Proceedings of the ... USENIX Security Symposium. UNIX Security Symposium最新文献

Research on the Security of Visual Reasoning CAPTCHA 视觉推理验证码安全性研究

Proceedings of the ... USENIX Security Symposium. UNIX Security Symposium Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.1109/tdsc.2023.3238408

Yipeng Gao, Haichang Gao, Sainan Luo, Yang Zi, Shudong Zhang, Wenjie Mao, Ping Wang, Yulong Shen, Jeff Yan

{"title":"Research on the Security of Visual Reasoning CAPTCHA","authors":"Yipeng Gao, Haichang Gao, Sainan Luo, Yang Zi, Shudong Zhang, Wenjie Mao, Ping Wang, Yulong Shen, Jeff Yan","doi":"10.1109/tdsc.2023.3238408","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/tdsc.2023.3238408","url":null,"abstract":"CAPTCHA is an effective mechanism for protecting computers from malicious bots. With the development of deep learning techniques, current mainstream text-based and traditional image-based CAPTCHAs have been proven to be insecure. Therefore, a major effort has been directed toward developing new CAPTCHAs by utilizing some other hard Artificial Intelligence (AI) problems. Recently, some commercial companies (Tencent, NetEase, Geetest, etc.) have begun deploying a new type of CAPTCHA based on visual reasoning to defend against bots. As a newly proposed CAPTCHA, it is therefore natural to ask a fundamental question: are visual reasoning CAPTCHAs as secure as their designers expect? This paper explores the security of visual reasoning CAPTCHAs. We proposed a modular attack and evaluated it on six different real-world visual reasoning CAPTCHAs, which achieved overall success rates ranging from 79.2% to 98.6%. The results show that visual reasoning CAPTCHAs are not as secure as anticipated; this latest effort to use novel, hard AI problems for CAPTCHAs has not yet succeeded. Then, we summarize some guidelines for designing better visual-based CAPTCHAs, and based on the lessons we learned from our attacks, we propose a new CAPTCHA based on commonsense knowledge (CsCAPTCHA) and show its security and usability experimentally.","PeriodicalId":91597,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... USENIX Security Symposium. UNIX Security Symposium","volume":"6 1","pages":"4976-4992"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80178706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 8

A Highly Accurate Query-Recovery Attack against Searchable Encryption using Non-Indexed Documents 针对使用非索引文档的可搜索加密的高精度查询恢复攻击

Proceedings of the ... USENIX Security Symposium. UNIX Security Symposium Pub Date : 2023-06-27 DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2306.15302

Marc Damie, Florian Hahn, Andreas Peter

{"title":"A Highly Accurate Query-Recovery Attack against Searchable Encryption using Non-Indexed Documents","authors":"Marc Damie, Florian Hahn, Andreas Peter","doi":"10.48550/arXiv.2306.15302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2306.15302","url":null,"abstract":"Cloud data storage solutions offer customers cost-effective and reduced data management. While attractive, data security issues remain to be a core concern. Traditional encryption protects stored documents, but hinders simple functionalities such as keyword search. Therefore, searchable encryption schemes have been proposed to allow for the search on encrypted data. Efficient schemes leak at least the access pattern (the accessed documents per keyword search), which is known to be exploitable in query recovery attacks assuming the attacker has a significant amount of background knowledge on the stored documents. Existing attacks can only achieve decent results with strong adversary models (e.g. at least 20% of previously known documents or require additional knowledge such as on query frequencies) and they give no metric to evaluate the certainty of recovered queries. This hampers their practical utility and questions their relevance in the real-world. We propose a refined score attack which achieves query recovery rates of around 85% without requiring exact background knowledge on stored documents; a distributionally similar, but otherwise different (i.e., non-indexed), dataset suffices. The attack starts with very few known queries (around 10 known queries in our experiments over different datasets of varying size) and then iteratively recovers further queries with confidence scores by adding previously recovered queries that had high confidence scores to the set of known queries. Additional to high recovery rates, our approach yields interpretable results in terms of confidence scores.","PeriodicalId":91597,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... USENIX Security Symposium. UNIX Security Symposium","volume":"13 1","pages":"143-160"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87322446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 17

