IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Platforms and the Rule of Reason: The American Express Case","authors":"Herbert Hovenkamp","doi":"10.7916/CBLR.V2019I1.1688","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/CBLR.V2019I1.1688","url":null,"abstract":"In Ohio v. American Express Co., the Supreme Court applied antitrust’s rule of reason to a two-sided platform. The challenge was to an “anti-steering” rule, a vertical restraint preventing merchants from shifting customers who offered an AmEx card from to a less costly alternative such as Visa or Mastercard. \u0000 \u0000A two-sided platform is a business that depends on relationships between two different, noncompeting groups of transaction partners. For example, a printed periodical such as a newspaper earns revenue by selling both advertising and subscriptions to the paper itself. Success depends on a platform’s ability to maintain the appropriate balance between participation on one side and the other. For example, if Uber, a two-sided platform offering transportation services, sets too high a fare it will have enough drivers but too few passengers. If the price is too low, it will have too many passengers in relation to available drivers. \u0000 \u0000Administering antitrust under the rule of reason depends on careful fact finding. Under antitrust’s per se rule, once a practice is proven little evidence of anticompetitive effects is relevant. By contrast, the rule of reason requires a searching factual examination of a record, enabling the court to understand the effects of the defendant’s activities. This obliges appellate courts to review the record, and the Supreme Court’s AmEx opinion should be tested against this requirement. The Court ignored specific district court fact findings to the effect that AmEx’s anti-steering rule imposed higher costs on everyone, including customers who purchased with cash. \u0000 \u0000The Court also concluded that AmEx’s anti-steering rule combatted free riding, because otherwise competing card issuers could profit from AmEx’s business model. That might be true if one could obtain AmEx’s perks merely by owning the card, but here one received the perks only for transactions actually made with the card, so there was no free riding. \u0000 \u0000More generally, the Court’s analysis assumed that costs on one side of a two-sided platform are offset by gains on the other side. In some situations, such as the Uber example above, that may be true. But in the AmEx case both sides of the platform were harmed by the anti-steering rule. Both customers and merchants lost an opportunity to bargain around Amex’s higher fees. In addition, competing platforms were also worse off because whey were denied the opportunity to offer a lower cost substitute transaction. \u0000 \u0000Competition always exists at the margin. One cannot evaluate the competitive effects of a particular restraint by considering whether the overall costs of a defendant’s business practices exceed the benefits. The AmEx challengers were not trying to tear down AmEx’s entire business, but only to enjoin its anti-steering rule. That requires assessing the marginal costs and benefits of the anti-steering rule. The record was clear that at the margin each merchant affected by the steering rule was worse o","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131391124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Cryptocurrency -- What Estate Planners Need to Know","authors":"Gerry W. Beyer","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3314161","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3314161","url":null,"abstract":"Less than a decade ago, if an estate planner asked clients whether they owned any cryptocurrency, the most likely response would be, “You mean, money to buy a crypt?” Now, due to the widespread media coverage of Bitcoin, the most famous of all cryptocurrencies, most clients will have some basic idea about what the estate planner is inquiring. \u0000 \u0000The use of cryptocurrency is increasing at a rapid pace. As of December 31, 2018, there were approximately 17.5 million Bitcoins in circulation worth over $67 billion. Although only a few cryptocurrencies in addition to Bitcoin are well-known outside the cryptocurrency community (e.g., XRP, Ethereum, EOS, and Stellar), over 2,000 different virtual currencies are actively traded. These other cryptocurrencies are sometimes referred to as altcoins, meaning that they are an alternative to Bitcoin. \u0000 \u0000A recent survey revealed that 25% of individuals between the ages of 24 and 38 who either had $50,000 of investable assets or earned $100,000 or more per year own cryptocurrency. A growing number of mainstream businesses already accept Bitcoin such as Microsoft, Subway, KFC Canada, many Etsy vendors, Whole Foods, Dish Network, and Expedia. In addition, some law firms are already accepting Bitcoin in payment of legal services. \u0000 \u0000This article starts by building a basic foundation about virtual currencies and how they operate. The article then reviews the estate planning and administration issues that arise with owning cryptocurrency and concludes with recommendations for how to address virtual currency in your practice.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116709601","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Governing what Wasn’t Meant to be Governed: A Controversy-Based Approach to the Study of Bitcoin Governance","authors":"F. Musiani, Alexandre Mallard, Cécile Méadel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3490202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3490202","url":null,"abstract":"Is it possible to implement trustworthy governance mechanisms for Bitcoin -- the technology that, by design and by manifesto, “was not meant to be governed” to begin with? This question has been raised several times since the creation of Bitcoin, which has been presented as an “alternative” currency circumventing state-backed financial and economic institutions. It is no coincidence that Bitcoin’s birth and swift rise took place at the very moment in recent history, 2008, when the worldwide financial crisis exposed the shortcomings and unsavory innerworkings of the global financial system. Not meant to be controlled by any central authority, Bitcoin’s monetary supply is shaped and defined by its namesake protocol -- its cornerstone being that from the inception of the system, the total amount of bitcoins that could ever be created was known and established in advance (twenty-one million), and so was their generation rate over time. The generation