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Identity, Utility, and Cooperative Behaviour: An Evolutionary Perspective 身份、效用和合作行为:一个进化的视角
Law & Prosociality eJournal Pub Date : 2011-06-01 DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2011.01646.x
P. Wichardt
{"title":"Identity, Utility, and Cooperative Behaviour: An Evolutionary Perspective","authors":"P. Wichardt","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9442.2011.01646.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2011.01646.x","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides an argument for the advantage of a preference for identity-consistent behaviour from an evolutionary point of view. Within a stylized model of social interaction, it is shown that the development of cooperative social norms is greatly facilitated if the agents possess a preference for identity-consistent behaviour. As compliance with cooperative norms (in the long run) has a positive effect on the agents’ pay-offs, it is argued that such a preference is evolutionarily advantageous. Notably, the argument, which assumes that agents always act in accordance with their preferences, also accounts for the cost of those features that are crucial for the selection process.","PeriodicalId":113084,"journal":{"name":"Law & Prosociality eJournal","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133213067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 11
Cognitive Load in the Multi-Player Prisoner's Dilemma Game: Are There Brains in Games? 多人囚徒困境博弈中的认知负荷:游戏中有大脑吗?
Law & Prosociality eJournal Pub Date : 2011-05-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1841523
Sean Duffy, John Smith
{"title":"Cognitive Load in the Multi-Player Prisoner's Dilemma Game: Are There Brains in Games?","authors":"Sean Duffy, John Smith","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1841523","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1841523","url":null,"abstract":"We find that differences in the ability to devote cognitive resources to a strategic interaction imply differences in strategic behavior. In our experiment, we manipulated the availability of cognitive resources by applying a differential cognitive load. In cognitive load experiments, subjects are directed to perform a task which occupies cognitive resources, in addition to making a choice in another domain. The greater the cognitive resources required for the task implies that fewer such resources are available for deliberation on the choice. In our experiment, subjects played a finitely repeated multi-player prisoner's dilemma game under two cognitive load treatments. In one treatment, subjects were placed under a high cognitive load (given a 7 digit number to recall) and subjects in the other were placed under a low cognitive load (given a 2 digit number). According to two different measures, we find evidence that the low load subjects behaved more strategically. First, the low load subjects exhibited more strategic defection near the end of play than the high load subjects. Second, we find evidence that low load subjects were better able to condition their behavior on the outcomes of previous periods.","PeriodicalId":113084,"journal":{"name":"Law & Prosociality eJournal","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126822594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 105
Trust Game: Does Trust Begets Trustworthiness 信任游戏:信任会带来值得信赖吗
Law & Prosociality eJournal Pub Date : 2011-04-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1804914
Şaziye Gaziog̃lu
{"title":"Trust Game: Does Trust Begets Trustworthiness","authors":"Şaziye Gaziog̃lu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1804914","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1804914","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we introduce a trust game and we test whether 'trust' begets ‘trustworthiness’. We designed a trust game with unknown number of rounds to the player, which created cooperation and efficiency in the trust game. We compared the results of this investment game with the previous finding. We also investigate the gender differences in the trust game. Our findings suggest that the trust is higher in woman, whereas trustworthiness is higher in man. Confirming Ashraf et al (2003). Furthermore, we also found that Trust Begets Trustworthiness, contrary to other previous results.","PeriodicalId":113084,"journal":{"name":"Law & Prosociality eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127856621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Lying: The Integrity Approach 说谎:诚实的方法
Law & Prosociality eJournal Pub Date : 2011-04-04 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1802438
C. Tollefsen
{"title":"Lying: The Integrity Approach","authors":"C. Tollefsen","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1802438","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1802438","url":null,"abstract":"I defend the claim that lying, understood as assertion contrary to what one believes, is always wrong.","PeriodicalId":113084,"journal":{"name":"Law & Prosociality eJournal","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125070530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Talent Acquisition and Retention in Social Enterprises: Innovations in HR Strategies 社会企业人才获取与保留:人力资源战略创新
Law & Prosociality eJournal Pub Date : 2011-02-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1820643
A. Bhati, M. Manimala
{"title":"Talent Acquisition and Retention in Social Enterprises: Innovations in HR Strategies","authors":"A. Bhati, M. Manimala","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1820643","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1820643","url":null,"abstract":"Over the years there has been a phenomenal growth in the number of social enterprises in India. This is partly a consequence of a new policy of the government to gradually withdraw from social development activities. The gap thus created is being filled by social enterprises. A social enterprise can be a ‘for-profit’ or ‘not-for-profit’ venture engaged in income-generating activities with an agenda of bringing about a positive change in the society. While social enterprises are engaged in the development of people, it is rather paradoxical that they experience a variety of problems with respect to the management of human resources within their enterprises. It is common knowledge that social enterprises perennially struggle with various critical human resource issues such as getting employees at low rates of compensation, providing growth opportunities for employees within the organization, retaining talent especially in the middle management, providing clearly defined roles and tasks to employees, etc, leading to high attrition and increasing the cost of acquiring and training new employees. It thus, becomes critical for social enterprises to think out-of-the-box and try a variety of innovative strategies to overcome these problems. This paper discusses a few such innovative HR strategies adopted by social enterprises to attract and retain talent, such as offering jobs to people with vision and value congruence, enhancing the credibility of the organization through brand building, providing opportunities for personal growth, creating a sense of ownership among employees through participation in decision making, creating sense of ownership among employees by giving equity shares, creating entrepreneurial opportunities within the organization, finding employees from among beneficiaries, attracting employees to serene lifestyle in peaceful and scenic location and providing attractive fringe benefits to employees. Collectively these strategies seem to suggest that social enterprises adopt a ‘partnership paradigm’ for managing their employees.","PeriodicalId":113084,"journal":{"name":"Law & Prosociality eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122310126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Cooperating to Resist Coercion: An Experimental Study 合作抵抗胁迫:一项实验研究
