Journal of Government and Economics最新文献_第3页

Ideology and economic change the contrasting paths to the modern economy in late 19th century China and Japan 意识形态与经济变革：19 世纪末中国和日本通往现代经济的截然不同的道路

Journal of Government and Economics Pub Date : 2024-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100122

Debin Ma , Jared Rubin

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引用次数: 0

Does government regulations protecting employee privacy hurt employment? The Impact of Salary History Bans on Employment 保护员工隐私的政府法规会损害就业吗？薪资记录禁令对就业的影响

Journal of Government and Economics Pub Date : 2024-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100117

Ting Zhai

{"title":"Does government regulations protecting employee privacy hurt employment? The Impact of Salary History Bans on Employment","authors":"Ting Zhai","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100117","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100117","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>There is a long-standing debate over the merits of confidential and transparent pay. Yet, as some states and counties in the U.S. have implemented policies that prohibit employers from asking about historical pay, many top tech companies such as Apple have introduced corresponding policies. In particular, this paper examines whether they have impacted employment. In this paper, we use the implementation of the salary history ban as a ”quasi-natural experiment” to assess the impact of the policy on employment using a staggered difference-in-differences method based on county-level panel data from 2013 to 2021. The study shows that the salary history ban does not significantly contribute to the increase in employment levels in general; even the implementation of the salary history ban reduces employment in local firms by an average of 1.04% relative to firms in areas where the policy is not implemented. This paper provides new empirical evidence on the effects of salary history bans and provides a reference for further improvements in corporate payroll management systems in practice.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"15 ","pages":"Article 100117"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667319324000211/pdfft?md5=49732887d9f01e3a5cc37403e4ac9efd&pid=1-s2.0-S2667319324000211-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142149610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Public debt and debt sustainability in Europe, salary regulation in the U.S., East Asia education fever, and tax revenues of oil-rich countries 欧洲的公共债务和债务可持续性、美国的薪酬监管、东亚的教育热和石油富国的税收收入

Journal of Government and Economics Pub Date : 2024-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100123

Zhangkai Huang, David Daokui Li

引用次数: 0

Crowding in during the Seven Years’ War 七年战争期间的拥挤情况

Journal of Government and Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100109

Nuno Palma , Carolyn Sissoko

引用次数: 0

Preference alignment or executive predominance: The rise of states' rulemaking provisions in the U.S. 偏好一致还是行政主导：美国各州制定规则条款的兴起

Journal of Government and Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100110

Brian Baugus , Feler Bose , Jeffry Jacob

引用次数: 0

“Controlled Competition”: How Governments can induce Long-Term Competition "受控竞争"：政府如何引导长期竞争

Journal of Government and Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100111

Yutaka Suzuki

{"title":"“Controlled Competition”: How Governments can induce Long-Term Competition","authors":"Yutaka Suzuki","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100111","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100111","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper builds a model of dynamic tournaments under incomplete contract situations to analyze how the government, as a national development strategy, induces incentives or forms of competition between multiple companies (between state-owned enterprises (SOEs), between private-owned enterprises (POEs), or between SOEs and POEs) in the long-run. This paper can be considered as a model analysis of “controlled competition” under “State Capitalism”, in which the government participates in the market as an active player, such as in China, Singapore, and in a broad sense, in Japanese Industrial Policy in the past. In addition to clarifying the incentive mechanism embedded in this model, we also examine the problems and areas for improvement from the perspective of incentive design. In particular, in the long-term competition between two heterogeneous companies, it would be a beneficial policy for the government if the feedback effect could be mitigated by handicapping the winner and favoring the loser, thereby restoring the competitive pressure that had decreased. At the same time, as excessive competition-inhibiting discriminatory prizes (“Cronyism”) greatly impede investment incentives for both companies, these can be viewed as a \"government failure\", and thus the institution should be redesigned to correct such obstacles, thereby maintaining appropriate competitive pressures.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"14 ","pages":"Article 100111"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667319324000156/pdfft?md5=d824e9c534f4278d7a6b30a6be5fe599&pid=1-s2.0-S2667319324000156-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141978069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The rise of the administrative state, competition in state capitalism, political manipulation of data, and the Bank of England's role in funding the Seven Years' War 行政国家的兴起、国家资本主义的竞争、对数据的政治操纵以及英格兰银行在资助七年战争中的作用

Journal of Government and Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100113

Zhangkai Huang, David Daokui Li

引用次数: 0

Political business cycle and macro-fiscal forecast errors in sub-saharan Africa 撒哈拉以南非洲的政治商业周期和宏观财政预测误差。

Journal of Government and Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100112

A.S. Alade , A․A Kilishi

引用次数: 0

The effects of intergovernmental transfers on the local fiscal incentives of Brazilian municipalities 政府间转移支付对巴西各市地方财政激励机制的影响

Journal of Government and Economics Pub Date : 2024-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100104

Pedro Jorge Holanda Figueiredo Alves , Jevuks Matheus Araujo

{"title":"The effects of intergovernmental transfers on the local fiscal incentives of Brazilian municipalities","authors":"Pedro Jorge Holanda Figueiredo Alves , Jevuks Matheus Araujo","doi":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100104","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jge.2024.100104","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The objective of this work is to analyze the impact of fiscal decentralization on the behavior of Brazilian municipal policymakers. This work uses the first three cutoffs of the transfer rules of the Municipal Participation Fund (FPM) and applies a regression discontinuity designs (RDD) to capture the effects that have impacted municipal budget rates from 2013 to 2016. The comportment hypothesis is that transfer gains can generate (a) perverse incentives, if the gains are earmarked for personnel and administrative expenses or if they decrease revenue, or (b) beneficial incentives, if the main gains are spent on education or health. The results found for the estimates of the data panel model suggest that an increase in exogenous revenue generates a significant increase only in spending on administrative and sports and leisure functions and that the possible channel for this increase in expenses should be aimed at increasing the number of employees with commissioned position. These results indicate that the transfers generate only perverse incentives. This article explores how local managers allocate their resources according to their additional budget. Unlike the other works, we look for the mayor's behavior in relation to spending on the employment of commissioned civil servants, which can lead to perverse incentives.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100785,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Government and Economics","volume":"13 ","pages":"Article 100104"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667319324000089/pdfft?md5=4bb2a616a455418e869a0cc16d51bd01&pid=1-s2.0-S2667319324000089-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140274986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Safety effects of property rights contract changes: Evidence from field experience in fisheries 产权合同变更的安全效应：来自渔业实地经验的证据

Journal of Government and Economics Pub Date : 2024-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jge.2024.100105

Akbar Marvasti

引用次数: 0