of bitcoins is based on an activity called mining, based on the principle that bitcoins are assigned as a reward to those users -- the miners -- that lend their computing and hard disk resources to the system for operational and security purposes. The establishment of the system’s functioning as “purely” technical, as mentioned, was strictly related to the alleged aim of wiping corruption and “human-made” dangerous and speculative practices from finance and markets. Banks and states could not be trusted anymore, opening the way to a trustless, cryptography-reliant, architecture-based solution. However -- and as we have explored in previous work (Mallard, Méadel and Musiani, 2014) -- when Bitcoin started becoming a global network and raised interest and business opportunities for a variety of actors worldwide, including a number of new market intermediaries, the issue of trust came back in full colors raising questions related to the global redistribution of authority and power -- and governance.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117211085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Antitrust by Design – The Prohibition of Anti-Competitive Coordination and the Consensus Mechanism of the Blockchain","authors":"Sebastian Louven, David Saive","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3259142","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3259142","url":null,"abstract":"Is the blockchain technology with its technical coordination mechanisms also posing new challenges to antitrust dogma? Are conventional principles transferable to platforms or do we need new approaches? This paper examines the applicability of the prohibition of concerted practices to blockchain issues and which requirements arise for a compliance-conscious design of new technologies.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130474189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Disruptive Technology and the Fintech Industry in Nigeria: Imperatives for Legal and Policy Responses","authors":"O. Ojo, Ugo Nwaokike","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3306164","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3306164","url":null,"abstract":"From faster payments to online lending and distributed ledgers, Financial Technology (popularly referred to as Fintech) is radically revolutionalising the way and manner in which we conduct our businesses and carry on with our daily activities concerning finances and financing initiatives. It is invariably impacting on every aspect of our lives, ranging from the payment for services rendered, merchant activities, lending platforms, banking services, crypto-currencies, wealth or finance management, mobilisation of funds, to mention a few. There is no doubt that the emergence of Fintech is a direct product of the evolution of the age of disruptive and digital technology or innovation, offering innovative products and services to consumers and stakeholders across the entire financial ecosystem. It is common that any innovation comes various issues or risks associated with the system and some of the problems relating to the Fintech industry are regulatory uncertainties affecting investors' participation, hostility from Financial Services (FS) incumbents, poor data protection, terrorism financing, money laundering, cyber crimes, identity theft or fraud, business and financial crimes. These issues coupled with the increasing and sustained interest for a collaborative and inclusive process of stakeholders' engagement in this emerging area, has led to the echoing demands for the government and the regulators as an important stakeholder in the Fintech ecosystem to enact relevant legislation and issue applicable guidelines and regulations for all stakeholders in the Fintech industry.<br><br>It is in the light of this that this paper examines the concept of Fintech and the evolution of the industry in Nigeria within the global business and commercial landscape whilst highlighting the various associated issues affecting the industry and the manner the law is expected to respond to them. The paper also examines the legal and regulatory framework for the Fintech industry in the United Kingdom and the United States and draws out relevant and invaluable lessons for the development of the industry in Nigeria intending to fashioning out a viable legal and regulatory framework for the Nigerian Fintech industry.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"187 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117278452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Smart Contracts and Blockchains: Steroid for Collusion?","authors":"Ai Deng","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3187010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3187010","url":null,"abstract":"What is a smart contract? What is a blockchain? After an intuitive introduction to these technologies, I discuss the implications smart contracts and the blockchain technology have on collusion.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"45 11","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131751608","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Problemi e prospettive del sistema bancario italiano (Issues and Future of Italian Banking System)","authors":"Vito Meli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3219051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3219051","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Italian Abstract:</b> Il testo commenta il lavoro di Montanaro e Tonveronachi (2017) in particolare riguardo gli aspetti legati alla tutela della concorrenza nel settore bancario italiano. Montanaro e Tonveronachi sembrano attribuire i problemi da loro riscontrati nel settore, tra le altre cause, anche a un eccesso di concorrenza. L’autore, invece, sostiene che è proprio la carenza di pressione competitiva, insieme ad altre ragioni, ad aver contribuito a non indurre il sistema bancario nazionale a procedere sulla strada della riduzione dei costi e dell’innovazione, ponendo così le basi per le difficoltà di “vitalità” rilevata da Montanaro e Tonveronachi. <b>English Abstract:</b> The article comments on Montanaro and Tonveronachi (2017) with specific regard to competition and antitrust enforcement in the Italian banking sector. Montanaro and Tonveronachi partly attribute to “competitive excesses” the causes of the problems they undercover in the sector. In contrast, the author argues that a lack of competitive pressure contributed to prevent the banking sector from taking the road of costs reduction and innovation. Among other causes, this is a source of the problems highlighted by Montanaro and Tonveronachi.