{"title":"Ist das Angebot von Nahrungsmitteln \"Ohne Gentechnik\" wirtschaftlich nachhaltig?","authors":"T. Venus, Nicholas Kalaitzandonakes, J. Wesseler","doi":"10.3790/VJH.81.4.93","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3790/VJH.81.4.93","url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses to the evaluation of the economic sustainability of genetically modified free, \"GM-free\", product labeling. The rules and regulations governing the \"GM-free\" product label in the European Union are discussed in detail. The major question we address is whether the supply of \"GM-free\" labelled animal products can be an economically sustainable strategy. We discuss this question against the backdrop of emerging supply chain risks caused by low-level presence (LLP) of unapproved GM organisms (GMOs) as well as the asynchronous approval of GMOs. In diesem Beitrag wird diskutiert, ob das Angebot von Nahrungsmitteln mit der Kennzeichnung \"Ohne Gentechnik\" wirtschaftlich nachhaltig ist. Zudem wird dem Leser ein Uberblick gegeben zur Regulierung genetisch veranderter Organismen (GVO) in der EU und zur Entwicklung der Kennzeichnungen \"Ohne Gentechnik\" oder \"gentechnikfrei\" in EU-Mitgliedsstaaten. Dies wird vor allem vor dem Hintergrund steigender Risiken durch \"asynchrone Zulassungsprozesse\" und \"Low-Level Presence\" von GVO diskutiert.","PeriodicalId":90860,"journal":{"name":"International journal of economic research","volume":"73 1","pages":"93-110"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86395027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Fed's Re-Programming Strategy to Re-Energize the U.S. Economy During the Great Recession","authors":"Osama D. Sweidan, M. Raj, Hamid Uddin","doi":"10.17256/JER.2012.17.2.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17256/JER.2012.17.2.003","url":null,"abstract":"The main goal of the Fed’s unconventional monetary policy is to decrease the spread between the interest rate on government securities and the firms’borrowing cost to maintain these firms. As a result, zero lower bound interest rate is adopted. Thus, this paper seeks to introduce an analysis to the Feds’ reactions and procedures to counter the great recession of 2007-2008 in an economic model which contains the mechanism of zero lower bound. The paper utilizes a backward-looking model to achieve its goal. The paper shows that within the context of zero lower bound mechanism the relationship between the inflation rate and real GDP is unstable. At the same time, when the level of macroeconomic indictors’ are set-up at zero level, the main engine to push the economy forward is the monetary policy shocks As a result, the paper concludes that in such circumstances aggressive measures and reactions are a necessary procedure to prevent the economy from falling into a deflationary trap. Moreover, the paper introduces a scenario of how the economy can get out of the great recession within the paper’s model. Besides, the paper illustrates that the remedy process is an accurate and sensitive step to the reactions in the economy.","PeriodicalId":90860,"journal":{"name":"International journal of economic research","volume":"34 1","pages":"159-187"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79439555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Leveraged Buy Out: Does the Arrival of New Targets Increase the Agents' Incentives?","authors":"O. Yousfi","doi":"10.17256/JER.2012.17.2.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17256/JER.2012.17.2.001","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the financial capital structure in Leveraged Buy Out (LBO) acquisitions. It analyzes how the arrival of new targets improves the agents’ incentives when there is asymmetric information. The entrepreneur and the LBO investor exert unobservable efforts to enhance the productivity of their project. We show that there are no debt-equity contracts that induce the entrepreneur and the LBO investor to provide the first-best levels of efforts. The decision of the LBO fund to exit prematurely the entrepreneur’s project increases the agents’ incentives. We also find that the entrepreneur’s incentives increase with the amount of debt and when the LBO investor promises her the whole compensation cost.","PeriodicalId":90860,"journal":{"name":"International journal of economic research","volume":"18 1","pages":"99-137"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78361515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Two Faces of Comprehensive Information Technology, Knowledge Acquisition, and Polarized Wage Structure","authors":"Sung‐min Kim","doi":"10.17256/JER.2012.17.2.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17256/JER.2012.17.2.002","url":null,"abstract":"Garicano (2000) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) distinguish comprehensive information technology advances between information technology advances and communication technology advances, both of which have qualitatively different characteristics. Based on this distinction, this paper shows that, first, decreasing knowledge acquisition costs, due to advances in information technology, raise wage differentials between problem solvers and production workers and within-group wage differentials. Second, cheaper communication costs, due to communication technology advances, increase wage inequality between problem solvers and production workers and within-group wage inequality for problem solvers, but decrease within-group wage inequality for production workers. These heterogeneous impacts of information and communication technology advances on between-group wage inequality and on within-group wage inequality would provide a rationale for a wage polarization pattern in the recent U.S. labor market in which there is an increasing wage inequality in the upper-tail of wage distribution and a decreasing wage inequality in the lowertail of wage distribution.","PeriodicalId":90860,"journal":{"name":"International journal of economic research","volume":"81 1","pages":"139-158"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77472881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Large Games with a Finite Number of Classes and Nash’s ‘Improved’ Proof","authors":"S. