Journal of Government and Economics最新文献_第3页

“Controlled Competition”: How Governments can induce Long-Term Competition "受控竞争"：政府如何引导长期竞争

Journal of Government and Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100111

Yutaka Suzuki

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引用次数: 0

The rise of the administrative state, competition in state capitalism, political manipulation of data, and the Bank of England's role in funding the Seven Years' War 行政国家的兴起、国家资本主义的竞争、对数据的政治操纵以及英格兰银行在资助七年战争中的作用

Journal of Government and Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100113

Zhangkai Huang, David Daokui Li

引用次数: 0

Political business cycle and macro-fiscal forecast errors in sub-saharan Africa 撒哈拉以南非洲的政治商业周期和宏观财政预测误差。

Journal of Government and Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100112

A.S. Alade , A․A Kilishi

引用次数: 0

The effects of intergovernmental transfers on the local fiscal incentives of Brazilian municipalities 政府间转移支付对巴西各市地方财政激励机制的影响

Journal of Government and Economics Pub Date : 2024-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100104

Pedro Jorge Holanda Figueiredo Alves , Jevuks Matheus Araujo

{"title":"The effects of intergovernmental transfers on the local fiscal incentives of Brazilian municipalities","authors":"Pedro Jorge Holanda Figueiredo Alves , Jevuks Matheus Araujo","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100104","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100104","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The objective of this work is to analyze the impact of fiscal decentralization on the behavior of Brazilian municipal policymakers. This work uses the first three cutoffs of the transfer rules of the Municipal Participation Fund (FPM) and applies a regression discontinuity designs (RDD) to capture the effects that have impacted municipal budget rates from 2013 to 2016. The comportment hypothesis is that transfer gains can generate (a) perverse incentives, if the gains are earmarked for personnel and administrative expenses or if they decrease revenue, or (b) beneficial incentives, if the main gains are spent on education or health. The results found for the estimates of the data panel model suggest that an increase in exogenous revenue generates a significant increase only in spending on administrative and sports and leisure functions and that the possible channel for this increase in expenses should be aimed at increasing the number of employees with commissioned position. These results indicate that the transfers generate only perverse incentives. This article explores how local managers allocate their resources according to their additional budget. Unlike the other works, we look for the mayor's behavior in relation to spending on the employment of commissioned civil servants, which can lead to perverse incentives.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"13 ","pages":"Article 100104"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667319324000089/pdfft?md5=4bb2a616a455418e869a0cc16d51bd01&pid=1-s2.0-S2667319324000089-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140274986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Safety effects of property rights contract changes: Evidence from field experience in fisheries 产权合同变更的安全效应：来自渔业实地经验的证据

Journal of Government and Economics Pub Date : 2024-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100105

Akbar Marvasti

引用次数: 0

A light model of international governance, colonization and the quality of financial markets, mayor's behavior facing a windfall of revenue, economic freedom and fiscal multiplier, and the privatization of commons 国际治理的轻型模式》、《殖民化与金融市场的质量》、《市长面对意外收入的行为》、《经济自由与财政乘数》以及《下议院私有化》。

Journal of Government and Economics Pub Date : 2024-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100106

Zhangkai Huang, David Daokui Li

引用次数: 0

How to smooth US-China economic relations for the benefit of the global economy: A light model of global economic governance 如何畅通中美经济关系，造福全球经济？全球经济治理的轻型模式

Journal of Government and Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100097

Dani Rodrik

引用次数: 0

The unfree, the freer, and the government: Economic freedom and the fiscal multiplier 不自由者、自由者和政府：经济自由与财政乘数

Journal of Government and Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100098

Rafael Acevedo , Maria Lorca-Susino , Jose U. Mora

引用次数: 0

Colonial origins and growth of financial markets in Africa: A comparative analysis based on institutions 非洲金融市场的殖民起源与发展：基于机构的比较分析

Journal of Government and Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100099

Désiré Avom , Bruno Emmanuel Ongo Nkoa , Charles Christian Atangana Zambo , Ulrich Kevin Kamdoum Kamwa , Donald Ferdinand Okere Atanga

{"title":"Colonial origins and growth of financial markets in Africa: A comparative analysis based on institutions","authors":"Désiré Avom , Bruno Emmanuel Ongo Nkoa , Charles Christian Atangana Zambo , Ulrich Kevin Kamdoum Kamwa , Donald Ferdinand Okere Atanga","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100099","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100099","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper studies the effect of settlement and mortality on the growth of African financial markets using the mediation of institutions over the period 1996–2017. A comparative result is based on two types of data bases. Firstly, the Acemoglu et al.’s (2001) database and the Albouy's (2006) database. Two samples including 29 for the settler mortality rate and 33 for the settler rate have been chosen. Applying ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, we find that institutions exert a negative and significant influence on financial market growth in African countries where settler mortality rates were high while in countries where settlers settled, the interaction effect of settler sedentarization rate and institutions is positive and significant. These results remain robust to several tests conducted. As a key recommendation, we suggest that African governments put in place new institutional governance policies that take into account the current economic context to further improve the growth of their financial markets.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"13 ","pages":"Article 100099"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S266731932400003X/pdfft?md5=7fb351350fc5595b7420ce3cef2851bf&pid=1-s2.0-S266731932400003X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139395578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Central bank digital currency, monetary policy and gender discrimination, the employment effect of minimum wage, politically good inefficiencies, and corruption and development 中央银行数字货币、货币政策与性别歧视、最低工资的就业效应、政治效益低下以及腐败与发展

Journal of Government and Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100100

Zhangkai Huang, David D. Li

引用次数: 0