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127203864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Development and Performance Evaluation of Automated Cassava-Grating Machine","authors":"Abudu Muhammed, Ososomi Sunday, Omoakhalen A.I., Imuran A.S","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3200907","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3200907","url":null,"abstract":"Performance and economic returns of developed automated cassava-grating machine was investigated. The equipment has a realistic functional efficiency of 91.5% and 88.4% for manually and electrically powered operation with the discharge capacity 4.04 and 3.66 tons per day respectively. Simulation of its economic analysis shows between $2.6 and $3.0 could be saved while using automated cassava grater over manual system for 1-ton of cassava tuber. At 0.01 and 0.05 level of significance, it showed that the machine has a good economic potential over the convection method of grating. It saves time and labour requirements by a factor of 0.68. Design of a Cassava grating machine is dual-mode in operation; it is powered both manually and mechanically. This feature makes it useful in the rural areas where there is erratic or no power supply. Cassava is fed into machine through the hopper down to the granting drum, which rotates at a pre-set constant speed. Cassava is an important starchy root crop of the tropical world, the need to mechanize its growing and processing cannot be overemphasised.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129834415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Trading Safety for Innovation and Access: An Empirical Evaluation of the FDA's Premarket Approval Process","authors":"George Horvath","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2990627","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2990627","url":null,"abstract":"Congress created the Premarket Approval (PMA) process to provide a rigorous safety evaluation of high-risk medical devices before they may be sold on the U.S. market. Evaluating a PMA application requires the FDA to conduct a lengthy, complex, and costly assessment of the extensive data a manufacturer must submit. But other policy concerns, notably a fear of hampering innovation and a desire to assure timely access to new technologies, have led Congress to relax some of the rigorous data requirements the PMA process imposes on manufacturers. Congress mandates that the FDA employ the “least burdensome” approach to regulation that allows a reasonable assurance of safety. The FDA has interpreted this as permitting it, among other things, to approve high-risk devices based on small, short-duration clinical trials the designs of which fall short of the most rigorous scientific standards. Congress also created “PMA Supplement” pathways that allow manufacturers to modify their PMA-approved devices with only limited supporting data. And Congress included several provisions in the recently-enacted 21st Century Cures Act that further tip the balance away from ensuring device safety. \u0000Scholars writing in the medical literature have raised concerns that the standards for PMA approval have become too relaxed, potentially compromising device safety. But most empirical studies have focused on the less rigorous 510(k) pathway, which is designed for low- and medium-risk devices. These studies provide limited evidence about how frequently PMA-approved devices fail. And no empirical work has examined whether these failures are related to the statutes and regulations through which Congress and the FDA have attempted to balance safety against innovation and access. This Article begins such an examination, presenting the results of a new empirical study of PMA-approved devices. The study finds that at least 4.6-6% of PMA-approved devices will fail in such a way as to threaten death or serious and permanent harm. Complex cardiovascular devices and devices that have been frequently and rapidly modified through certain PMA supplements are most likely to fail. \u0000Based on the concerns that have been raised and on the findings of this study, this Article suggests that Congress and the FDA should take steps to readjust the balance between safety on one hand and innovation and access on the other. The FDA should insist on scientifically rigorous, longer-duration clinical trials before approving PMA applications. Further, the FDA should limit the number of significant modifications that manufacturers of certain devices are permitted to make to a device through PMA supplements before a thorough safety assessment is required, and should limit how soon after one significant modification is approved that a second modification will be considered. Finally, Congress should amend the 21st Century Cures Act to avoid further tipping the balance between safety, innovation, and access away","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114371766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Antitrust Provides a More Reasonable Regulatory Framework than Net Neutrality","authors":"Joshua D. Wright","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3020068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3020068","url":null,"abstract":"In 2015, the FCC reclassified the framework for regulation of the Internet from Title I of the Telecommunications Act to Title II. This reclassification treats the Internet as a common carrier and bans any vertical agreements between Internet service providers and content providers. Economic analysis shows the 2015 Order harmed consumers and depressed investment. In April 2017, the FCC initiated a proceeding to end the Title II regulatory approach. Such a shift will also replace the categorical ban on vertical arrangements to a regulatory regime grounded by antitrust law and its “rule of reason.” Critics argue the antitrust approach cannot reach each of the harms envisioned by proponents of net neutrality or is otherwise insufficient. We explain that the criticism that antitrust cannot reach harm to innovation caused by anticompetitive conduct is wrong as a matter of both antitrust as a matter of theory and practice. We conclude that antitrust is superior to proposed alternatives that would condemn vertical arrangements in broadband markets either on a categorical basis or the plaintiff bearing the prima facie burden of showing proof of harm to competition.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116880914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}