IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Antitrust and the Corporate Tax, 1909–1928","authors":"R. Avi-Yonah","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3612167","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3612167","url":null,"abstract":"Between the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 and the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, the question of what to do about “trusts” dominated American political life. Before 1889, the dominant form of amalgamating competing businesses was the trust, because corporations could not hold shares in other corporations, and instead the shareholders would exchange their shares for trust certificates. But in 1889 New Jersey (the “traitor state”, according to muckraking journalist Lincoln Steffens) changed its corporate law to allow for holding company structures, setting of a great wave of amalgamations in areas like oil, tobacco, sugar and steel. \u0000 \u0000This paper will focus on one attempt to address the “trust problem” by means other than the Sherman Act (which faced some resistance in the courts, as the government lost the E.C. Knight case in the Supreme Court in 1895 and barely won the Northern Securities case in 1905). This was the corporate tax act of 1909, which as will be seen below, was primarily intended as an antitrust measure. However, after the enactment of the Clayton Act and the creation of the FTC in 1914, the corporate tax was less needed as an antitrust measure, and between 1919 and 1928 its antitrust features were largely eliminated.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116975644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Should Platforms Be Allowed to Sell on Their Own Marketplaces?","authors":"Andrei Hagiu, T. Teh, Julian Wright","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3606055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3606055","url":null,"abstract":"A growing number of intermediaries (e.g. Amazon, Apple's Appstore, and Walmart) act as resellers on their own marketplaces. We build a model of dual marketplace and reseller intermediation to explore the implications of this practice, and the call to ban it, taking into account an intermediary's optimal choice of mode. Our analysis shows that an outright ban tends to benefit third-party sellers at the expense of consumer surplus or welfare, even after allowing for innovation by third-party sellers. Rather than an outright ban, we show that policies that limit the imitation of highly innovative third-party products and prevent steering of buyers to the intermediary's own products would lead to preferable outcomes.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114281676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Correcting Common Misperceptions About the State of Antitrust Law and Enforcement in Digital Markets","authors":"Geoffrey A. Manne","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3623690","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3623690","url":null,"abstract":"Allegations of the insufficiency of the modern antitrust regime regularly take as given that there is something wrong with antitrust doctrine or its enforcement, and cast about for policy “corrections.” The common flaw with all of these arguments, however, is that they are not grounded in robust empirical or theoretical support. Rather, they are little more than hunches that something must be wrong, conscripted to serve a presumptively interventionist agenda. Because they are merely hypotheses about things that could go wrong, they do not determine — and rarely even ask — if heightened antitrust scrutiny and increased antitrust enforcement are actually called for in the first place.<br><br>Of course, it is possible that there are harms being missed and for which enforcers should be better equipped. Advocates of reform have yet to adequately explain much of what we need to know to make such a determination, however, and even more so to craft the right approach to it if we did. Laws should be formulated on more than an intuition that surely, somewhere, there must be anticompetitive conduct. Antitrust law should be refined on the basis of an empirical demonstration of harms, as well as a careful weighing of those harms against the losses to social welfare that would arise if procompetitive conduct were deterred alongside anticompetitive.<br><br>Contrary to the conventional wisdom, enforcers are hardly asleep at the switch and courts are hardly blindly deferential to conduct undertaken by large firms in the digital economy. It is impossible to infer from the general “state of the world,” or from perceived “wrong” judicial decisions, that the current antitrust regime has failed.<br><br>In particular, several common misperceptions seem to be fueling the current drive for new and invigorated antitrust laws. These misperceptions are that:<br><br>We can infer that antitrust enforcement is lax by looking at the number of cases enforcers bring; Concentration is rising across the economy, and, as a result of this trend, competition is declining; Digital markets must be uncompetitive because of the size of many large digital platforms; Vertical integration by dominant digital platforms is presumptively harmful; Digital platforms anticompetitively self-preference to the detriment of competition and consumers; Dominant tech platforms engage in so-called “killer acquisitions” to stave off potential competitors before they grow too large; and Access to user data confers a competitive advantage on incumbents and creates an important barrier to entry.<br><br>I address these misconceptions in turn.