Economics LettersPub Date : 2026-02-01Epub Date: 2025-12-16DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112744
Federico Boffa , Piersilvio De Bortoli , Andrea Nicolodi
{"title":"Green and guilty: The interplay of environmental quality and greenwashing","authors":"Federico Boffa , Piersilvio De Bortoli , Andrea Nicolodi","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112744","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112744","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We develop a model with environmentally-conscious consumers whose utility depends on their perception of imperfectly observable firms’ environmental investments, and consumers differ in their level of sophistication. Firms can engage in greenwashing, i.e, in sending a costly message overstating their level of actual investments. We show that in equilibrium firms engage in greenwashing, and that greenwashing is complement to authentic green investments, rationalizing the available empirical evidence. We also show that both greenwashing and genuine investment decrease when consumers’ sophistication increases, and that a two product monopolist induces less (more) greenwashing and actual investments than two single product duopolists when products are substitutes (complements). Our findings imply a novel tradeoff between policies aimed at discouraging greenwashing or at fostering consumers’ awareness and the equilibrium level of genuine environmental investments.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"260 ","pages":"Article 112744"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145974725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economics LettersPub Date : 2026-02-01Epub Date: 2026-01-12DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112823
Olurotimi O. Soneye
{"title":"A self-employed pure altruist can donate both time and money","authors":"Olurotimi O. Soneye","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112823","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112823","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In models of voluntary contributions to public goods, pure altruists are typically held to donate either time or money, but not both. I show that under self-employment, a pure altruist can rationally contribute both time and money when the opportunity cost of time is endogenously linked to productivity. This link segments giving into time-only, money-only, and joint regimes. An implication is that observing joint contributions of time and money does not necessarily imply behavior driven by warm glow.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"260 ","pages":"Article 112823"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145974726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economics LettersPub Date : 2026-02-01Epub Date: 2025-12-11DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112776
DongIk Kang , Jongsang Park
{"title":"Adverse selection in reverse mortgages: Evidence from South Korea","authors":"DongIk Kang , Jongsang Park","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112776","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112776","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study tests for adverse selection in a government sponsored reverse mortgage market where pricing depends only on age, aggregate interest rates, and home value. Using district-level data from South Korea, we apply the “positive-correlation test,” linking coverage to unpriced risk factors such as longevity and housing-price expectations. We find that areas with higher life expectancy show greater participation and coverage. In contrast, slower past housing-price growth predicts greater coverage, particularly for high-value districts. The significant relationship between the unpriced risk factors and coverage reveal the presence of adverse selection in the market for reverse mortgages.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"259 ","pages":"Article 112776"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145750278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economics LettersPub Date : 2026-02-01Epub Date: 2025-12-11DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112777
Wassim Rajhi
{"title":"Global dollar shocks and the development drag index","authors":"Wassim Rajhi","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112777","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112777","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper quantifies how global dollar shocks redistribute macro-financial stress toward developing economies. We construct an annual country-year indicator, the Development Drag Index (DDI), which measures the recurring cost of dollar dependence as a share of GDP. The DDI aggregates import price pass-through, reserve carry costs, and sovereign spreads on foreign-currency debt. Using a shift-share two-way fixed effects design for 2016–2024, we interact common dollar shocks with time-invariant country exposure. Quantitatively, crisis-scale dollar appreciations are associated with an increase in the DDI for highly dollar-exposed developing economies, while routine dollar movements have no detectable effect.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"259 ","pages":"Article 112777"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145798511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economics LettersPub Date : 2026-02-01Epub Date: 2025-12-27DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112798
Rolf Färe , Giannis Karagiannis
{"title":"A note on measuring multi-product market power using the lerner index","authors":"Rolf Färe , Giannis Karagiannis","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112798","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112798","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this note we re-examine Shaffer and Spierdijk (2020) conditions for the aggregate Lerner index to be equal to the weighted-average of product-specific Lerner indices and we show that they can be made weaker than assuming a separable cost function with a linear output aggregation function. In particular, we verify that the aggregate Lerner index is equal to the weighted average of the product-specific Lerner indices, with revenue share as weights, if the cost function is separable in outputs and the output aggregation function is linearly homogenous.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"259 ","pages":"Article 112798"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145880979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economics LettersPub Date : 2026-02-01Epub Date: 2026-01-12DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112821