Hot Pixels: Frequency, Power, and Temperature Attacks on GPUs and ARM SoCs 热像素:gpu和ARM soc的频率，功率和温度攻击

Proceedings of the ... USENIX Security Symposium. UNIX Security Symposium Pub Date : 2023-05-22 DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2305.12784

Hritvik Taneja, Jason Kim, Jie Xu, S. V. Schaik, Daniel Genkin, Y. Yarom

{"title":"Hot Pixels: Frequency, Power, and Temperature Attacks on GPUs and ARM SoCs","authors":"Hritvik Taneja, Jason Kim, Jie Xu, S. V. Schaik, Daniel Genkin, Y. Yarom","doi":"10.48550/arXiv.2305.12784","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2305.12784","url":null,"abstract":"The drive to create thinner, lighter, and more energy efficient devices has resulted in modern SoCs being forced to balance a delicate tradeoff between power consumption, heat dissipation, and execution speed (i.e., frequency). While beneficial, these DVFS mechanisms have also resulted in software-visible hybrid side-channels, which use software to probe analog properties of computing devices. Such hybrid attacks are an emerging threat that can bypass countermeasures for traditional microarchitectural side-channel attacks. Given the rise in popularity of both Arm SoCs and GPUs, in this paper we investigate the susceptibility of these devices to information leakage via power, temperature and frequency, as measured via internal sensors. We demonstrate that the sensor data observed correlates with both instructions executed and data processed, allowing us to mount software-visible hybrid side-channel attacks on these devices. To demonstrate the real-world impact of this issue, we present JavaScript-based pixel stealing and history sniffing attacks on Chrome and Safari, with all side channel countermeasures enabled. Finally, we also show website fingerprinting attacks, without any elevated privileges.","PeriodicalId":91597,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... USENIX Security Symposium. UNIX Security Symposium","volume":"10 1","pages":"6275-6292"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87323711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

PTW: Pivotal Tuning Watermarking for Pre-Trained Image Generators PTW:关键调整水印预训练图像生成器

Proceedings of the ... USENIX Security Symposium. UNIX Security Symposium Pub Date : 2023-04-14 DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2304.07361

Nils Lukas, F. Kerschbaum

{"title":"PTW: Pivotal Tuning Watermarking for Pre-Trained Image Generators","authors":"Nils Lukas, F. Kerschbaum","doi":"10.48550/arXiv.2304.07361","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2304.07361","url":null,"abstract":"Deepfakes refer to content synthesized using deep generators, which, when misused, have the potential to erode trust in digital media. Synthesizing high-quality deepfakes requires access to large and complex generators only a few entities can train and provide. The threat is malicious users that exploit access to the provided model and generate harmful deepfakes without risking detection. Watermarking makes deepfakes detectable by embedding an identifiable code into the generator that is later extractable from its generated images. We propose Pivotal Tuning Watermarking (PTW), a method for watermarking pre-trained generators (i) three orders of magnitude faster than watermarking from scratch and (ii) without the need for any training data. We improve existing watermarking methods and scale to generators $4 times$ larger than related work. PTW can embed longer codes than existing methods while better preserving the generator's image quality. We propose rigorous, game-based definitions for robustness and undetectability and our study reveals that watermarking is not robust against an adaptive white-box attacker who has control over the generator's parameters. We propose an adaptive attack that can successfully remove any watermarking with access to only $200$ non-watermarked images. Our work challenges the trustworthiness of watermarking for deepfake detection when the parameters of a generator are available. Source code to reproduce our experiments is available at https://github.com/dnn-security/gan-watermark.","PeriodicalId":91597,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... USENIX Security Symposium. UNIX Security Symposium","volume":"6 1 1","pages":"2241-2258"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90226976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7

