Journal of Government and Economics最新文献

{"title":"How export shocks corrupt: Theory and evidence","authors":"Joël Cariolle ,&nbsp;Petros G. Sekeris","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2022.100057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jge.2022.100057","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Corruption is an important topic for governments and economics. A widely held belief is that exposure to international trade helps reducing corruption. In this article we show through theory and evidence that the relationship between trade and corruption is more nuanced. We show that firm level corruption actually increases when exports experience booms or busts. The reason is that export booms result in stronger incentives to favor production rather than corruption in low export settings, and vice versa in high export settings. Consequently, export busts when exports are very low, and export booms when exports are high, lead both to higher corruption. We corroborate these findings with an extensive database of some 45,000 firms from 72 developing and transition economies, surveyed over 2006–2017. We also confirm the corruption-deterrent effect of institutional quality.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"8 ","pages":"Article 100057"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667319322000283/pdfft?md5=f9db527bbec601e907379674f0a00d6b&pid=1-s2.0-S2667319322000283-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136549539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Data markets, government defense spending, big political families, and international tax coordination: Introducing articles of the journal of government and economics volume 7","authors":"Zhangkai Huang,&nbsp;David Daokui Li","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2022.100053","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2022.100053","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"7 ","pages":"Article 100053"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667319322000246/pdfft?md5=b195bf05f94c1615a3c14a1ec922d697&pid=1-s2.0-S2667319322000246-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91194803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Are data markets a solution to big tech market power? A competitive analysis","authors":"Anindya Sen","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2022.100052","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2022.100052","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper explores whether the establishment of data markets based on individual data portability can result in better societal outcomes. The results suggest that markets where individuals can sell data generated through their online engagement to third parties, could result in pareto improving outcomes for subscribers to digital platforms and purchasers of targeted advertising services. Data markets would enable third parties to combine their own proprietary data with other individual level data and produce information for targeted advertising, reducing the market power of Big Tech firms. However, successful data markets require strong regulatory measures by governments that ensure privacy and that data collected by Big Tech firms are considered the property of individuals. Such policies have the potential to guarantee that the benefits of Big Data are not confined to a few large firms.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"7 ","pages":"Article 100052"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667319322000234/pdfft?md5=cb2170fdc3f9a545aed3b48f82924a39&pid=1-s2.0-S2667319322000234-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86019381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Defense and Non-defense vs Debt: How does defense and non-defense government spending impact the dynamics of federal government debt in the United States?","authors":"Haydory Akbar Ahmed ,&nbsp;Sharif Mahmood ,&nbsp;Hedieh Shadmani","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2022.100050","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2022.100050","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper explores the dynamic relationship among defense and non-defense government spending, the government debt, and the output gap in the United States. We estimate structural vector auto-regression (SVAR) models for the full sample (1947:Q1 to 2021:Q1), as well as two sub-samples: (1947:Q1-1980:Q1), during which debt-to-GDP ratio was falling, and (1981:Q1- 2021:Q1), during which the debt-to-GDP ratio was rising. The impulse responses (IRF) and forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) are computed to analyze the dynamics objectively and systematically. The impulse responses for the full sample and the second sub-sample indicate that non-defense spending responds to a shock to the output gap in a counter-cyclical fashion. Moreover, we find significant evidence of the impact of debt-to-GDP ratio on both defense and non-defense spending. A shock to a debt-to-GDP ratio causes non-defense spending to rise on impact and fall over the forecast horizon in all three time intervals. Defense spending, however, responds differently to this shock. While it is not significantly impacted in the full sample, it decreases in the first sub-sample and increases in the second sub-sample. The results from variance decomposition also show that a shock to debt-to-GDP ratio can explain most of variations in non-defense spending and part of the variations in defense spending. These results confirm that debt to GDP ratio is an important determinant of both defense and non-defense spending especially in the most recent years, as both categories tend to decline in response to a shock to debt to GDP ratio. This reinforces the idea that policy makers should focus mostly on reducing debt and therefore reducing interest payments associated with debt accumulation to have greater flexibility in spending on different categories.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"7 ","pages":"Article 100050"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667319322000210/pdfft?md5=fc5fc53cff4c728079d198702afce09d&pid=1-s2.0-S2667319322000210-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79950339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Optimal mechanism in governmental project screening: A theory of Kornai's soft budget constraint","authors":"Chong-en Bai ,&nbsp;Yijiang Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2022.100049","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2022.100049","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Soft budget constraint refers to the phenomenon that money losing inefficient projects keep on getting subsidies and operating. It was first phrased and analyzed by the late Hungarian economist Janos Kornai when he studied former socialist economies and by now, economists generally have agreed that soft budget constraint also exists extensively in market economies. As an important area of research in government and economics, existing explanations of soft budget have focused on the government's lack of commitment to terminate inefficient investment projects. In this paper, we propose a new theory in which soft budget constraint is an optimal governmental mechanism to induce greater effort in project selection. The idea is that if a manager (banker) selects a bad project, he has to keep on subsidizing it and lose more. Anticipating this, soft budget constraint makes the manager work hard to avoid choosing bad projects. Our theory sheds light on research in government and economics from the perspective of mechanism design.