Law & Prosociality eJournal Pub Date : 2011-01-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1754063
M. Rider, Lucy F. Ackert, Ann B. Gillette
{"title":"Cooperating to Resist Coercion: An Experimental Study","authors":"M. Rider, Lucy F. Ackert, Ann B. Gillette","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1754063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1754063","url":null,"abstract":"This study sheds light on the difficulties people face in cooperating to resist coercion. We adapt a threshold public goods game to investigate whether people are able to cooperate to resist coercion despite individual incentives to free-ride. Behavior in this resistance game is similar to that observed in multi-period public goods games. Specifically, we observe \"out-of-equilibrium\" outcomes and a decrease in successful resistance in later periods of a session compared to earlier ones. Nevertheless, cooperation remains relatively high even in the later periods. Finally, we find that increasing the resistance threshold has a substantial negative effect on the probability of successful resistance.","PeriodicalId":113084,"journal":{"name":"Law & Prosociality eJournal","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132470183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance Under Endogenous Supervision 监控与薪酬:内生性监督下员工绩效的实验
Law & Prosociality eJournal Pub Date : 2011-01-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1755002
Dennis A. V. Dittrich, M. Kocher
{"title":"Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance Under Endogenous Supervision","authors":"Dennis A. V. Dittrich, M. Kocher","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1755002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1755002","url":null,"abstract":"We present an experimental test of a shirking model where monitoring intensity is endogenous and effort a continuous variable. Wage level, monitoring intensity and consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined by the maximization problem of the firm. As a result, monitoring and pay should be complements. In our experiment, between and within treatment variation is qualitatively in line with the normative predictions of the model under standard assumptions. Yet, we also find evidence for reciprocal behavior. Our data analysis shows, however, that it does not pay for the employer to solely rely on the reciprocity of employees.","PeriodicalId":113084,"journal":{"name":"Law & Prosociality eJournal","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114704308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World 慢点生气，快点原谅:不确定世界中的合作
Law & Prosociality eJournal Pub Date : 2010-12-09 DOI: 10.1257/AER.102.2.720
D. Fudenberg, David G. Rand, Anna Dreber
{"title":"Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World","authors":"D. Fudenberg, David G. Rand, Anna Dreber","doi":"10.1257/AER.102.2.720","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/AER.102.2.720","url":null,"abstract":"We study the experimental play of the repeated prisoner's dilemma when intended actions are implemented with noise. In treatments where cooperation is an equilibrium, subjects cooperate substantially more than in treatments without cooperative equilibria. In all settings there was considerable strategic diversity, indicating that subjects had not fully learned the distribution of play. Furthermore, cooperative strategies yielded higher payoffs than uncooperative strategies in the treatments with cooperative equilibria. In these treatments successful strategies were \"lenient\" in not retaliating for the first defection, and many were \"forgiving\" in trying to return to cooperation after inflicting a punishment. (JEL C72, C73, D81)","PeriodicalId":113084,"journal":{"name":"Law & Prosociality eJournal","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126845766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 331
Trust Among the Avatars: A Virtual World Experiment, With and Without Textual and Visual Cues 角色之间的信任:一个虚拟世界的实验，有和没有文本和视觉线索
Law & Prosociality eJournal Pub Date : 2010-12-07 DOI: 10.4284/0038-4038-78.1.63
Stephen A. Atlas, L. Putterman
{"title":"Trust Among the Avatars: A Virtual World Experiment, With and Without Textual and Visual Cues","authors":"Stephen A. Atlas, L. Putterman","doi":"10.4284/0038-4038-78.1.63","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4284/0038-4038-78.1.63","url":null,"abstract":"We invited “residents” of a virtual world who vary in real-world age and occupation to play a trust game with stakes comparable to “in world” wages. In different treatments, the lab wall was adorned with an emotively suggestive photograph, a suggestive text was added to the instructions, or both a photo and text were added. We find high levels of trust and reciprocity that appear still higher for non-student and older subjects. Variation of results by treatment suggests that both photographic and textual cues influenced the level of trust but not that of trustworthiness.","PeriodicalId":113084,"journal":{"name":"Law & Prosociality eJournal","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125683013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 25
Would You Trust Yourself? On the Long-Run Stability of Reciprocal Trust 你会相信自己吗?论相互信任的长期稳定性
Law & Prosociality eJournal Pub Date : 2010-11-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1709467
Philipp Schliffke
{"title":"Would You Trust Yourself? On the Long-Run Stability of Reciprocal Trust","authors":"Philipp Schliffke","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1709467","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1709467","url":null,"abstract":"Preferences for reciprocity of the Falk-Fischbacher type are applied to a game of trust. After deriving the reciprocity equilibrium, the evolution of preferences is analysed showing that a medium level of reciprocity is evolutionary stable. If players exhibit different inclinations regarding positive and negative reciprocity, a medium level of positive reciprocity remains stable but negative reciprocity must vanish. In both cases, players should show a level of reciprocity such that they would exactly trust themselves. The evolutionary equilibrium is characterized neither by efficiency (besides perfect information) nor by equity, although equity is used as a reference standard.","PeriodicalId":113084,"journal":{"name":"Law & Prosociality eJournal","volume":"114 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116918445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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