Shiyi Lu , Cheng Qian , Yiyin Wu
{"title":"Technological linkage and commonality in liquidity","authors":"Shiyi Lu , Cheng Qian , Yiyin Wu","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112821","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112821","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this paper, we find that interfirm technological linkage could induce commonality in stock liquidity. Analyzing the listed firms on the Chinese STAR Market, we document notable liquidity comovements among technology-linked stocks, a phenomenon not attributable to alternative interfirm linkages. Additionally, our research indicates that technological liquidity commonality is less pronounced among firms with more institutional investors, more analyst coverage, and higher profitability. Overall, our findings provide a new insight into the demand-side dynamics shaping commonality in liquidity.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"260 ","pages":"Article 112821"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146023993","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economics LettersPub Date : 2026-02-01Epub Date: 2026-01-17DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112824
Yuki Iwanaga , Teruyoshi Kobayashi
{"title":"Welfare bounds for linear-quadratic network games","authors":"Yuki Iwanaga , Teruyoshi Kobayashi","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112824","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112824","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper quantifies the efficiency of the Nash equilibrium in the class of linear-quadratic network games. We show that the theoretical bounds of the welfare ratio, defined as the equilibrium welfare relative to the social optimum, are fully characterized by the spectrum of the adjacency matrix of the underlying network. Specifically, the lower bound of the welfare ratio is determined by the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix, while the upper bound reaches unity whenever the matrix is rank-deficient. Applying the theory to empirical social networks, we find that the upper bounds tend to be close to unity.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"260 ","pages":"Article 112824"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146023994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economics LettersPub Date : 2026-02-01Epub Date: 2026-01-19DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112831
Michelle Xiaomin Fan , Doudou Gong , Qianqian Kong , Hui Yang
{"title":"Linear efficient and symmetric power indices","authors":"Michelle Xiaomin Fan , Doudou Gong , Qianqian Kong , Hui Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112831","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112831","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Chameni Nembua (2012) formulated all linear, efficient, and symmetric values for TU-games by assigning different coefficients to players’ marginal contributions corresponding to different coalition sizes. In this paper, we consider these values in voting games, and analyze how their coefficients influence players’ voting power. Our main result is that when all coefficients are between 0 and 1, players in minimal winning coalitions have positive voting power, whereas null players have non-negative voting power. We give the necessary and sufficient conditions for null players to have zero voting power. Moreover, we apply this result to unanimity games.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"260 ","pages":"Article 112831"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146023995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economics LettersPub Date : 2026-02-01Epub Date: 2026-01-05DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112808
Hai Lin , Rui Qiao
{"title":"Dark trading and informational efficiency around macroeconomic news arrivals: Evidence from the U.S. Treasury market","authors":"Hai Lin , Rui Qiao","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112808","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112808","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This letter investigates whether scheduled macroeconomic news announcements influence the market dark trading activities and how dark trading affects market efficiency around the news arrivals. We provide empirical evidence that the workup trading activities increase significantly after scheduled news arrivals, and the impact of news weakens after five minutes. We also find that dark trading decreases informational efficiency. Additionally, we find that the U.S. Treasury market incorporates new information very quickly, and the market efficiency is improved after news announcements.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"260 ","pages":"Article 112808"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145974731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economics LettersPub Date : 2026-02-01Epub Date: 2025-12-11DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112783
Lijuan Qu
{"title":"Incomplete information, strategic uncertainty and optimal monetary policy","authors":"Lijuan Qu","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112783","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112783","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies optimal monetary policy under incomplete information and strategic uncertainty. We show that heightened strategic uncertainty steers policy toward price stabilization by strengthening the central bank’s price-stabilizing response, while an increase in public relative to private information promotes output stabilization by raising the policy weight on output stability. Under endogenous learning, private learning reinforces price stabilization, whereas public learning strengthens output stabilization.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"259 ","pages":"Article 112783"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145750279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}