Inductive Graph Unlearning 归纳图学习

Proceedings of the ... USENIX Security Symposium. UNIX Security Symposium Pub Date : 2023-04-06 DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2304.03093

Cheng-Long Wang, Mengdi Huai, Di Wang

{"title":"Inductive Graph Unlearning","authors":"Cheng-Long Wang, Mengdi Huai, Di Wang","doi":"10.48550/arXiv.2304.03093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2304.03093","url":null,"abstract":"As a way to implement the\"right to be forgotten\"in machine learning, textit{machine unlearning} aims to completely remove the contributions and information of the samples to be deleted from a trained model without affecting the contributions of other samples. Recently, many frameworks for machine unlearning have been proposed, and most of them focus on image and text data. To extend machine unlearning to graph data, textit{GraphEraser} has been proposed. However, a critical issue is that textit{GraphEraser} is specifically designed for the transductive graph setting, where the graph is static and attributes and edges of test nodes are visible during training. It is unsuitable for the inductive setting, where the graph could be dynamic and the test graph information is invisible in advance. Such inductive capability is essential for production machine learning systems with evolving graphs like social media and transaction networks. To fill this gap, we propose the underline{{bf G}}underline{{bf U}}ided underline{{bf I}}nunderline{{bf D}}uctivunderline{{bf E}} Graph Unlearning framework (GUIDE). GUIDE consists of three components: guided graph partitioning with fairness and balance, efficient subgraph repair, and similarity-based aggregation. Empirically, we evaluate our method on several inductive benchmarks and evolving transaction graphs. Generally speaking, GUIDE can be efficiently implemented on the inductive graph learning tasks for its low graph partition cost, no matter on computation or structure information. The code will be available here: https://github.com/Happy2Git/GUIDE.","PeriodicalId":91597,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... USENIX Security Symposium. UNIX Security Symposium","volume":"20 1","pages":"3205-3222"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81427183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5

Token-Level Fuzzing 标记级起毛

Proceedings of the ... USENIX Security Symposium. UNIX Security Symposium Pub Date : 2023-04-04 DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2304.02103

Christopher Salls, Chani Jindal, Jake Corina, Chris A. Kruegel, G. Vigna

{"title":"Token-Level Fuzzing","authors":"Christopher Salls, Chani Jindal, Jake Corina, Chris A. Kruegel, G. Vigna","doi":"10.48550/arXiv.2304.02103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2304.02103","url":null,"abstract":"Fuzzing has become a commonly used approach to identifying bugs in complex, real-world programs. However, interpreters are notoriously difficult to fuzz effectively, as they expect highly structured inputs, which are rarely produced by most fuzzing mutations. For this class of programs, grammar-based fuzzing has been shown to be effective. Tools based on this approach can find bugs in the code that is executed after parsing the interpreter inputs, by following language-specific rules when generating and mutating test cases. Unfortunately, grammar-based fuzzing is often unable to discover subtle bugs associated with the parsing and handling of the language syntax. Additionally, if the grammar provided to the fuzzer is incomplete, or does not match the implementation completely, the fuzzer will fail to exercise important parts of the available functionality. In this paper, we propose a new fuzzing technique, called Token-Level Fuzzing. Instead of applying mutations either at the byte level or at the grammar level, Token-Level Fuzzing applies mutations at the token level. Evolutionary fuzzers can leverage this technique to both generate inputs that are parsed successfully and generate inputs that do not conform strictly to the grammar. As a result, the proposed approach can find bugs that neither byte-level fuzzing nor grammar-based fuzzing can find. We evaluated Token-Level Fuzzing by modifying AFL and fuzzing four popular JavaScript engines, finding 29 previously unknown bugs, several of which could not be found with state-of-the-art byte-level and grammar-based fuzzers.","PeriodicalId":91597,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... USENIX Security Symposium. UNIX Security Symposium","volume":"15 1","pages":"2795-2809"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72852196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 12

Aegis: Mitigating Targeted Bit-flip Attacks against Deep Neural Networks Aegis:减轻针对深度神经网络的定向比特翻转攻击

