Strategic Competition and Self-Confidence

Stefanie Brilon, S. Grassi, Manuel Grieder, Jonathan F. Schulz
{"title":"Strategic Competition and Self-Confidence","authors":"Stefanie Brilon, S. Grassi, Manuel Grieder, Jonathan F. Schulz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3481057","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This study tests the hypothesis that competitive strategic interactions foster overconfidence. We experimentally compare a strategic environment in which players have an incentive to overstate their own ability to deter competitors and avoid competition with a nonstrategic environment in which these incentives are removed. Subsequently, we measure the participants’ confidence. Overconfidence persists in the former environment but vanishes in the latter. We provide evidence for three mechanisms that contribute to the persistence of overconfidence. First, participants who win uncontested update their confidence as if they had won in an actual competition. Second, by contrast, participants who do not compete do not update their confidence, thus creating an asymmetry in updating. Third, inflated ability messages are “contagious” because they affect positively how their receivers update their confidence. We provide empirical evidence on the role of these mechanisms to explain the Dunning–Kruger effect and gender differences in confidence. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4688 .","PeriodicalId":11465,"journal":{"name":"Econometrics: Econometric & Statistical Methods - General eJournal","volume":"s3-45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Econometrics: Econometric & Statistical Methods - General eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3481057","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

Abstract

This study tests the hypothesis that competitive strategic interactions foster overconfidence. We experimentally compare a strategic environment in which players have an incentive to overstate their own ability to deter competitors and avoid competition with a nonstrategic environment in which these incentives are removed. Subsequently, we measure the participants’ confidence. Overconfidence persists in the former environment but vanishes in the latter. We provide evidence for three mechanisms that contribute to the persistence of overconfidence. First, participants who win uncontested update their confidence as if they had won in an actual competition. Second, by contrast, participants who do not compete do not update their confidence, thus creating an asymmetry in updating. Third, inflated ability messages are “contagious” because they affect positively how their receivers update their confidence. We provide empirical evidence on the role of these mechanisms to explain the Dunning–Kruger effect and gender differences in confidence. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4688 .
战略竞争与自信
本研究检验了竞争性战略互动促进过度自信的假设。我们通过实验将战略环境与非战略环境进行了比较,在战略环境中,玩家有动机夸大自己阻止竞争对手和避免竞争的能力,而在非战略环境中,这些动机被移除。随后,我们测量了参与者的信心。过度自信在前一种环境中持续存在,但在后一种环境中消失。我们为导致过度自信持续存在的三种机制提供了证据。首先,在没有竞争的情况下获胜的参与者会增强信心,就像他们在真正的比赛中获胜一样。第二,相比之下,不竞争的参与者不会更新他们的信心,从而造成更新的不对称。第三,夸大能力的信息具有“传染性”,因为它们会积极影响接受者如何更新他们的信心。我们提供了这些机制在解释Dunning-Kruger效应和性别信心差异中的作用的实证证据。本文被闫晨、行为经济学和决策分析等学科接受。补充材料:数据文件和在线附录可在https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4688上获得。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信