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Sortals, Timelessness, and Transcendental Truth 分类，永恒和先验真理
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.1093/ARISUP/AKAB005
P. Mackie
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引用次数: 0
The Concept of Disorder Revisited: Robustly Value-Laden Despite Change 重新审视失序的概念:尽管有变化，但仍有强大的价值承载
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.1093/arisup/akaa010
I. Cooper
{"title":"The Concept of Disorder Revisited: Robustly Value-Laden Despite Change","authors":"I. Cooper","doi":"10.1093/arisup/akaa010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akaa010","url":null,"abstract":"Our concept of disorder is changing. This causes problems for projects of descriptive conceptual analysis. Conceptual change means that a criterion that was necessary for a condition to be a disorder at one time may cease to be necessary a relatively short time later. Nevertheless, some conceptually based claims will be fairly robust. In particular, the claim that no adequate account of disorder can appeal only to biological facts can be maintained for the foreseeable future. This is because our current concept of disorder continues to be laden with ethical and political values in multiple ways.","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76535034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Doctors without ‘Disorders’ 没有“疾病”的医生
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.1093/arisup/akaa006
L. Bortolotti
{"title":"Doctors without ‘Disorders’","authors":"L. Bortolotti","doi":"10.1093/arisup/akaa006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akaa006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 On one influential view, the problems that should attract medical attention involve a disorder, because the goals of medical practice are to prevent and treat disorders. Based on this view, if there are no mental disorders then the status of psychiatry as a medical field is challenged. In this paper, I observe that it is often difficult to establish whether the problems that attract medical attention involve a disorder, and argue that none of the notions of disorder proposed so far offers a successful demarcation criterion between medical and non-medical problems. As an illustration, I consider why delusions are considered pathological and whether they attract medical attention in virtue of being pathological, where ‘pathological’ stands for ‘being caused by a disorder’. Although there are several promising answers to what makes delusions pathological, available accounts of the pathological nature of delusions fail to distinguish delusions from other irrational beliefs that are not typically thought of as pathological; and cannot explain why delusions typically attract medical attention whereas other irrational beliefs do not.","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"428 1","pages":"163-184"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86359119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Group Belief: Lessons from Lies and Bullshit 群体信仰:谎言和胡扯的教训
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.1093/arisup/akaa007
I—Jennifer Lackey
{"title":"Group Belief: Lessons from Lies and Bullshit","authors":"I—Jennifer Lackey","doi":"10.1093/arisup/akaa007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akaa007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Groups and other sorts of collective entities are frequently said to believe things. Sarah Huckabee Sanders, for instance, was asked by reporters at White House press conferences whether the Trump administration ‘believes in climate change’ or ‘believes that slavery is wrong’. Similarly, it is said on the website of the Aclu of Illinois that the organization ‘firmly believes that rights should not be limited based on a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity’. A widespread philosophical view is that belief on the part of a group’s members is neither necessary nor sufficient for group belief. In other words, groups are said to be able to believe that p even when not a single individual member of the group believes that p. In this paper, I challenge this view by focusing on two phenomena that have been entirely ignored in the literature: group lies and group bullshit. I show that when group belief is understood in terms of actions over which group members have voluntarily control, as is standardly thought, paradigmatic instances of a group lying or bullshitting end up counting as a group believing. Thus we need to look elsewhere for an adequate account of group belief.","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"76 1","pages":"185-208"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89825739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Modern and Medieval Modal Spaces 现代和中世纪的模态空间
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.1093/arisup/akaa001
Arif Ahmed
{"title":"Modern and Medieval Modal Spaces","authors":"Arif Ahmed","doi":"10.1093/arisup/akaa001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akaa001","url":null,"abstract":"The interesting question about modality is not about its extension, but about its point. Everyone can agree (for instance) that the past is necessary in the Ockhamist sense but not in some ‘modern’ senses, and that the present is necessary in the Ockhamist sense but not in the Scotist sense. But why should it matter? These comments on Pasnau (2020) first set out a simple-minded explication in modern terms of some of these fourteenth-century ideas. Then I take issue with (a) Pasnau’s claim that the necessity of the past has something to do with the structure of ‘narrative history’, and (b) Duns Scotus’s claim that the contingency of the present has something to do with human freedom.","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"98 1","pages":"255-273"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76091461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Art and Metaphysics 艺术与形而上学
