IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Taking Stock of Spectrum Sharing","authors":"J. Leibovitz, R. Milkman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3916386","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3916386","url":null,"abstract":"Shared access to airwaves dates back to the dawn of radio. Yet, recent spectrum policy in the United States has articulated the idea of “spectrum sharing” as a distinct form of radio regulation. In this paper we take stock of spectrum sharing as a public policy, with a focus on four questions. 1. What does it mean to have a spectrum sharing “policy”? We consider different ways of looking at spectrum sharing, including as a form of traditional radio coexistence and as a set of new technologies. We observe: * Sharing technologies can be grouped according to a simple framework, based on whether they use coordinating, sensing, or informing techniques and whether the implementation is centralized or decentralized. * Spectrum sharing as a public policy is not the same as spectrum sharing technology. Spectrum sharing as public policy is necessary when different categories of spectrum users are governed by overlapping, heterogeneous regulatory models. 2. What have we learned from recent spectrum sharing policy approaches? We consider several different spectrum sharing initiatives from recent years, including coordinated sharing in the licensed AWS-3 Band, automated sharing in the UHF, 5 GHz, and 6 GHz Bands (Television White Space, Dynamic Frequency Selection, and Automatedic Frequency Coordination, respectively), and multi-tiered sharing in the 3.5 GHz Band (the Citizens Broadband Radio Service). Key takeaways include the following: * White House leadership is critical when federal spectrum interests are at stake. Convening stakeholders in an organized forum to align expectations and share information is also essential. Sharing scenarios that involve both unlicensed operators and more traditional licensed users generally require an automated sharing technology to operate at scale. This automation can take the different technological forms described above. Enforcement is an important function that can be facilitated through centralized systems. * Multi-tier sharing can be complex but has been shown to work, with over 150,000 network nodes deployed in CBRS and no reported cases of interference. The CBRS rules promote sharing among a wide and heterogeneous range of users and use cases, including public and private networks, mobile and fixed wireless access, and consumer and industrial applications. Rule changes after the original order prevented experiential learning from some of the more innovative aspects of the CBRS regime and limited access to the Priority Access License tier in major markets to large network service providers. 3. What principles should guide future spectrum sharing policies? From these past experiences we distill several principles that are essential to a successful spectrum sharing policy: * Develop interference expectations. Sharing regimes should be informed by reasonable interference expectations, developed using modern analytics, rather than worst-case analysis. * Encourage standards and technologies that facilitate sharing. Shar","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122852503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Antitrust Economics of Cryptocurrency Mining","authors":"Florian Deuflhard, C.-Philipp Heller","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3917012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3917012","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The development of blockchain-based applications, to date mostly virtual currencies, touches many areas of law and economics. The most well-known applications of public blockchains rely on Proof of Work as a consensus mechanism in which miners compete to solve a cryptographic puzzle. We argue that economic tools for market definition may be adapted to delineate relevant cryptocurrency mining markets. Antitrust law can help to prevent network attacks and exclusion of transactions with lower fees by large miners. When multiple blockchains are part of the same market, the role of network effects in securing the leading position of more established cryptocurrencies can potentially lead to exclusionary behaviour.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131237885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Unilateral Practices by Digital Platforms: Facts and Myths about the Reach and Effectiveness of Competition Law","authors":"H. Schweitzer, Frederik Gutmann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3857751","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3857751","url":null,"abstract":"A frequent starting point of the ongoing debates on a future platform regulation – in the EU in the form of a “Digital Markets Act” (DMA) – is the alleged ineffectiveness of competition law enforcement in the digital realm, and in particular when it comes to “abuse of domi-nance” or monopolization proceedings against the largest digital platforms. This paper aims to do add to this debate in two ways: In a first part, it provides a rough overview of the competition law cases on unilateral practices in digital markets that have been initiated and partly completed over the last 10 years or so, with a strong focus on cases against large digital platforms. While there is a focus on the EU and its Member States, the overview also looks at relevant cases in other jurisdictions like the U.S., Australia, India, Russia and China in order to give an impression of the global enforcement dynamics. The overview – which is mostly based on the Concurrences database, with only some additional research on our part, which is by necessity selective – does not dive into a discussion of the merits of the cases. Rather, it is meant to systematize the enforcement actions and to provide a clearer picture when, where and why