{"title":"Testing Predictions on Supplier Governance from the Global Value Chains Literature","authors":"Johannes Van Biesebroeck, A. Schmitt","doi":"10.1093/icc/dtab034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dtab034","url":null,"abstract":"A vast empirical literature analyzes the determinants of the make-or-buy decision, but firms also need to decide how to organize their supplier relationships when they choose to buy. The global value chains framework provides predictions on the nature of buyer-supplier collaboration. We use a unique transaction-level dataset of outsourced automotive components to study carmakers' choice between four distinct types of supplier governance: market, captive, relational, or modular. The theory formulates predictions based on three characteristics: the complexity or contractibility of a transaction, the capabilities of suppliers, and how objectively codifiable performance requirements are. The results illustrate that sourcing relationships differ systematically and that proxies for the three characteristics have effects in line with the theory.","PeriodicalId":121231,"journal":{"name":"CEPR Discussion Paper Series","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126186217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ageing-Driven Migration and Redistribution: Comparing Policy Regimes","authors":"A. Razin, Alexander Horst Schwemmer","doi":"10.3386/w26998","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w26998","url":null,"abstract":"Life cycle and insurance-type considerations dominate redistribution policy. Wage and fiscal prospects of ageing dominate migration policy. The paper compares distinct policy regimes, directed at migration and redistribution issues. Migration quotas, provision of social benefits, labor income taxation, and capital income taxation, are all endogenously determined in a policy-optimizing framework. The analysis makes a three-way comparison: free-migration regime vs. restricted-migration regime, welfare-state regime vs. no-migration-quota, no-redistribution regime, and low-income-majority regime vs. high-income-majority regime.","PeriodicalId":121231,"journal":{"name":"CEPR Discussion Paper Series","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115055715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"High Order Openness","authors":"J. Imbs, Laurent L. Pauwels","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3595049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3595049","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a new measure of high order trade, labeled HOT, based on the fraction of a sector’s downstream uses that cross a border. Because it decomposes gross output, HOT evaluates a sector’s exposure to foreign shocks abstracting altogether from observed direct trade, which we exploit to construct instruments for openness. For the same reason, we can evaluate HOT with precision for activities where measured direct trade is essentially zero, like some services. We compute HOT and its instruments for 50 sectors in 43 countries using recently released data on international input-output linkages. We compare its properties with conventional measures that all rely on observed direct trade. HOT correlates positively with conventional trade measures across countries, much less across sectors as many more are open according to our measure. HOT correlates significantly with sector productivity, growth, and synchronization; none of the conventional measures do. Once instrumented, we show high order openness causes productivity and synchronization, but not growth.","PeriodicalId":121231,"journal":{"name":"CEPR Discussion Paper Series","volume":"171 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123180113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Global Giants and Local Stars: How Changes in Brand Ownership Affect Competition","authors":"Vanessa Alviarez, K. Head, T. Mayer","doi":"10.18235/0003333","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18235/0003333","url":null,"abstract":"We assess the consequences for consumers in 76 countries of multinational acquisitions in beer and spirits. Outcomes depend on how changes in ownership affect markups versus efficiency. We find that owner fixed effects contribute very little to the performance of brands. On average, foreign ownership tends to raise costs and lower appeal. Using the estimated model, we simulate the consequences of counter-factual national merger regulation. The US beer price index would have been 4-7% higher without divestitures. Up to 30% savings could have been obtained in Latin America by emulating the pro-competition policies of the US and EU.","PeriodicalId":121231,"journal":{"name":"CEPR Discussion Paper Series","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121751759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Voluntary and Mandatory Social Distancing: Evidence on COVID-19 Exposure Rates from Chinese Provinces and Selected Countries","authors":"A. Chudik, M. Pesaran, A. Rebucci","doi":"10.24149/gwp382","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24149/gwp382","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers a modification of the standard Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model of epidemic that allows for different degrees of compulsory as well as voluntary social distancing. It is shown that the fraction of population that self-isolates varies with the perceived probability of contracting the disease. Implications of social distancing both on the epidemic and recession curves are investigated and their trade off is simulated under a number of different social distancing and economic participation scenarios. We show that mandating social distancing is very effective at flattening the epidemic curve, but is costly in terms of employment loss. However, if targeted towards individuals most likely to spread the infection, the employment loss can be somewhat reduced. We also show that voluntary self-isolation driven by individual's perceived risk of becoming infected kicks in only towards the peak of the epidemic and has little or no impact on flattening the epidemic curve. Using available statistics and correcting for measurement errors, we estimate the rate of exposure to COVID-19 for 21 Chinese provinces and a selected number of countries. The exposure rates are generally small, but vary considerably between Hubei and other Chinese provinces as well as across countries. Strikingly, the exposure rate in Hubei province is around 40 times larger than the rates for other Chinese provinces, with the exposure rates for some European countries being 3-5 times larger than Hubei (the epicenter of the epidemic). The paper also provides country-specific estimates of the recovery rate, showing it to be about 21 days (a week longer than the 14 days typically assumed), and relatively homogeneous across Chinese provinces and for a selected number of countries.","PeriodicalId":121231,"journal":{"name":"CEPR Discussion Paper Series","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126821555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Liza Archanskaia, Johannes van Biesebroeck, Gerald Willmann
