{"title":"Terms-of-Trade Shocks are Not All Alike","authors":"F. Di Pace, Luciana Juvenal, Ivan Petrella","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3764541","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3764541","url":null,"abstract":"When analyzing terms-of-trade shocks, it is implicitly assumed that the economy responds symmetrically to changes in export and import prices. Using a sample of developing countries our paper shows that this is not the case. We construct export and import price indices using commodity and manufacturing price data matched with trade shares and separately identify export price, import price, and global economic activity shocks using sign and narrative restrictions. Taken together, export and import price shocks account for around 40 percent of output fluctuations but export price shocks are, on average, twice as important as import price shocks for domestic business cycles.","PeriodicalId":121231,"journal":{"name":"CEPR Discussion Paper Series","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134304521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Divided They Fall. Fragmented Parliaments and Government Stability","authors":"Davide Cipullo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3571910","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3571910","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies how political fragmentation affects government stability. Exploiting variation in the number of parties induced by a 5% vote share entry threshold in Spanish local councils, we show that the entry of an additional party in Parliament increases the probability of unseating the incumbent by 4 percentage points. We also document that mayors with more resources at their disposal for legislative bargaining are half as likely to be unseated. Challengers are younger, better educated, and more likely to win the following elections, suggesting that instability may induce positive selection on politicians. We interpret our results in light of a two-period bargaining model of coalition formation featuring government instability.","PeriodicalId":121231,"journal":{"name":"CEPR Discussion Paper Series","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116166604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Productivity Advantage of Cities","authors":"N. Jacob, Giordano Mion","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3594013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3594013","url":null,"abstract":"Ever since Marshall (1890) agglomeration externalities have been viewed as the key factor explaining the existence of cities and their size. However, while the various micro foundations of agglomeration externalities stress the importance of Total Factor Productivity (TFP), the empirical evidence on agglomeration externalities rests on measures obtained using firm revenue or value-added as a measure of firm output: revenue-based TFP (TFP-R). This paper uses data on French manufacturing firms' revenue, quantity and prices to estimate TFP and TFP-R and decompose the latter into various elements. Our analysis suggests that the revenue productivity advantage of denser areas is mainly driven by higher prices charged rather than differences in TFP. At the same time, firms in denser areas are able to sell higher quantities, and generate higher revenues, despite higher prices. These and other results we document suggest that firms in denser areas are able to charge higher prices because they sell higher demand/quality products. Finally, while the correlation between firm revenue TFP and firm size is positive in each location, it is also systematically related to density: firms with higher (lower) TFP-R account for a larger (smaller) share of total revenue in denser areas. These patterns thus amplify in aggregate regional-level figures any firm-level differences in productivity across space.","PeriodicalId":121231,"journal":{"name":"CEPR Discussion Paper Series","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116259315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Economic Warfare in Twentieth-Century History and Strategy","authors":"M. Harrison","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3605458","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3605458","url":null,"abstract":"In two world wars, both sides committed substantial resources to economic warfare. Before the event, influential thinkers believed that the threat of blockade (and later of bombing) would deter aggression. When war broke out, they hoped that economic action might bring the war to a close without the need for a conclusive military struggle. Why were they disappointed, and what was the true relationship between economic warfare and combat between military forces? The answer to this question depends on the effects of economic warfare, which can be understood only after considering the adversary’s adaptation. When the full range of adaptations is considered, it becomes clear that economic warfare and combat were usually strategic complements; they acted together and did not substitute for each other. The paper examines this question both in breadth and more narrowly, focusing on the Allied air campaign against Germany in World War II. There are implications for history and policy.","PeriodicalId":121231,"journal":{"name":"CEPR Discussion Paper Series","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126848102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bureaucrats Under Populism","authors":"Greg Sasso, M. Morelli","doi":"10.31235/osf.io/uznxd","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/uznxd","url":null,"abstract":"We explore the consequences of populism for bureaucrats' incentives by analyzing a model of delegated policymaking between politicians and bureaucrats. Populist politicians prefer a bureaucrat who implements their policy commitment, while non-populist politicians prefer a good bureaucrat with discretion. The presence of populist politicians thus determines replacement of good with bad bureaucrats and creates incentives for good bureaucrats to ``feign loyalty''. We show that feigning loyalty is more prevalent when the probability of populist leadership in the future is higher and the bureaucrats' pool of potential replacements is worse. We also show that bureaucratic turnover is higher under populists when the bureaucracy is strong and higher under non-populists when the bureaucracy is weak.","PeriodicalId":121231,"journal":{"name":"CEPR Discussion Paper Series","volume":"23 Suppl 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126062796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Emerging and Developing Economies: Ten Years after the Global Recession","authors":"M. Kose, F. Ohnsorge","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3541418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3541418","url":null,"abstract":"Although emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) weathered the global recession a decade ago relatively well, they now appear less well placed to cope with the substantial downside risks facing the global economy. In many EMDEs, the room for monetary and fiscal policies to respond to shocks has eroded; underlying growth potential has slowed; and the momentum for improving policy frameworks, institutions, and business climates seems to have slackened. The experience of the 2009 global recession highlights once again the critical role of policy room in shielding economic activity during adverse shocks. The subsequent decade of anemic growth underlines the need for sound policy frameworks, institutions, and business environments to promote sustained growth. With the global growth outlook weakening and vulnerabilities rising, the policy priority for EMDEs is now to improve resilience to shocks and to lift long-term growth prospects.","PeriodicalId":121231,"journal":{"name":"CEPR Discussion Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124088348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
F. Giavazzi, Felix Iglhaut, Giacomo Lemoli, Gaia Rubera
{"title":"Terrorist Attacks, Cultural Incidents and the Vote for Radical Parties: Analyzing Text from Twitter","authors":"F. Giavazzi, Felix Iglhaut, Giacomo Lemoli, Gaia Rubera","doi":"10.3386/w26825","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w26825","url":null,"abstract":"We study the role of perceived threats from cultural diversity induced by terrorist attacks and a salient criminal event on public discourse and voters' support for far-right parties. We first develop a rule which allocates Twitter users in Germany to electoral districts and then use a machine learning method to compute measures of textual similarity between the tweets they produce and tweets by accounts of the main German parties. Using the dates of the aforementioned exogenous events we estimate constituency-level shifts in similarity to party language. We find that following these events Twitter text becomes on average more similar to that of the main far-right party, AfD, while the opposite happens for some of the other parties. Regressing estimated shifts in similarity on changes in vote shares between federal elections we find a significant association. Our results point to the role of perceived threats on the success of nationalist parties.","PeriodicalId":121231,"journal":{"name":"CEPR Discussion Paper Series","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121914260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Simultaneous Search for Differentiated Products: The Impact of Search Costs and Firm Prominence","authors":"J. Moraga-González, Z. Sándor, M. Wildenbeest","doi":"10.1093/ej/ueaa075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaa075","url":null,"abstract":"This paper extends the literature on simultaneous search by allowing for differentiated products and consumer search cost heterogeneity. In a duopolistic market, consumers with sufficiently low search costs choose to inspect the products of the two firms and purchase, if any, the most suitable; consumers with higher search costs choose to examine just one of the products; consumers with prohibitively high search costs do not check any of the products and drop out of the market altogether. We show conditions under which a symmetric price equilibrium always exists. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the search cost distribution under which an increase in the costs of search of all consumers may result in a lower, equal or higher equilibrium price. We extend this analysis to the case with more than two firms. The effects of prominence on equilibrium prices are also studied. The prominent firm charges a higher price than the non-prominent firm and both their prices are below the symmetric equilibrium price. Consequently, with simultaneous search, market prominence increases the surplus of consumers.","PeriodicalId":121231,"journal":{"name":"CEPR Discussion Paper Series","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129114787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"To What Extent are Tariffs Offset by Exchange Rates?","authors":"O. Jeanne","doi":"10.3386/W27654","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W27654","url":null,"abstract":"In theory, we should expect tariffs to be partially offset by a currency appreciation in the tariff-imposing country or by a depreciation in the country on which the tariff is imposed. We find, based on a calibrated model, that the tariffs imposed by the US in 2018-19 should not have had a large impact on the dollar but may have significantly depreciated the renminbi. This prediction is consistent with a high-frequency event analysis looking at the impact of tariff-related news on the dollar and the renminbi. We find that tariffs explained at most one fifth of the dollar effective appreciation but around two thirds of the renminbi effective depreciation observed in 2018-19.","PeriodicalId":121231,"journal":{"name":"CEPR Discussion Paper Series","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130329845","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
E. Auriol, Julie Lassébie, Amma Panin, Eva Raiber, P. Seabright
{"title":"God Insures Those Who Pay? Formal Insurance and Religious Offerings in Ghana","authors":"E. Auriol, Julie Lassébie, Amma Panin, Eva Raiber, P. Seabright","doi":"10.1093/QJE/QJAA015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/QJE/QJAA015","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article provides experimental support for the hypothesis that insurance can be a motive for religious donations. We randomize enrollment of members of a Pentecostal church in Ghana into a commercial funeral insurance policy. Then church members allocate money between themselves and a set of religious goods in a series of dictator games with significant stakes. Members enrolled in insurance give significantly less money to their own church compared with members who only receive information about the insurance. Enrollment also reduces giving toward other spiritual goods. We set up a model exploring different channels of religiously based insurance. The implications of the model and the results from the dictator games suggest that adherents perceive the church as a source of insurance and that this insurance is derived from beliefs in an interventionist God. Survey results suggest that material insurance from the church community is also important and we hypothesize that these two insurance channels exist in parallel.","PeriodicalId":121231,"journal":{"name":"CEPR Discussion Paper Series","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115874253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}