on the oversight of functions and establishing accountability for wrongdoing. Regulation should not be prematurely imposed in a manner that may inhibit the ability of private market regulation to develop effective outcomes that align with public policy concerns. Any development of regulatory oversight must also contemplate the involvement of intermediaries providing services specific to digital assets as well as intermediaries already involved in traditional markets. \u0000 \u0000It is proposed that it is necessary to cease looking at the regulation of exchange systems and intermediary conduct in isolation from the characteristics of digital assets. There is a clear prospect for a more fundamental interaction between secondary market activity and the asset design process that could better facilitate the formation of regulatory building blocks. This depends on the development of an effective public-private partnership.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"124 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116037002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Insuring Rents","authors":"Bryan P. Cutsinger, Alexander Marsella, Yang Zhou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3375405","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3375405","url":null,"abstract":"Economists have long recognized the need for durability-enhancing mechanisms to facilitate political exchange, but the focus has been almost entirely on mechanisms that raise the cost of reneging on bargains once they have been struck. What happens if these mechanisms fail? This paper argues that politicians have an incentive to establish an insurance-like mechanism that indemnifies interest groups whose legislatively-created benefits have been reduced. I consider the role of the Department of Justice's settlement authority in facilitating this type of transfer, and illustrate my argument by examining two recent settlements involving Citigroup and Bank of America. These settlements are notable not only because they involved the allocation of money to third-party groups who were not directly harmed by the alleged violations of federal law, but because both corporations were required to donate millions of dollars to housing counseling organizations whose subsidies Congress reduced following the 2010 midterm elections.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132810863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Dark Side of Bank Resolution: Counterparty Risk through Bail-in","authors":"W. Ringe, Jatine Patel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3314103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3314103","url":null,"abstract":"The introduction of bail-in resolution powers to impose the costs of a large bank’s failure on its creditors (rather than on the taxpayer) is the most intriguing initiative of the post-financial crisis regulatory framework. However, a fundamental conundrum remains in the legal regime: it is unclear who should hold bank capital that is subject to bail-in. \u0000This paper argues that such regulatory agnosticism as to the ideal counterparties of bail-in-able debt facilitates the subversion of the new bail-in tool. This includes inducing banking capital investors to counterproductively choose outcomes that further systemic risk. \u0000Using a difference-in-differences methodology, we provide evidence from the introduction of bail-in powers at the Eurozone level, showing that the introduction of bail-in powers went hand in hand with a growing interconnectedness of European banks. This confirms that counterparties matter fundamentally to bail-in, in a way that might be counterproductive for the objectives of bail-in, and that this counterproductivity results within the current regulatory framework’s prescriptive paradigm. \u0000We then discuss the challenges of regulating individual entities, within the financial system ‘commons’, to optimise banking capital counterparties. In particular, we develop Coasian, as opposed to prescriptive, principles that are likely to improve the current framework by facilitate learning about and adjusting to systemic risk. This article builds upon the literature by providing an analysis of the interaction between banking capital counterparties and bail-in; identifying a significant gap in the regulatory framework; and explaining why Coasian regulatory measures are necessary.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122479239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Banking Law in the Light of Nepalese Supreme Court Verdict","authors":"Suman Acharya","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3339514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3339514","url":null,"abstract":"Banking law is the branch of civil law which tries to perpetuate credibility of banking business. Good governance, customer protection, transparency and financial safety are the major concern of banking jurisprudence. In contemporary time, banking business is much risky job across the globe because if there is no proper awareness of existing laws and regulations, it may not only be the threat of the job but also causes huge amount of penalty to secure public confidence and protection of depositors. Efficiency in the fund management is necessary. Nepal doesn’t have long history of banking business. Yet, its scope has been increasing and ever increasing. Supreme Court of Nepal has developed new dimensions of banking jurisprudence for safe and secured transaction of banking business. Cross border banking poses new level of threat, which is necessary to resolve with global cooperation. As a common law following country, precedence of the court is equivalent to the legislation in Nepal until quashed by new decision.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117013873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Reconciling Independence and Accountability at the European Central Bank: The False Promise of Proceduralism","authors":"Mark Dawson, Ana Bobić, Adina Maricut‐Akbik","doi":"10.1111/eulj.12305","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/eulj.12305","url":null,"abstract":"This article revisits the balancing act between independence and accountability at the European Central Bank (ECB). It contrasts procedural and substantive concepts of accountability, and challenges the mainstream idea that independence and accountability can be reconciled through narrow mandates, the indiscriminate increase of transparency, the creation of multiple channels of accountability, and the active use of judicial review. These assumptions form the pillars of a procedural type of accountability that promises to resolve the independence/accountability dilemma but fails to do so in practice. The article brings evidence to show how ECB accountability has become a complex administrative exercise that focuses on the procedural steps leading up to monetary and supervisory decisions while simultaneously limiting substantive accountability. The failure to acknowledge the trade‐off between independence and accountability (said to be ‘two sides of the same coin’) has resulted in a tendency to privilege the former over the latter.