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.1093/ARISUP/AKAA002
M. Morris
{"title":"Art and Metaphysics","authors":"M. Morris","doi":"10.1093/ARISUP/AKAA002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ARISUP/AKAA002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Artists often think of themselves as engaged in a project of understanding things. Many of those who look at, listen to, or read works of art think that they emerge from the experience with their understanding enriched. The aim of this paper is to explain what kind of understanding representational art can provide.","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74893836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
If This Isn’t Racism, What Is? The Politics of the Philosophy of Immigration 如果这不是种族主义，那什么是?移民哲学的政治
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.1093/arisup/akaa013
L. Finlayson
{"title":"If This Isn’t Racism, What Is? The Politics of the Philosophy of Immigration","authors":"L. Finlayson","doi":"10.1093/arisup/akaa013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akaa013","url":null,"abstract":"Alison Jaggar (2020) recommends a radical break with a dominant approach to the philosophy of immigration shared by both liberal cosmopolitans and liberal nationalists. This paper is intended as an exploration of Jaggar’s conclusions and as an attempt to carry them further. Building on her critique, I argue that the characteristic questions asked by both cosmopolitans and nationalists appear inappropriate when seen against the political reality of immigration. In the last part of the paper, I argue that liberal nationalist contributions in particular have problematized immigration and immigrants in ways not fundamentally different from those seen on the racist right.","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"20 1","pages":"115-139"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81869402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
The Goal of Conversation 对话的目的
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.1093/arisup/akaa005
Z. Szabó
{"title":"The Goal of Conversation","authors":"Z. Szabó","doi":"10.1093/arisup/akaa005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akaa005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Dickie (2020) presents an argument against the traditional, broadly Gricean view of conversation. She argues that speakers must sometimes be more specific than required for sharing knowledge on a topic of common concern. Her proposed solution is to claim that the goal of conversation is not just sharing knowledge but also sharing cognitive focus. In response, I argue that her proposal faces both conceptual and empirical difficulties, and that the traditional view can handle the problem of non-specificity by acknowledging that in order to sustain mutual trust, conversational participants should be less than optimally efficient.","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"8 1","pages":"57-86"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74457045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Medieval Modal Spaces 中世纪模态空间
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.1093/arisup/akaa004
I—Robert Pasnau
{"title":"Medieval Modal Spaces","authors":"I—Robert Pasnau","doi":"10.1093/arisup/akaa004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akaa004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 There is often said to be something peculiar about the history of modal theory up until the turn of the fourteenth century, when John Duns Scotus decisively reframed the issues. I wish to argue that this impression of dramatic discontinuity is almost entirely a misimpression. Premodern philosophers prescind from the wide-open modal space of all possible worlds because they seek to adapt their modal discourse to the explanatory and linguistic demands of their context.","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"15 1","pages":"225-254"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81164454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Appropriate Normative Powers 适当的规范权力
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.1093/arisup/akaa009
Victor Tadros
{"title":"Appropriate Normative Powers","authors":"Victor Tadros","doi":"10.1093/arisup/akaa009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akaa009","url":null,"abstract":"A normative power is a power to alter rights and duties directly. This paper explores what it means to alter rights and duties directly. In the light of that, it examines the kind of argument that might support the existence of normative powers. Both simple and complex instrumentalist accounts of such powers are rejected, as is an approach to normative powers that is based on the existence of normative interests. An alternative is sketched, where normative powers arise based on the appropriateness of a person responding to a decision by limiting their freedom.","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"2 1","pages":"301-326"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85157206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
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