XDRI攻击——以及如何增强住宅路由器的弹性

Philipp Jeitner, Haya Schulmann, Lucas Teichmann, M. Waidner
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引用次数: 3

摘要

我们探索了住宅路由器的安全性,并发现了一系列关键漏洞。我们的评估显示,在36个流行的路由器中,有10个容易通过误解特殊字符来注入虚假记录。我们还发现,在36台路由器中,有15台可以绕过旨在防止缓存中毒攻击的机制。在我们对广告网络的互联网范围研究中,我们确定并分析了网络客户端使用的976个住宅路由器,其中95%以上的路由器易受我们的攻击。总体而言,易受攻击的路由器非常普遍,分布在177个国家和4830个网络中。为了了解导致漏洞的核心因素,我们对路由器进行了黑盒和白盒分析。我们发现许多问题可归因于对协议行为和互联网的错误假设,对标准建议的误解,错误和简化的DNS软件实现。我们提供建议来减轻我们的攻击。我们还设置了一个工具,使每个人都能在https://xdi-attack.net/上评估其路由器的安全性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
XDRI Attacks - and - How to Enhance Resilience of Residential Routers
We explore the security of residential routers and find a range of critical vulnerabilities. Our evaluations show that 10 out of 36 popular routers are vulnerable to injections of fake records via misinterpretation of special characters. We also find that in 15 of the 36 routers the mechanisms, that are meant to prevent cache poisoning attacks, can be circumvented. In our Internet-wide study with an advertisement network, we identified and analyzed 976 residential routers used by web clients, out of which more than 95% were found vulnerable to our attacks. Overall, vulnerable routers are prevalent and are distributed among 177 countries and 4830 networks. To understand the core factors causing the vulnerabilities we perform black- and white-box analyses of the routers. We find that many problems can be attributed to incorrect assumptions on the protocols’ behaviour and the Internet, misunderstanding of the standard recommendations, bugs, and simplified DNS software implementations. We provide recommendations to mitigate our attacks. We also set up a tool to enable everyone to evaluate the security of their routers at https://xdi-attack.net/ .
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