{"title":"Comparative Advantage in (Non-)Routine Production","authors":"Liza Archanskaia, Johannes van Biesebroeck, Gerald Willmann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3593376","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3593376","url":null,"abstract":"We illustrate a new source of comparative advantage that is generated by countries’ different ability to adjust to technological change. Our model introduces substitution of workers in codifiable (routine) tasks with more efficient machines, a process extensively documented in the labor literature, into a canonical 2 × 2 × 2 Heckscher-Ohlin model. Our key hypothesis is that labor reallocation across tasks is subject to frictions, the importance of which varies by country. The arrival of capital-augmenting innovations triggers the movement of workers out of routine tasks, and countries with low labor market frictions become relatively abundant in non-routine labor. In the new equilibrium, more flexible countries specialize in producing goods that use non-routine labor more intensively. We document empirically that the ranking of countries with respect to the routine intensity of their exports is strongly related to labor market institutions and to cultural norms that influence adjustment to technological change, such as risk aversion or long-term orientation. The explanatory power of this mechanism for trade flows is especially strong for intra-EU trade.","PeriodicalId":121231,"journal":{"name":"CEPR Discussion Paper Series","volume":"114 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130198187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Political Model of Trust","authors":"Marina Agranov, Ran Eilat, K. Sonin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3585370","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3585370","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze a simple model of political competition, in which the uninformed median voter chooses whether to follow or ignore the advice of the informed elites. In equilibrium, information transmission is possible only if voters trust the elites’ endorsement of potentially biased candidates. When inequality is high, the elites’ informational advantage is minimized by the voters’ distrust. When inequality reaches a certain threshold, the trust, and thus the information transmission, breaks down completely. Finally, the size of the elite forming in equilibrium depends on the amount of trust they are able to maintain.","PeriodicalId":121231,"journal":{"name":"CEPR Discussion Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130514972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Optimal Covid-19 Quarantine and Testing Policies","authors":"F. Piguillem, Liyan Shi","doi":"10.1093/ej/ueac026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueac026","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We study quantitatively the optimality of quarantine and testing policies; and whether they are complements or substitutes. We extend the epidemiological SEIR model incorporating an information friction. Our main finding is that testing is a cost-efficient substitute for lockdowns, rendering them almost unnecessary. By identifying carriers, testing contains the spread of the virus without reducing output. Although the implementation requires widespread massive testing. As a byproduct, we show that two distinct optimal lockdown policy types arise: suppression, intended to eliminate the virus, and mitigation, concerned about flattening the curve. The choice between them is determined by a ‘hope for the cure’ effect, arising due to either an expected vaccine or the belief that the virus can be eliminated. Conditional on the policy type, the intensity and duration of the intervention is invariant to both the tradeoff between lives and output and the aversion to GDP variations: the optimal intervention path depends mostly on the virus dynamics.","PeriodicalId":121231,"journal":{"name":"CEPR Discussion Paper Series","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132877905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Ties that Bind Us: Social Networks and Productivity in the Factory","authors":"Farzana Afridi, A. Dhillon, Swati Sharma","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3695412","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3695412","url":null,"abstract":"We use high frequency worker level productivity data from garment manufacturing units in India to study the effects of caste-based social networks on individual and group productivity when workers are complements in the production function but wages are paid at the individual level. Using exogenous variation in production line composition for almost 35,000 worker-days, we find that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of own caste workers in the line increases daily individual productivity by about 10 percentage points. The lowest performing worker increases her effort by more than 15 percentage points when the production line has a more homogeneous caste composition. Production externalities that impose financial costs due to worker's poor performance on co-workers within her social network can explain our findings. Our results suggest that even in the absence of explicit group-based financial incentives, social networks can be leveraged to improve both worker and group productivity.","PeriodicalId":121231,"journal":{"name":"CEPR Discussion Paper Series","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124298804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Economic Policy Incentives to Preserve Lives and Livelihoods","authors":"Roberto Chang, A. Velasco","doi":"10.3386/w27020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w27020","url":null,"abstract":"The Covid-19 pandemic has motivated a myriad of studies and proposals on how economic policy should respond to this colossal shock. But in this debate it is seldom recognized that the health shock is not entirely exogenous. Its magnitude and dynamics themselves depend on economic policies, and the explicit or implicit incentives those policies provide. To illuminate the feedback loops between medical and economic factors we develop a minimal economic model of pandemics. In the model, as in reality, individual decisions to comply (or not) with virus-related public health directives depend on economic variables and incentives, which themselves respond to current economic policy and expectations of future policies. The analysis yields several practical lessons: because policies affect the speed of virus transmission via incentives, public health measures and economic policies can complement each other, reducing the cost of attaining desired social goals; expectations of expansionary macroeconomic policies during the recovery phase can help reduce the speed of infection, and hence the size of the health shock; the credibility of announced policies is key to rule out both self-fulfilling pessimistic expectations and time inconsistency problems. The analysis also yields a critique of the current use of SIR models for policy evaluation, in the spirit of Lucas (1983).","PeriodicalId":121231,"journal":{"name":"CEPR Discussion Paper Series","volume":"115 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117172251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}