多人囚徒困境博弈中的认知负荷:游戏中有大脑吗?

Sean Duffy, John Smith
{"title":"多人囚徒困境博弈中的认知负荷:游戏中有大脑吗?","authors":"Sean Duffy, John Smith","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1841523","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We find that differences in the ability to devote cognitive resources to a strategic interaction imply differences in strategic behavior. In our experiment, we manipulated the availability of cognitive resources by applying a differential cognitive load. In cognitive load experiments, subjects are directed to perform a task which occupies cognitive resources, in addition to making a choice in another domain. The greater the cognitive resources required for the task implies that fewer such resources are available for deliberation on the choice. In our experiment, subjects played a finitely repeated multi-player prisoner's dilemma game under two cognitive load treatments. In one treatment, subjects were placed under a high cognitive load (given a 7 digit number to recall) and subjects in the other were placed under a low cognitive load (given a 2 digit number). According to two different measures, we find evidence that the low load subjects behaved more strategically. First, the low load subjects exhibited more strategic defection near the end of play than the high load subjects. Second, we find evidence that low load subjects were better able to condition their behavior on the outcomes of previous periods.","PeriodicalId":113084,"journal":{"name":"Law & Prosociality eJournal","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2011-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"105","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Cognitive Load in the Multi-Player Prisoner's Dilemma Game: Are There Brains in Games?\",\"authors\":\"Sean Duffy, John Smith\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1841523\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We find that differences in the ability to devote cognitive resources to a strategic interaction imply differences in strategic behavior. In our experiment, we manipulated the availability of cognitive resources by applying a differential cognitive load. In cognitive load experiments, subjects are directed to perform a task which occupies cognitive resources, in addition to making a choice in another domain. The greater the cognitive resources required for the task implies that fewer such resources are available for deliberation on the choice. In our experiment, subjects played a finitely repeated multi-player prisoner's dilemma game under two cognitive load treatments. In one treatment, subjects were placed under a high cognitive load (given a 7 digit number to recall) and subjects in the other were placed under a low cognitive load (given a 2 digit number). According to two different measures, we find evidence that the low load subjects behaved more strategically. First, the low load subjects exhibited more strategic defection near the end of play than the high load subjects. Second, we find evidence that low load subjects were better able to condition their behavior on the outcomes of previous periods.\",\"PeriodicalId\":113084,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Law & Prosociality eJournal\",\"volume\":\"18 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2011-05-11\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"105\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Law & Prosociality eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1841523\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Law & Prosociality eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1841523","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 105

摘要

我们发现,将认知资源投入战略互动的能力的差异意味着战略行为的差异。在我们的实验中,我们通过应用不同的认知负荷来操纵认知资源的可用性。在认知负荷实验中,被试被要求完成一项占用认知资源的任务,并在另一个领域做出选择。任务所需的认知资源越多,意味着用于考虑选择的认知资源就越少。在我们的实验中,受试者在两种认知负荷处理下进行有限重复的多人囚徒困境游戏。在一种治疗中,受试者被置于高认知负荷下(给他们一个7位数的数字来回忆),而另一种治疗中受试者被置于低认知负荷下(给他们一个2位数的数字)。根据两种不同的测量,我们发现证据表明低负荷受试者表现得更有策略性。首先,低负荷被试在游戏结束时比高负荷被试表现出更多的策略背叛。其次,我们发现证据表明,低负荷的受试者能够更好地根据前一阶段的结果来调整他们的行为。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Cognitive Load in the Multi-Player Prisoner's Dilemma Game: Are There Brains in Games?
We find that differences in the ability to devote cognitive resources to a strategic interaction imply differences in strategic behavior. In our experiment, we manipulated the availability of cognitive resources by applying a differential cognitive load. In cognitive load experiments, subjects are directed to perform a task which occupies cognitive resources, in addition to making a choice in another domain. The greater the cognitive resources required for the task implies that fewer such resources are available for deliberation on the choice. In our experiment, subjects played a finitely repeated multi-player prisoner's dilemma game under two cognitive load treatments. In one treatment, subjects were placed under a high cognitive load (given a 7 digit number to recall) and subjects in the other were placed under a low cognitive load (given a 2 digit number). According to two different measures, we find evidence that the low load subjects behaved more strategically. First, the low load subjects exhibited more strategic defection near the end of play than the high load subjects. Second, we find evidence that low load subjects were better able to condition their behavior on the outcomes of previous periods.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信