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"200 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116155408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Identity, Diversity, and Team Performance: Evidence from U.S. Mutual Funds","authors":"R. Evans, M. Prado, A. Rizzo, Rafael Zambrana","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3505619","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3505619","url":null,"abstract":"We examine team diversity and performance in the asset management industry. Focusing on political ideology as the source of both potential complementarities and conflict in a group, we find diverse teams perform better than homogeneous teams. The mechanism involves both improved decision-making due to more diverse perspectives and increased monitoring by heterogeneous team members. The benefits of ideological diversity are undone when political polarization is higher, consistent with increased intra-team conflict. In examining why less diverse teams are prevalent in asset management, we find entrenched managers prefer homogeneous teams, and the local labor market supply of ideologically diverse managers is constrained.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114970377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"What is the Value of an Innovation? Theory and Evidence on the Stock Market's Reaction to Innovation Announcements","authors":"Thomas J. Chemmanur, Dongmei Li, Kevin Tseng, Yu Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3504261","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3504261","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze, theoretically and empirically, the effect of investor attention on the stock market reaction to innovation announcements and suggest how market-based measures of the economic value of patents can be enhanced. We develop a dynamic model with limited investor attention to show that, following the immediate market reaction to innovation announcements, there will also be a stock return drift: the magnitude of the announcement effect will be increasing while that of the post-announcement drift will be decreasing in investor attention. We test our model predictions using two different datasets: a matched sample of pharmaceutical industry patent grant and subsequent FDA drug approval announcements; and a general USPTO sample of patent grant announcements. We use the media coverage of innovation announcements as a proxy for the investor attention paid to them. Consistent with model predictions, we find the following. First, in our matched patent grant and drug approval analysis, the announcement effects of patent grant announcements are smaller than those of FDA drug approval announcements; the subsequent stock return drifts, however, are larger for patent grant announcements. Second, the announcement effect of patent grant announcements is increasing in investor attention while the subsequent stock return drift is decreasing in investor attention. Third, the stock-return drift following patent grant announcements has predictive power for the economic value of patents, over and above the information contained in the announcement effect. Finally, we show that a long-short trading strategy based on investor attention is profitable over the one-month period after patent grant announcements.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115224659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Sustainable Open Innovation to Address a Grand Challenge: Lessons from Carlsberg and the Green Fiber Bottle","authors":"M. Bogers, H. Chesbrough, Robert W. Strand","doi":"10.1108/bfj-07-2019-0534","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/bfj-07-2019-0534","url":null,"abstract":"This paper describes the case of how the Danish beer manufacturer, Carlsberg, developed the Green Fiber Bottle as part of its sustainability program through an open innovation approach in collaboration with complementary partners. It thereby illustrates how a grand challenge associated with sustainability can be effectively addressed through open innovation and reveals the opportunities and challenges that emerge in that context.,The paper summarizes some key elements of the case and, in particular, discusses some of the lessons learned, which can be further explored in future research, practice, and policy.,The case suggests a number of key issues that are relevant when attempting to address grand challenges, in general, and sustainability in the food and beverage (FB sustainability beyond a solid business case; opportunities and challenges in the face of new business models; the importance of early wins for addressing societal challenges for signals and scaling; and the importance of the Nordic context and long-term vision.,The case describes a recent (and to some extent still ongoing) initiative of how a particular F&B company has explored new approaches to developing its sustainability program. Therefore, it highlights some of the unique characteristics of this case. This paper also lays the groundwork for the establishment of “Sustainable Open Innovation” as a domain in its own right.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129613450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Political Attitudes, Partisanship, and Merger Activity","authors":"R. Duchin, Abed El Karim Farroukh, J. Harford, Tarun Patel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3497907","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3497907","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides novel evidence that similarity in employees’ political attitudes plays a role in mergers and acquisitions. Using detailed data on individual campaign contributions to Democrats and Republicans, our estimates show that firms are considerably more likely to announce a merger, complete a merger, and a have shorter time-to-completion when their political attitudes are closer. Furthermore, acquisition announcement returns and post-merger operating performance are significantly higher when the acquirer and the target have more similar political attitudes. The effects of political partisanship on mergers are stronger in more recent years, when the political polarization in the U.S. is greater. Overall, we provide estimates that political attitudes and polarization have real effects on the allocation of assets in the economy.