{"title":"The Behavioural Consequences of Unfair Punishment","authors":"Michalis Drouvelis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1734047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1734047","url":null,"abstract":"Experimental evidence from public good games with punishment suggests that punishment works when subjects assign it fairly by sanctioning non-cooperators. This paper reports an experiment in which punishment is assigned unfairly in the sense that it is not linked to individual behaviour and is melted out to all group members (irrespective of their prior behaviour). We test whether unfair punishment generates different contribution and punishment behaviour relative to the standard punishment game. Our findings suggest different dynamics of average contributions in the presence of unfair punishment relative to the standard punishment game. Contribution levels are significantly different only when subjects have obtained experience from both games. We also find that, although the assignment of punishment is unaffected after the experience of an environment with unfair punishment, a history of unfair punishment makes a difference regarding reactions to alleviation, reward and punishment received.","PeriodicalId":113084,"journal":{"name":"Law & Prosociality eJournal","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127802919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Size Matters (in Output-Sharing Groups): Voting to End the Tragedy of the Commons","authors":"Josh Cherry, S. Salant, Neslihan Uler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1674423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1674423","url":null,"abstract":"Individuals extracting common-pool resources in the field sometimes form output-sharing groups to avoid costs of crowding. In theory, if the right number of groups forms, Nash equilibrium aggregate effort should fall to the socially optimal level. Whether individuals manage to form the efficient number of groups and to invest within the chosen groups as theory predicts, however, has not been previously determined. We investigate these questions experimentally. We find that subjects do vote in most cases to divide themselves into the optimal number of output-sharing groups, and in addition do decrease the inefficiency significantly (by 50% to 71%). We did observe systematic departures from the theory when the group sizes are not predicted to induce socially optimal investment. Without exception these are in the direction of the socially optimal investment, confirming the tendency noted elsewhere in public goods experiments for subjects to be more “other-regarding” than purely selfish.","PeriodicalId":113084,"journal":{"name":"Law & Prosociality eJournal","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121745283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Legal Mechanization of Corporate Social Responsibility Through Alien Tort Statute Litigation: A Response to Professor Branson with Some Supplemental Thoughts","authors":"Donald J. Kochan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1672051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1672051","url":null,"abstract":"Courts continue to struggle with theories of liability for corporations under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) (a/k/a Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”). Recent cases like Kiobel (2d Circuit, 2010) and Doe v. Exxon Mobile (DC Circuit, July 2011) have raised issues of whether corporations can be sued at all under the ATS, illustrate that issues about corporate liability under the ATS continue to percolate within the judiciary.Written in early 2010 and just published in July 2011, this Response essay argues that as Alien Tort Statute jurisprudence “matures” or becomes more sophisticated, the legitimate limits of the law regress. The further expansion within the corporate defendant pool – attempting to pin liability on parent, great grandparent corporations and up to the top – raises the stakes and complexity of ATS litigation. The corporate social responsibility discussion raises three principal issues about how a moral corporation lives its life: how a corporation chooses its self-interest versus the interests of others, when and how it should help others if control decisions may harm the shareholder owners, and how far the corporation must affirmatively go to help right the perceived wrongs in the world in which they operate. Although these questions could be posed simply as ones of policy or morality, with the injection of the ATS into the discussion they become questions that must be answered by examining the dictates and limits of law. Every expansion of liability, whether it is in terms of the persons or entities who may be sued or the nature of claims recognized as creating legal obligations, should be viewed cautiously. In our zeal to “right every wrong,” we should not lose sight of some fundamental principles of corporate law and the limits of the judicial process that are at risk as the ATS liability net widens.","PeriodicalId":113084,"journal":{"name":"Law & Prosociality eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131286373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ignorance is not Always Bliss: Feedback and Dynamics in Public Good Experiments","authors":"M. Bigoni, S. Suetens","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1634835","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1634835","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we study the effects of providing additional feedback about individual contributions and earnings on the dynamics of contributions in a repeated public good game. We include treatments where subjects can freely choose whether to obtain additional information about individual contributions or individual earnings. We find that, in the aggregate, contributions decline less fast when additional information about contributions and earnings is provided on top of aggregate information. We also find that there exist substantial but intuitively appealing differences in the way individuals react to feedback. Particularly, individuals with a high propensity to contribute tend to imitate the highest contributor more often and are more inclined to obtain feedback about individual contributions than about individual earnings than individuals with a lower propensity to contribute.","PeriodicalId":113084,"journal":{"name":"Law & Prosociality eJournal","volume":"146 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132019410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Trust and Social Exchange","authors":"Rick K. Wilson, Catherine C. Eckel","doi":"10.1017/CBO9780511921452.017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511921452.017","url":null,"abstract":"Trust and its complement, trustworthiness, are key concepts in political science. Trust is seen as critical for the existence of stable political institutions, as well as for the formation of social capital and civic engagement (Putnam 1993, 2000; Stolle 1998). It also serves as a social lubricant that reduces the cost of exchange, whether in reaching political compromise (Fenno 1978; Bianco 1994) or in daily market and nonmarket exchange (Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Sztompka 1999; Knight 2001). Researchers