Theoretical medicine and bioethics最新文献_第4页

Jotterand, F., M. Ienca, B. Elger, & T. Wangmo. Eds. Intelligent assistive technologies for dementia: clinical, ethical, social, and regulatory implications. Oxford University Press. 2019. 320 pp. ISBN: 13:9780190459802. Jotterand, F., M. Ienca, B. Elger, & T. Wangmo.Eds.痴呆症智能辅助技术：临床、伦理、社会和监管影响》。牛津大学出版社。2019.320 pp.ISBN：13：9780190459802。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2024-02-14 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-024-09661-7

Mirko Daniel Garasic

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Ten have, Henk A.M.J. Wounded planet: How Declining Biodiversity Endangers Health and How Bioethics Can Help. John Hopkins University Press. 2019. 376 pp. Hard cover: ISBN: 978-1-4214-2745-4. Ten have, Henk A.M.J. Wounded planet: How Declining Biodiversity Endangers Health and How Bioethics Can Help.约翰-霍普金斯大学出版社。2019.376 pp.硬皮：ISBN：978-1-4214-2745-4。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2024-02-14 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-024-09662-6

Mirko Daniel Garasic

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Bishop, Jeffrey P., M. Therese Lysaught, and Andrew A. Michel. Biopolitics after Neuroscience: Morality and the Economy of Virtue. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2022. 288pp. $115.00 (cloth); $39.95 (paper). ISBN 9781350288447. Bishop, Jeffrey P., M. Therese Lysaught, and Andrew A. Michel.Biopolitics after Neuroscience：Morality and the Economy of Virtue.伦敦：布鲁姆斯伯里出版社，2022 年。288pp.115.00美元（布）；39.95美元（纸）。ISBN9781350288447。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2024-02-07 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-024-09660-8

John Han

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Sexual citizenship: defending society's most disadvantaged. 性公民：保护社会中最弱势的群体。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2024-02-01 Epub Date: 2023-12-27 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-023-09654-y

Steven J Firth, Ivars Neiders

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Refund: a defense of luck egalitarian policy in healthcare. 退款：在医疗保健领域为运气辩护的平等政策。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2024-02-01 Epub Date: 2023-10-30 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-023-09649-9

Masahiro Yoshida, Akira Inoue

{"title":"Refund: a defense of luck egalitarian policy in healthcare.","authors":"Masahiro Yoshida, Akira Inoue","doi":"10.1007/s11017-023-09649-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-023-09649-9","url":null,"abstract":"Luck egalitarianism assigns a central role to personal responsibility in egalitarian justice. In the context of healthcare, luck egalitarianism is the view that the distribution of medical and healthcare resources-or common resources in general-should respond to the (im)prudence of individuals. Recently, Joar Björk, Gert Helgesson, and Niklas Juth have argued that it is impractical to use luck egalitarianism as a normative framework in healthcare because it has no reasonable way of dealing with the imprudent. In response to their argument, this paper first suggests that the epistemic problems of applying luck egalitarianism to the healthcare context raised by Björk et al. can be circumvented by using the exemption system as a policy application of luck egalitarian healthcare justice. This paper then shows that an ex ante policy, a tax system with refunds, can reasonably be adopted as a luck egalitarian institutional design of healthcare policy. We argue that the proposed conception of luck egalitarianism can deal with the problem of differential option luck. Finally, we show that the threshold problem for the definition of imprudence does not refute the proposed ex ante policy.","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71416456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

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Reviewers, 2023 审查员，2023 年

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.4103/2949-6993.394850

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Reviewers, 2023 审查员，2023 年

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.4103/2949-6993.394850

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Reviewers, 2023. 审查员，2023 年。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-024-09659-1

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Age-based restrictions on reproductive care: discerning the arbitrary from the necessary. 基于年龄的生殖保健限制：区分任意性和必要性。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2024-02-01 Epub Date: 2023-10-11 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-023-09648-w

Steven R Piek, Guido Pennings, Veerle Provoost

{"title":"Age-based restrictions on reproductive care: discerning the arbitrary from the necessary.","authors":"Steven R Piek, Guido Pennings, Veerle Provoost","doi":"10.1007/s11017-023-09648-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-023-09648-w","url":null,"abstract":"Policies that determine whether someone is allowed access to reproductive healthcare or not vary widely among countries, especially in their age requirements. This raises the suspicion of arbitrariness, especially because often no underlying justification is provided. In this article, we pose the question-under which circumstances is it morally acceptable to use age for policy and legislation in the first place? We start from the notion that everyone has a conditional positive right to fertility treatment. Subsequently, we set off to formulate a framework that helps to determine who should be excluded from treatment nonetheless. The framework's three core elements are: choosing and ethically justifying exclusion criteria (target), determining the actual limit between in- and exclusion (cut-off), and selecting variables that help to predict the exclusion criteria via correlation (as they are not directly measurable) (proxy). This framework allows us to show that referring to age in policy and legislation is only ethically justifiable if there is a sufficiently strong correlation with a non-directly measurable exclusion criterion. Moreover, since age is only one of many predicting variables, it should therefore not be ascribed any special status. Finally, our framework may be used as an argumentative scheme to critically assess the ethical legitimacy of policies that regulate access to (fertility) treatments in general.","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41224557","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

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The harm threshold and Mill's harm principle. 伤害阈值与密尔的伤害原则。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2024-02-01 Epub Date: 2023-11-18 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-023-09652-0

Maggie Taylor

{"title":"The harm threshold and Mill's harm principle.","authors":"Maggie Taylor","doi":"10.1007/s11017-023-09652-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-023-09652-0","url":null,"abstract":"The Harm Threshold (HT) holds that the state may interfere in medical decisions parents make on their children's behalf only when those decisions are likely to cause serious harm to the child. Such a high bar for intervention seems incompatible with both parental obligations and the state's role in protecting children's well-being. In this paper, I assess the theoretical underpinnings for the HT, focusing on John Stuart Mill's Harm Principle as its most plausible conceptual foundation. I offer (i) a novel, text-based argument showing that Mill's Harm Principle does not give justificatory force to the HT; and (ii) a positive account of some considerations which, beyond significant harm, would comprise an intervention principle normatively grounded in Mill's ethical theory. I find that substantive recommendations derived from Mill's socio-political texts are less laissez-faire than they have been interpreted by HT proponents. Justification for state intervention owes not to the severity of a harm, but to whether that harm arises from the failure to satisfy one's duty. Thus, a pediatric intervention principle derived from Mill ought not to be oriented around the degree of harm caused by a parent's healthcare decision, but rather, the kind of harm-specifically, whether the harm arises from violation of parental obligation. These findings challenge the interpretation of Mill adopted by HT proponents, eliminating a critical source of justification for a protected domain of parental liberty and reorienting the debate to focus on parental duties.","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10869433/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136400923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0