action has been taken on which grounds. A second part strives to draw some tentative conclusions from this overview against the background of ongoing pol-icy debates. Has enforcement indeed been intolerably slow? Does the enforcement pano-rama indicate what’s special about ensuring undistorted competition in the presence of gatekeepers and why we might need a special regime of platform regulation? Does it tell us something about the optimal scope of such a regulation, and about the interaction of com-petition law, the law on unfair business terms and consumer protection law in the digital realm? Does it hold insights about what we can expect from public and private enforcement respectively?","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129323816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Cryptocurrencies: Analysis of the Technology and Need for Its Regulation","authors":"Sumit Saundal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3903787","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3903787","url":null,"abstract":"Cryptocurrencies have been subject to much controversy across the world. So much so that many countries, including India, have made attempts to ban the cryptocurrency business altogether, considering it an economical threat which must be nipped in the bud. However, the crazy money that hangs in the air and concerns from the fin-tech entrepreneurs have made these governments sit up and take notice of the need for regulating the crypto market. The purpose of the present research is to delve into the evolution of cryptocurrencies, to analyze the legal issues surrounding the cryptocurrencies and their trading and the circumstances necessitating their regulation at the highest level. The research also covers the current international setup in cryptocurrency regulations and developing trends. The research gives a special emphasis on the Indian scenario – the developments in the past, regulatory actions, hits and misses, judicial pronouncements and emerging trends in the country.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130842340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Digital Trade in the Australia – EU FTA: A Future-Forward Perspective","authors":"N. Mishra","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3838572","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3838572","url":null,"abstract":"This paper assesses the significance of the Digital Trade Chapter of the Australia – EU FTA and focuses on the disciplines necessary to boost digital trade. In the ongoing negotiations, the EU and Australia are likely to agree upon conventional digital trade disciplines (e.g., e-signatures, e-authentication, paperless trading, customs duties on electronic transmissions) as well as provisions on online consumer trust and spam, and more contemporary disciplines on source code disclosure and data localization. These disciplines can undoubtedly contribute to boosting digital trade between Australia and the EU. However, data flows and data protection will remain a sticky issue in the ongoing negotiations, given the differences in data protection laws of the EU and Australia, and the EU’s exceptionally defensive approach in data protection. Instead of bypassing such issues, the FTA negotiators should view the negotiations as an opportunity to build mutual consensus and foster cooperation in formulating standards and mechanisms for data transfer. Further, the negotiations provide an opportunity for adopting deeper disciplines on digital trade facilitation that can nurture start-ups as well as experimenting with novel models for regulatory cooperation in nascent policy areas including AI ethics and open government data.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"1981 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128043009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Competition Law and Political Influence of Large Corporations – Antitrust Analysis and the Link between Political and Economic Institutions","authors":"Francisco Beneke","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3831269","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3831269","url":null,"abstract":"Economic policy determines the intensity of competition in markets. This gives incumbents the incentive to use their financial resources to influence policymaking in order to restrict competition and maintain or increase economic profits. Public authorities should promote that profits be used rather in welfare enhancing or neutral ways. Is competition law an adequate tool to promote this goal? This paper aims to ground the discussion on legal administrability considerations. The focus is therefore on whether we can design legal standards and identify evidence that courts can use to assess the tradeoffs between static efficiency, political influence of large corporations, and innovation. This paper argues that if political considerations are to be taken into account in antitrust analysis, these should be made explicit and looking at the evidence at hand in each case, in order to avoid enforcement guided by assumptions – such as that increases in market concentration always lead to risks in terms of political influence – that can otherwise be revised on a case-by-case basis.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134245800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"College Radio","authors":"Bhavya Sri Yarlagadda, T. Mohansai, V. Swetha, G. Bhanu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3718359","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3718359","url":null,"abstract":"FM is utilized as an amazing transmitter. FM radio band is chosen for radio transmission; any mobiles can be turned into FM, therefore, making it direct for the gathering of spectator's people to tune into the channel without any additional expense. Here we are planning to develop an FM Campus Radio. By utilizing this FM Radio students can make announcements or share any significant news. It comprises of FM station that can be controlled and kept up by either students or the management. It gives away to the students to explore in different dimensions. This proposed model of an FM transmitter is set up by utilizing the raspberry pi board. Pi board can be used as both server and FM transmitter. By utilizing this PI board the expense is diminished to an extraordinary degree which permits a foundation of webcasting of radio. A small antenna with low RF is utilized as the FM radio is utilizing inside the college. This FM requires low voltage as the PI board comprises low voltage.