Econometrics: Econometric & Statistical Methods - General eJournal最新文献_第9页

Strategic Competition and Self-Confidence 战略竞争与自信

Econometrics: Econometric & Statistical Methods - General eJournal Pub Date : 2019-10-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3481057

Stefanie Brilon, S. Grassi, Manuel Grieder, Jonathan F. Schulz

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引用次数: 1

Persuasion with Coarse Communication 用粗糙的沟通说服

Econometrics: Econometric & Statistical Methods - General eJournal Pub Date : 2019-10-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3540677

Yunus C. Aybas, E. Turkel

{"title":"Persuasion with Coarse Communication","authors":"Yunus C. Aybas, E. Turkel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3540677","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3540677","url":null,"abstract":"Persuasion is an exceedingly difficult task. A leading cause of this difficulty is the misalignment of preferences, which is studied extensively by the literature on persuasion games. However, the difficulty of communication also has a first order effect on the outcomes and welfare of agents. Motivated by this observation, we study a model of Bayesian Persuasion in which the communication between the sender and the receiver is constrained. This is done by allowing the cardinality of the signal space to be less than the cardinality of the action space and the state space, which limits the number of action recommendations that the sender can make. Existence of a maximum to the sender's problem is proven and its properties are characterized. This generalizes the standard Bayesian Persuasion framework, in which existence results rely on the assumption of rich signal spaces. We analyze the sender's willingness to pay for an additional signal as a function of the prior belief, which can be interpreted as the value of precise communication. We provide an upper bound for this value which applies to all finite persuasion games. While increased precision is always better for the sender, we show that the receiver might prefer coarse communication. We show this by analyzing a game of advice seeking, where the receiver has the ability to choose the size of the signal space.","PeriodicalId":11465,"journal":{"name":"Econometrics: Econometric & Statistical Methods - General eJournal","volume":"93 5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87662710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 10

The Quasilinear Quadratic Utility Model: An Overview 拟线性二次型实用模型综述

Econometrics: Econometric & Statistical Methods - General eJournal Pub Date : 2019-10-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3422221

Philippe Choné, Laurent Linnemer

引用次数: 3

Ambiguous State Dynamics, Learning, and Endogenous Long-Run Risk 模糊状态动态、学习和内生长期风险

Econometrics: Econometric & Statistical Methods - General eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3399366

Hongseok Choi

引用次数: 1

Simultaneous Two-Dimensional Continuous-Time Markov Chain Approximation of Two-Dimensional Fully Coupled Markov Diffusion Processes 二维全耦合马尔可夫扩散过程的二维连续马尔可夫链近似

Econometrics: Econometric & Statistical Methods - General eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3461115

Yuejuan Xi, Kailin Ding, Ning Ning

引用次数: 6

Copulas and the Quantity Theory of Money copula与货币数量理论

Econometrics: Econometric & Statistical Methods - General eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3456812

E. Weber

引用次数: 0

Measuring Linear Correlation Between Random Vectors 测量随机向量之间的线性相关性

Econometrics: Econometric & Statistical Methods - General eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3116066

Giovanni Puccetti

引用次数: 8

Models Where the Least Trimmed Squares and Least Median of Squares Estimators Are Maximum Likelihood 最小裁剪二乘和最小二乘中值估计量为极大似然的模型

Econometrics: Econometric & Statistical Methods - General eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3455870

Vanessa Berenguer-Rico, S. Johansen, B. Nielsen

引用次数: 13

A Competing Risks Model with Time-varying Heterogeneity and Simultaneous Failure 具有时变异质性和同时失效的竞争风险模型

Econometrics: Econometric & Statistical Methods - General eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3456382

Ruixuan Liu

引用次数: 2

A Practical Method for Testing Many Moment Inequalities 检验多矩不等式的一种实用方法

Econometrics: Econometric & Statistical Methods - General eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3454610

Yuehao Bai, Andrés Santos, A. Shaikh

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引用次数: 13