Economics LettersPub Date : 2024-09-29DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112004
Yichu Li
{"title":"Roe v. Wade and sex balancing","authors":"Yichu Li","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I provide evidence that abortion was used for gender balancing. The probability of the first two children being the same sex decreased immediately after <em>Roe v. Wade</em>. This crowded out the practice of having additional children to achieve gender diversity.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"244 ","pages":"Article 112004"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142416539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economics LettersPub Date : 2024-09-28DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112002
Lia Pacelli , Filippo Passerini
{"title":"Monopsony and rent sharing: Evidence from Italian hiring subsidies","authors":"Lia Pacelli , Filippo Passerini","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We estimate that hiring subsidies reduce concentration in labor markets where both small and large firms coexist. Wages increase only when HSs are in place and firms keep 96% of the subsidy amount, indicating that even small firms have relevant wage-setting power.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"244 ","pages":"Article 112002"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142416144","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economics LettersPub Date : 2024-09-28DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111994
Nicolás Blampied , Scott Mark Romeo Mahadeo
{"title":"Airline industry equities under external uncertainty shocks","authors":"Nicolás Blampied , Scott Mark Romeo Mahadeo","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111994","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111994","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We gauge the impact of news and other relevant external uncertainties facing airline firms via an equity market lens. Using local projections, we establish that rising investors’ fear shocks have long-lasting negative effects on airline industry equity returns, while increasing geopolitical, climate policy, and fuel cost uncertainties have comparatively short-lived impacts. Our results are robust to several alternative model specifications, including a pre-pandemic subsample. Based on our findings, we provide a promising avenue for future research in airline financial management.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"244 ","pages":"Article 111994"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142358744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economics LettersPub Date : 2024-09-28DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111999
Anirudh Shingal
{"title":"Economic sanctions and domestic diversion","authors":"Anirudh Shingal","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111999","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111999","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The existing sanctions-impact literature has documented diversion effects favouring third countries for both merchandise trade and investment, but it has not considered sanctions diverting trade towards the domestic economy in sender and target countries. We contribute by using the Global Sanctions Database (Felbermayr et al. 2020a,b) in a structural gravity framework to provide evidence for domestic trade diversion. Our results show that the adverse effects of different sanction-types on senders’ bilateral manufacturing imports get accentuated (and any positive effects get neutralized) when the underlying data include internal trade flows, providing evidence for diversion towards domestic producers in sanctioning countries. A similar finding is observed on the bilateral export side suggesting that sanctions also divert trade towards domestic consumption. Moreover, we find sanctions to reduce senders’ cross-border imports when domestic suppliers in the sanctioning country are more competitive, thereby supporting the political economy of sanctions-imposition.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"244 ","pages":"Article 111999"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142416587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economics LettersPub Date : 2024-09-28DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111990
James R. Hines Jr. , Daniel Schaffa
{"title":"Capital gains realizations","authors":"James R. Hines Jr. , Daniel Schaffa","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111990","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111990","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>If there are important nondeductible costs to long-term investing, then higher capital gains tax rates may encourage or discourage investors from realizing accumulated gains. This ambiguity suggests that the sizeable observed effects of capital gains taxes on realizations may partly reflect factors other than the time value of money, such as investor anticipations of future tax rate changes.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"244 ","pages":"Article 111990"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142416540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economics LettersPub Date : 2024-09-27DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111991
Marina Agranov
{"title":"Communication in stag hunt games: When does it really help?","authors":"Marina Agranov","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111991","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111991","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines whether the effectiveness of cheap-talk communication in Stag-Hunt-like games is influenced by payoff asymmetry between players. We find that communication improves efficiency when both players benefit from the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Otherwise, its impact is limited, regardless of whether one or both players communicate their intended actions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"244 ","pages":"Article 111991"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142416321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economics LettersPub Date : 2024-09-26DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111992
Maria Dolores Gadea-Rivas , Jesús Gonzalo , Andrey Ramos
{"title":"Trends in temperature data: Micro-foundations of their nature","authors":"Maria Dolores Gadea-Rivas , Jesús Gonzalo , Andrey Ramos","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111992","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111992","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Determining whether Global Average Temperature (GAT) is an integrated process of order 1, I(1), or a stationary process around a trend function is crucial for detection, attribution, impact, and forecasting studies of climate change. In this paper, we investigate the nature of trends in GAT building on the analysis of individual temperature grids. Our micro-founded evidence suggests that GAT is stationary around a non-linear deterministic trend in the form of a linear function with one structural break. This break can be attributed to a combination of breaks on individual grids and the standard aggregation method under acceleration in global warming.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"244 ","pages":"Article 111992"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142326746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economics LettersPub Date : 2024-09-24DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111993
Shanhui Yang
{"title":"Characterizing a probabilistic version of the Boston mechanism under weak priorities","authors":"Shanhui Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111993","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111993","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We characterize the probabilistic version of the Boston mechanism from Han (2024). This mechanism uniquely satisfies respect for rank, equal-rank ex-ante stability, and equal-rank equal-priority ordinal fairness. Additionally, it uniquely selects the rank-based leximin-optimal allocation among all equal-rank ex-ante stable allocations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"244 ","pages":"Article 111993"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142326745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economics LettersPub Date : 2024-09-24DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111996
Badreddine Hamdi
{"title":"Political connections of independent directors and earnings quality: The case of French firms","authors":"Badreddine Hamdi","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111996","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111996","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines the impact of political connections of independent board directors on earnings quality. We used two proxies of earnings quality, namely, discretionary accruals and real earnings management. Based on a sample of 1,936 firm-year observations from 2012 to 2022, our results reveal that firms with politically connected independent directors are more likely to display lower earnings quality in higher discretionary accruals and greater real activities manipulation. These results suggest that the monitoring role of independent directors in constraining earnings management practices, as emphasized by the agency theory, may be compromised by political connections.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"244 ","pages":"Article 111996"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142322456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economics LettersPub Date : 2024-09-24DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111995
Kimberly S. Krieg , Ferdinand Siagian , Juan Wu
{"title":"Does analyst forecast informativeness affect managers’ financial reporting incentives?","authors":"Kimberly S. Krieg , Ferdinand Siagian , Juan Wu","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111995","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111995","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study investigates how the informativeness of analyst forecasts affects managers’ financial reporting incentives. Using a novel Match Index to estimate the earnings management induced by analyst forecasts, we find that when analyst forecasts are less informative, managers place less value on using them as a benchmark and thus, engage in less earnings management to meet that benchmark.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"244 ","pages":"Article 111995"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142326747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}