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"119663912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"An Overview of the Electronic Transactions Bill 2017","authors":"Anthonia Igba","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3275075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3275075","url":null,"abstract":"In the wake of the computer age and globalization, the need to use electronic transactions in our everyday life cannot be eroded. For any economy to grow, trans-border transactions are inevitable and electronic transaction aids this relationship. The rate of e-commerce in the Nigerian economy is on the increase, as most businesses- both small and medium scale now use social platforms and digital marketing strategies to drive awareness for their products and services. <br><br>The Electronic Transactions Bill (the Bill) seeks to provide a legal and regulatory framework for conducting transactions using electronic or related media, the protection of the rights of consumers and other parties in electronic transactions, as well as facilitating electronic commerce in Nigeria and data protection. The Bill also seeks to strengthen the provisions of Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011 on the admissibility of electronic evidence by providing a broad legal frame work.<br><br>Currently, the e-commerce market in Nigeria is worth approximately $13 billion (thirteen billion dollars), according to a report by London based Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). Experts in the Nigerian financial service sector have also estimated that Nigeria’s e-commerce market value could rise to $50 billion over the next 10 years. Recently, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) predicted that the e-commerce sector is expected to contribute about 10 percent, of a projected N10 trillion, to the nations’ Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2018.<br><br>The Bill has long been passed by the National Assembly but still awaits presidential assent.<br><br>This article would highlight some provisions of the Bill.<br>","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128533869","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Impact of Market Design on Transmission and Generation Investment in Electricity Markets","authors":"Veronika Grimm, Bastian Rückel, C. Sölch, Gregor Zöttl","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3235262","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3235262","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we propose an equilibrium model in order to analyze the impact of electricity market design on generation and transmission expansion in liberalized electricity markets. In a multi-level structure, our framework takes into account that generation investment and operation is decided by private investors, while network expansion and redispatch is decided by a regulated transmission system operator - as well as the different objectives of firms (profit maximization) and the regulator (welfare maximization). In order to illustrate the possibilities to quantify long term economic effects with our framework, we calibrate our model for the German electricity market. We consider various moderate adjustments of the market design: (i) the division of the market area into two price zones, (ii) the efficient curtailment of renewable production and (iii) a cost-benefit-driven balance between network expansion and network management measures. We then analyze the impact of these market designs on generation and transmission investment in case those design elements are anticipated upon network development planning. The resulting investment and production decisions are compared to a benchmark that reflects the current German electricity market design and to an overall optimal first-best benchmark. Our results reveal that price zones do have a significant impact on locational choice of generators and result in a reduced need for network expansion, but lead to only moderate annual welfare gains of approximately 0.9% of annual total system costs. Anticipation of optimal curtailment of renewables and a cost-benefit-driven use of redispatch operations upon network expansion planning, however, implies a welfare gain of over 4.9% of annual total system costs per year as compared to the existing market design, which equals 85% of the maximal possible welfare gain of the first-best benchmark.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131843673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Federal Guidance to Enhance the Availability of Financial Services for, and the Financial Transparency of, Marijuana-Related Businesses: The Distinctly Separate Federal Approaches Between Marijuana-Related Businesses and Marijuana-Related Business Banking","authors":"Dante Tosetti","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3221748","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3221748","url":null,"abstract":"In general, state licensed marijuana related businesses (“MRB”) have difficulty obtaining standard banking services from financial institutions since marijuana remains illegal under federal law. The prevailing notion that additional federal action is necessary to open banking services to the marijuana industry is inappropriate. Since MRB banking is inherently high-risk, the argument for additional legal or regulatory leeway to encourage MRB banking is not a sound solution. Federal guidance is in place for all state and federal chartered banks and credit unions to provide banking services to MRBs. A limited number of financial institutions follow the federal guidance and offer MRB banking services in an open and transparent manner, yet the number of such financial institutions does not meet the overall demand of the marijuana industry. Reinforcement of the federal guidance and awareness of the current best practices within marijuana banking could encourage additional financial institutions to service MRBs. As more financial institutions make the business decision to enter MRB banking under existing regulatory expectations, greater transparency of the marijuana ecosystem will be made available to all stakeholders.","PeriodicalId":138725,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Markets & Investment (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134058820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}