Proceedings of the ... USENIX Security Symposium. UNIX Security Symposium Pub Date : 2023-02-27 DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2302.13520

Jialai Wang, Ziyuan Zhang, Meiqi Wang, Han Qiu, Tianwei Zhang, Qi Li, Zongpeng Li, Tao Wei, Chao Zhang

{"title":"Aegis: Mitigating Targeted Bit-flip Attacks against Deep Neural Networks","authors":"Jialai Wang, Ziyuan Zhang, Meiqi Wang, Han Qiu, Tianwei Zhang, Qi Li, Zongpeng Li, Tao Wei, Chao Zhang","doi":"10.48550/arXiv.2302.13520","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2302.13520","url":null,"abstract":"Bit-flip attacks (BFAs) have attracted substantial attention recently, in which an adversary could tamper with a small number of model parameter bits to break the integrity of DNNs. To mitigate such threats, a batch of defense methods are proposed, focusing on the untargeted scenarios. Unfortunately, they either require extra trustworthy applications or make models more vulnerable to targeted BFAs. Countermeasures against targeted BFAs, stealthier and more purposeful by nature, are far from well established. In this work, we propose Aegis, a novel defense method to mitigate targeted BFAs. The core observation is that existing targeted attacks focus on flipping critical bits in certain important layers. Thus, we design a dynamic-exit mechanism to attach extra internal classifiers (ICs) to hidden layers. This mechanism enables input samples to early-exit from different layers, which effectively upsets the adversary's attack plans. Moreover, the dynamic-exit mechanism randomly selects ICs for predictions during each inference to significantly increase the attack cost for the adaptive attacks where all defense mechanisms are transparent to the adversary. We further propose a robustness training strategy to adapt ICs to the attack scenarios by simulating BFAs during the IC training phase, to increase model robustness. Extensive evaluations over four well-known datasets and two popular DNN structures reveal that Aegis could effectively mitigate different state-of-the-art targeted attacks, reducing attack success rate by 5-10$times$, significantly outperforming existing defense methods.","PeriodicalId":91597,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... USENIX Security Symposium. UNIX Security Symposium","volume":"42 1","pages":"2329-2346"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81285947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

PROVIDENCE: a Flexible Round-by-Round Risk-Limiting Audit 普罗维登斯:灵活的逐轮风险限制审计

Proceedings of the ... USENIX Security Symposium. UNIX Security Symposium Pub Date : 2022-10-17 DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2210.08717

Oliver Broadrick, P. Vora, Filip Zag'orski

{"title":"PROVIDENCE: a Flexible Round-by-Round Risk-Limiting Audit","authors":"Oliver Broadrick, P. Vora, Filip Zag'orski","doi":"10.48550/arXiv.2210.08717","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2210.08717","url":null,"abstract":"A Risk-Limiting Audit (RLA) is a statistical election tabulation audit with a rigorous error guarantee. We present ballot polling RLA PROVIDENCE, an audit with the efficiency of MINERVA and flexibility of BRAVO. We prove that PROVIDENCE is risk-limiting in the presence of an adversary who can choose subsequent round sizes given knowledge of previous samples. We describe a measure of audit workload as a function of the number of rounds, precincts touched, and ballots drawn.We quantify the problem of obtaining a misleading audit sample when rounds are too small, demonstrating the importance of the resulting constraint on audit planning. We present simulation results demonstrating the superiority of PROVIDENCE using these measures and describing an approach to planning audit round schedules. We describe the use of PROVIDENCE by the Rhode Island Board of Elections in a tabulation audit of the 2021 election. Our implementation of PROVIDENCE and audit planning tools in the open source R2B2 library should be useful to the states of Georgia and Pennsylvania, which are planning pre-certification ballot polling RLAs for the 2022 general election.","PeriodicalId":91597,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... USENIX Security Symposium. UNIX Security Symposium","volume":"30 1","pages":"6753-6770"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84650035","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

