治理不应该被治理的:一种基于争议的比特币治理研究方法

F. Musiani, Alexandre Mallard, Cécile Méadel
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引用次数: 2

摘要

是否有可能为比特币实施可信的治理机制——从设计和宣言上看,比特币一开始“就不应该被治理”?自比特币诞生以来,这个问题已经被提了好几次,比特币被描述为一种绕过国家支持的金融和经济机构的“替代”货币。比特币的诞生和迅速崛起发生在2008年,这并非巧合,当时全球金融危机暴露了全球金融体系的缺陷和令人讨厌的内部运作。比特币的货币供应不受任何中央机构的控制,它的货币供应是由其同名协议塑造和定义的——它的基石是,从系统开始,比特币的总数量是已知的,并提前确定的(2100万),随着时间的推移,它们的生成率也是如此。比特币的生成基于一种被称为“挖矿”的活动,其原理是将比特币作为奖励分配给那些将计算和硬盘资源借给系统用于操作和安全目的的用户——矿工。如上所述,将该系统的功能建立为“纯粹的”技术性,与所谓的从金融和市场中消除腐败和“人为的”危险和投机行为的目的密切相关。银行和国家不再被信任,这为一种不受信任的、依赖加密的、基于架构的解决方案开辟了道路。然而,正如我们在之前的工作中所探索的那样(Mallard, msamadel和Musiani, 2014),当比特币开始成为一个全球网络,并为世界各地的各种参与者(包括一些新的市场中介机构)带来兴趣和商业机会时,信任问题又全面出现了,引发了与全球权威和权力再分配以及治理相关的问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Governing what Wasn’t Meant to be Governed: A Controversy-Based Approach to the Study of Bitcoin Governance
Is it possible to implement trustworthy governance mechanisms for Bitcoin -- the technology that, by design and by manifesto, “was not meant to be governed” to begin with? This question has been raised several times since the creation of Bitcoin, which has been presented as an “alternative” currency circumventing state-backed financial and economic institutions. It is no coincidence that Bitcoin’s birth and swift rise took place at the very moment in recent history, 2008, when the worldwide financial crisis exposed the shortcomings and unsavory innerworkings of the global financial system. Not meant to be controlled by any central authority, Bitcoin’s monetary supply is shaped and defined by its namesake protocol -- its cornerstone being that from the inception of the system, the total amount of bitcoins that could ever be created was known and established in advance (twenty-one million), and so was their generation rate over time. The generation of bitcoins is based on an activity called mining, based on the principle that bitcoins are assigned as a reward to those users -- the miners -- that lend their computing and hard disk resources to the system for operational and security purposes. The establishment of the system’s functioning as “purely” technical, as mentioned, was strictly related to the alleged aim of wiping corruption and “human-made” dangerous and speculative practices from finance and markets. Banks and states could not be trusted anymore, opening the way to a trustless, cryptography-reliant, architecture-based solution. However -- and as we have explored in previous work (Mallard, Méadel and Musiani, 2014) -- when Bitcoin started becoming a global network and raised interest and business opportunities for a variety of actors worldwide, including a number of new market intermediaries, the issue of trust came back in full colors raising questions related to the global redistribution of authority and power -- and governance.
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