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126650560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Regulatory Sandboxes in the UK and Singapore: A Preliminary Survey","authors":"Christopher C. Chen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3448901","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3448901","url":null,"abstract":"After the UK launched the first regulatory sandbox regime in 2016, the approach was quickly transplanted to numerous other countries as a means of promoting innovation, improving competition and enhancing financial inclusion. However, it remains unclear whether the approach can effectively achieve the relevant policy goals and thus justify the differential regulatory treatment. This paper provides a broad overview of the regulatory sandbox regime and examines its potential benefits and problems. The paper then provides some empirical evidence by analysing the sandboxes awarded in the UK and Singapore between 2016 and 2018 with the aim of identifying what the businesses awarded the sandboxes are doing, the services they provide and their current regulatory status against the backdrop of the financial technology revolution. These cases provide a basis on which to assess the effectiveness of the regulatory sandbox approach in its infancy stage and provide some reflections for regulators.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"123 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127410675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The American Express Case: Back to the Future","authors":"A. Melamed","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3407652","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3407652","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines what the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in the American Express case, which is the only U.S. antitrust case that has explicitly addressed the unique issues raised by so-called platform or multi-sided markets, might tell us about the attitudes of the Court’s five-Justice majority about antitrust law.The majority opinion conflated the enduring normative contributions of the Chicago School with its embrace of empirical propositions from 40 years ago that have not stood the test of time and some of which are, in any event, not applicable to two-sided markets. The majority was willing to decide novel issues on the basis of abstract ideas about vertical restraints and free riding that were central to Chicago School analysis 40 years ago but which have since been shown to require more qualification and modification depending on factual context. The majority ignored the fact findings of the district court, and it was plainly willing to increase the risk of false negatives. Its decision was a triumph of ideology over fact-based decision-making.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128596788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Model Crypto-Asset Regulatory Framework","authors":"L. Perlman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3370679","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3370679","url":null,"abstract":"A stylized ‘crypto-asset’ regulatory framework (‘Framework’) is presented. \u0000 \u0000It is designed to capture the regulatory permutations and implications of the most prevalent and evolving forms of tradable value created through the use of evolving cryptographically-based (‘crypto’) schemes, as well as their stylized position in a financial ecosystem. The most prevalent of these value-based schemes are based on what is now known as distributed ledger technologies (DLTs), with the main type of DLT in use known as ‘blockchain’ technology. \u0000 \u0000Value-based applications that can be derived or generated from use of DLTs are known in this Framework as (private) crypto-assets. They can be distinguished from (public) applications of crypto-based value such as those planned by sovereign states for use as legal tender. \u0000 \u0000The main focus of the Framework is on these evolving ‘private’ use of crypto-assets and their representation as cryptographically-secure and traceable ‘tokens’ of value. These tokenized assets can be traded – that is transferred or exchanged - within regulated or unregulated exchanges, or directly, securely and independently between parties without the need for a centralized exchange. \u0000Together they form what could be termed the ‘crypto-economy.’ \u0000 \u0000All these developments challenge the four corners of existing legal and regulatory frameworks with, as yet, no global unanimity as to which regulators have oversight over all or some components of these crypto-assets. \u0000 \u0000The overall goal of any regulation would be to fasten the activities of the most proximate regulators to particular asset classes or value transfer/exchange mechanisms so as to avoid regulatory arbitrage. Where there are no proximate regulations to do so, regulatory sandboxes by the most proximate regulators could be employed. \u0000 \u0000The model Framework presented is designed to systematize the evolving asset types.","PeriodicalId":105752,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Regulatory Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122805803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}