in this area face three key challenges. First, the concept of trust has been used in a multiplicity of ways, leaving its meaning unclear. Second, it is used to refer both to trust in government and trust among individuals (interpersonal trust). Third, it is sometimes seen as a cause and sometimes as an effect of effective political institutions, leaving the causal relationship between trust and institutions unclear.","PeriodicalId":113084,"journal":{"name":"Law & Prosociality eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129483172","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do Religious Contexts Elicit More Trust and Altruism? An Experiment on Facebook","authors":"Bradley J. Ruffle, R. Sosis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1566123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1566123","url":null,"abstract":"We design a decision-making scenario experiment on Facebook to measure subjects’ altruism and trust toward attendees of a religious service, a fitness class and a local music performance. Secular and religious subjects alike display significantly more altruism and trust toward the synagogue attendees than participants at the other two venues. By all measures of religiosity, even the most secular subjects behave more prosocially in the religious venue than in the comparable non-religious settings. We also find that secular subjects are just as altruistic toward synagogue and prayer group members as religious subjects are. These findings support recent theories that emphasize the pivotal role of religious context in arousing high levels of prosociality among those who are religious. Finally, our results offer startlingly little evidence for the widely documented religious-secular divide in Israel.","PeriodicalId":113084,"journal":{"name":"Law & Prosociality eJournal","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126546506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Assortative Matching, Information and Cooperation: An Experiment","authors":"Chun-Lei Yang, C. Yue","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1543703","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1543703","url":null,"abstract":"Yang et al.(2007) show that assortative matching mechanisms can induce a high level of cooperation to prevail in repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments, but societies may also head to an all-defection state rapidly. Here, we additionally provide information on income distribution and show that cooperation significantly increases overall. Moreover, the effect can be traced back to a higher cooperation rate for people in the lowest income classes.","PeriodicalId":113084,"journal":{"name":"Law & Prosociality eJournal","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127893801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"\"Do the Right Thing:\" the Effects of Moral Suasion on Cooperation","authors":"Ernesto Dal Bó, Pedro Dal Bó","doi":"10.3386/w15559","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w15559","url":null,"abstract":"The use of moral appeals to affect the behavior of others is pervasive (from the pulpit to ethics classes) but little is known about the effects of moral suasion on behavior. In a series of experiments we study whether moral suasion affects behavior in voluntary contribution games and mechanisms by which behavior is altered. We find that observing a message with a moral standard according to the golden rule or, alternatively, utilitarian philosophy, results in a significant but transitory increase in contributions above the levels observed for subjects that did not receive a message or received a message that advised them to contribute without a moral rationale. When players have the option of punishing each other after the contribution stage the effect of the moral messages on contributions becomes persistent: punishments and moral messages interact to sustain cooperation. We investigate the mechanism through which moral suasion operates and find it to involve both expectation- and preference-shifting effects. These results suggest that the use of moral appeals can be an effective way of promoting cooperation.","PeriodicalId":113084,"journal":{"name":"Law & Prosociality eJournal","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115673077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Distinguishing Trust from Risk: An Anatomy of the Investment Game","authors":"Daniel Houser, D. Schunk, J. Winter","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1489785","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1489785","url":null,"abstract":"The role of trust in promoting economic activity and societal development has received considerable academic attention by social scientists. A popular way to measure trust at the individual level is the so-called “investment game” (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995). It has been widely noted, however, that risk attitudes can also affect decisions in this game, and thus in principle confound inferences about trust. We provide novel evidence shedding light on the role of risk attitudes for trusting decisions. To the best of our knowledge our data are the first rigorous evidence that (i) aggregate investment distributions differ significantly between trust and risk environments, and (ii) risk attitudes predict individual investment decisions in risk games but not in the corresponding trust games. Our results are convergent evidence that trust decisions are not tightly connected to a person’s risk attitudes, and they lend support to the “trust” interpretation of decisions in investment games.","PeriodicalId":113084,"journal":{"name":"Law & Prosociality eJournal","volume":"111 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126699966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Disentangling the Sources of Pro-Social Behavior in the Workplace: A Field Experiment","authors":"M. Tonin, Michael Vlassopoulos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1458869","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1458869","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents evidence from a field experiment, which aims to identify the two sources of workers’ pro-social motivation that have been considered in the literature: action-oriented altruism and output-oriented altruism. To this end we employ an experimental design that first measures the level of effort exerted by student workers on a data entry task in an environment that elicits purely selfish behavior and we compare it to effort exerted in an environment that also induces action-oriented altruism. We then compare the latter to effort exerted in an environment where both types of altruistic preferences are elicited. We find that action-oriented altruism accounts for a significant increase in effort, while there is no additional impact due to output-oriented altruism. We also find significant gender-related differences in the treatment effect: women are very responsive to the treatment condition eliciting action-oriented altruism, while men’s behavior is not affected by any of the treatments.","PeriodicalId":113084,"journal":{"name":"Law & Prosociality eJournal","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116959931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}