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128282128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"5G Security – The Politics of Huawei Equipment in the United Kingdom","authors":"E. Sutherland","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3654596","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3654596","url":null,"abstract":"While the US Congress has long viewed Huawei as a security threat, this only recently became part of US foreign policy, with efforts by the Trump Administration to press allies to exclude commercial operators from buying its 5G network equipment. US success has been mostly amongst its ‘Five Eyes’ surveillance partners. For 15 years the United Kingdom had allowed the installation of network equipment from Huawei, subject to special security arrangements. However, growing US political pressure, a shift to the right in the Conservative Party and other domestic factors saw rising parliamentary support for the exclusion of Huawei. After months of deliberation and evaluation the government of Boris Johnson instituted a limited ban on operators using 5G equipment from Huawei in January 2020. Then, under further US and parliamentary pressure the UK government performed a u-turn to adopt an outright ban, albeit phased to limit the costs and delays for citizens.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133241393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Collusion in Plain Sight: Firms’ Use of Public Announcements to Restrain Competition","authors":"Joseph E. Harrington Jr","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3644714","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3644714","url":null,"abstract":"This paper identifies three classes of public announcements which facilitate coordination among competitors to restrict competition. Nine episodes of collusion are investigated to understand how this method of communication operates and is effective. An assessment of the conduct of competition authorities and courts in these cases reveals inadequate enforcement. Recommendations are offered for how to more aggressively enforce antitrust law when agreements are reached through public announcements.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"77 6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134503801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Are Free Digital Services by Large Platforms a Broken System for Competition?","authors":"K. Diaw","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3636087","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3636087","url":null,"abstract":"There has been a significant shift in the past two years about the way large online platforms, e.g. Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, should be dealt with. The initially uncontested views about their benefits to consumers and the economy has been tainted by allegations of anti-competitive and other behavior that, it is argued, harms startups and small businesses, competition, consumers, among others. A key aspect of their business model is that they offer highly popular services worth “thousands of dollars” to end users ‘for free’. End users are, it is alleged, paying for such ‘free’ services through the back door, in money and not just with their personal data as it is common to hear. There are concerns that their business models can lead to higher consumer prices and less choice for the products sold or advertised on their platforms. Many have argued that competition among platforms is ‘for the market’: they compete in innovation and the most innovative gain monopoly positions until they are toppled. There are, however, growing concerns that some large platforms will be very difficult to challenge any time soon, let alone dislodge. I argue that a key reason is their ‘free services’, which: <br><br>(i) makes it almost impossible for startups to generate revenues whether from end users or businesses, even if they had full access to their data; and, more importantly <br><br>(ii) they might not have done absent entry concerns, i.e. they might have sold ads or levy commissions and charge (some) end users for their services. <br><br>I argue that governments/regulators should target interventions that incentivise platforms with certain characteristics to recover part of their costs from end users (characteristics of digital markets mean that prices for products can never be ‘high’). This would enable startups to grow by generating revenues from end users, address the data collection ‘race’ and privacy issues by reducing all platforms’ reliance on advertising revenues, hence stimulate competition among platforms. It would also increase market transparency and competition in other markets by reducing what customers potentially repay through the back door. Both Competition Policy (a modified ‘predation’ test) and, as a last resort, regulation are other options. While I do not specifically advocate for the digital tax which many governments have announced, I argue that it is the best opportunity outside Competition Policy and regulation to fix the problem, if well-designed. Promoting the funding of startups, especially for scaling up ‘successful’ ones is equally important.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115065342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}