XDRI Attacks - and - How to Enhance Resilience of Residential Routers XDRI攻击——以及如何增强住宅路由器的弹性

Proceedings of the ... USENIX Security Symposium. UNIX Security Symposium Pub Date : 2022-08-25 DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2208.12003

Philipp Jeitner, Haya Schulmann, Lucas Teichmann, M. Waidner

{"title":"XDRI Attacks - and - How to Enhance Resilience of Residential Routers","authors":"Philipp Jeitner, Haya Schulmann, Lucas Teichmann, M. Waidner","doi":"10.48550/arXiv.2208.12003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2208.12003","url":null,"abstract":"We explore the security of residential routers and ﬁnd a range of critical vulnerabilities. Our evaluations show that 10 out of 36 popular routers are vulnerable to injections of fake records via misinterpretation of special characters. We also ﬁnd that in 15 of the 36 routers the mechanisms, that are meant to prevent cache poisoning attacks, can be circumvented. In our Internet-wide study with an advertisement network, we identiﬁed and analyzed 976 residential routers used by web clients, out of which more than 95% were found vulnerable to our attacks. Overall, vulnerable routers are prevalent and are distributed among 177 countries and 4830 networks. To understand the core factors causing the vulnerabilities we perform black- and white-box analyses of the routers. We ﬁnd that many problems can be attributed to incorrect assumptions on the protocols’ behaviour and the Internet, misunderstanding of the standard recommendations, bugs, and simpliﬁed DNS software implementations. We provide recommendations to mitigate our attacks. We also set up a tool to enable everyone to evaluate the security of their routers at https://xdi-attack.net/ .","PeriodicalId":91597,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... USENIX Security Symposium. UNIX Security Symposium","volume":"3 1","pages":"4473-4490"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78454980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

MPInspector: A Systematic and Automatic Approach for Evaluating the Security of IoT Messaging Protocols MPInspector:一种评估物联网消息协议安全性的系统和自动方法

Proceedings of the ... USENIX Security Symposium. UNIX Security Symposium Pub Date : 2022-08-18 DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2208.08751

Qinying Wang, S. Ji, Yuan Tian, Xuhong Zhang, Binbin Zhao, Yu Kan, Zhaowei Lin, Changting Lin, Shuiguang Deng, A. Liu, R. Beyah

{"title":"MPInspector: A Systematic and Automatic Approach for Evaluating the Security of IoT Messaging Protocols","authors":"Qinying Wang, S. Ji, Yuan Tian, Xuhong Zhang, Binbin Zhao, Yu Kan, Zhaowei Lin, Changting Lin, Shuiguang Deng, A. Liu, R. Beyah","doi":"10.48550/arXiv.2208.08751","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2208.08751","url":null,"abstract":"Facilitated by messaging protocols (MP), many home devices are connected to the Internet, bringing convenience and accessibility to customers. However, most deployed MPs on IoT platforms are fragmented and are not implemented carefully to support secure communication. To the best of our knowledge, there is no systematic solution to perform automatic security checks on MP implementations yet. To bridge the gap, we present MPInspector, the first automatic and systematic solution for vetting the security of MP implementations. MPInspector combines model learning with formal analysis and operates in three stages: (a) using parameter semantics extraction and interaction logic extraction to automatically infer the state machine of an MP implementation, (b) generating security properties based on meta properties and the state machine, and (c) applying automatic property based formal verification to identify property violations. We evaluate MPInspector on three popular MPs, including MQTT, CoAP and AMQP, implemented on nine leading IoT platforms. It identifies 252 property violations, leveraging which we further identify eleven types of attacks under two realistic attack scenarios. In addition, we demonstrate that MPInspector is lightweight (the average overhead of end-to-end analysis is ~4.5 hours) and effective with a precision of 100% in identifying property violations.","PeriodicalId":91597,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... USENIX Security Symposium. UNIX Security Symposium","volume":"20 1","pages":"4205-4222"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86092214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 19