Divided They Fall. Fragmented Parliaments and Government Stability

Davide Cipullo
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

This paper studies how political fragmentation affects government stability. Exploiting variation in the number of parties induced by a 5% vote share entry threshold in Spanish local councils, we show that the entry of an additional party in Parliament increases the probability of unseating the incumbent by 4 percentage points. We also document that mayors with more resources at their disposal for legislative bargaining are half as likely to be unseated. Challengers are younger, better educated, and more likely to win the following elections, suggesting that instability may induce positive selection on politicians. We interpret our results in light of a two-period bargaining model of coalition formation featuring government instability.
分而治之。支离破碎的议会和政府稳定
本文研究政治分裂对政府稳定的影响。利用西班牙地方议会中5%的投票份额门槛所导致的政党数量变化,我们表明,议会中增加一个政党将使现任者下台的可能性增加4个百分点。我们还证明,拥有更多立法谈判资源的市长被罢免的可能性只有一半。挑战者更年轻,受教育程度更高,更有可能赢得接下来的选举,这表明不稳定可能会导致对政治家的积极选择。我们根据一个以政府不稳定为特征的两期议价模型来解释我们的结果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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