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"7 ","pages":"Article 100049"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667319322000209/pdfft?md5=23f7df2add680737836fcae1cf9bb43d&pid=1-s2.0-S2667319322000209-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75819993","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Re-allocating taxing rights and minimum tax rates in international profit taxation","authors":"Gerhard Kempkes,&nbsp;Nikolai Stähler","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2022.100048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jge.2022.100048","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>What happens when sovereign governments coordinate their tax policies? This is an important research topic in government and economics. We focus on implications of re-allocating taxing rights away from source countries (where goods are produced) to market countries (where goods are consumed) and introducing minimum rates in international profit taxation. Utilizing a dynamic macroeconomic model, we find that, in low tax economies, the average profit tax rate will rise. On one hand, this reduces price competitiveness of firms located in these regions and, thereby, output. On the other hand, higher profit tax revenues help to reduce other taxes. Moreover, lower expected future output requires less capital in production in the long run. Firms hence invest less and (temporarily) augment dividend payments. This raises disposable income of households, who (at least temporarily) increase consumption. The opposite holds for high tax economies. In terms of welfare, low tax economies can benefit from an increase in profit taxation. Reduced “tax avoidance” and higher repatriation of firm profits only changes this picture for relatively high levels of initial profit shifting.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"7 ","pages":"Article 100048"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667319322000192/pdfft?md5=17dc2cf22cdb75bb15421c3efdbf36bb&pid=1-s2.0-S2667319322000192-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"137220655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Political dynasties, business, and poverty in the Philippines","authors":"Ronald U. Mendoza,&nbsp;Jurel K. Yap,&nbsp;Gabrielle Ann S. Mendoza,&nbsp;Leonardo Jaminola III,&nbsp;Erica Celine Yu","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2022.100051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jge.2022.100051","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Despite studies finding a link between political dynasty prevalence and poverty, empirical evidence in the Philippines shows that the relationship between dynastic concentration and underdevelopment is not the same across regions. We argue that an independent economic elite and high levels of economic activity, typically found in Luzon, affect the poverty and development impact of political dynasties. Local socioeconomic contexts shape the opportunities for predatory behavior among politicians and their relationships with economic elites. Using novel survey data on business-government linkages as well as an extensive dataset on local government leadership in the Philippines spanning 2004 to 2016, we find that political dynasties exacerbate poverty in the resource-rich non-Luzon provinces but not in Luzon where there is a competitive business environment.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"7 ","pages":"Article 100051"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667319322000222/pdfft?md5=ae20214e99e8017d10e5c1f72b076b5c&pid=1-s2.0-S2667319322000222-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"137220649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Fiscal policy in the 21st century: Evidence on automatic stabilizers in the European union","authors":"Georgios Karras ,&nbsp;Michael C.-Y. Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2022.100038","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2022.100038","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Using data from 29 European countries over 2002Q1–2019Q4, we estimate automatic stabilizers using various techniques, and show that the use of simple measures of government size as proxies is based on assumptions that are unrealistic and potentially misleading. Relaxing these assumptions allows us to construct measures of automatic stabilizers which are based on revenue and expenditure elasticities that are estimated directly using the regression-based approach and allowed to vary across countries. We demonstrate that higher automatic stabilizers are associated with lower output volatility, and the relationship is statistically significant and remarkably robust. At the same time, however, the “stabilization benefit” of automatic stabilizers is shown to have varied considerably across countries and over time.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"6 ","pages":"Article 100038"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667319322000106/pdfft?md5=0c251ba4983c51f8e906f9f46cc8ba96&pid=1-s2.0-S2667319322000106-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73578820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Pension policy in autocracy: The case of Hungary","authors":"András Simonovits","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2022.100040","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2022.100040","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This purpose of this paper is to analyze pension policy in an autocracy, using contemporary Hungary as a context. The inefficiencies and unfairness of the current policy can be characterized by tensions: the intra- and intercohort polarization of benefits rises, the difference between the loose retirement age for females with long entitlement and the otherwise rigid retirement age widens. Conclusion: it would be easier to reduce these tensions in a rebuilt democracy but even an autocracy cannot avoid some reforms.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"6 ","pages":"Article 100040"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S266731932200012X/pdfft?md5=11e19aa0e224399b93f7dc23c9ee6429&pid=1-s2.0-S266731932200012X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79826905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Towards a carbon neutral economy: How government should respond to market failures and market absence","authors":"Nicholas Stern","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2022.100036","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2022.100036","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The transition towards a carbon-neutral economy is a fundamental change, it involves not only transforming the energy sector but also radical reforms across the whole economy. Managing fundamental and wholesale change across such a large economy is a massive coordination challenge requiring the simultaneous deployment of a collection of instruments and institutional change. This paper looks into the key challenges in building a carbon-neutral economy and discusses how governments and markets should work together in addressing these challenges. Due to significant failures in key markets relevant to tackling carbon emissions and to the absence of crucial markets, this paper argues that governments must play an active role in formulating and implementing effective environmental policies, regulations and design. This paper discusses major market failures and market absence, leading to suggestions on policy measures that governments should take to overcome these challenges, enabling markets to give better signals in directing resource allocation and guiding the low-carbon transition. Governments must act to facilitate a transition that enables equity in opportunities and outcomes across regions and individuals. Implementing these strategies and policies requires cohesive government structures, led from the most senior levels, to foster the necessary investment, innovation and change needed.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"6 ","pages":"Article 100036"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667319322000088/pdfft?md5=d2e11bbfde783d2f235ca10a5feba561&pid=1-s2.0-S2667319322000088-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73229012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}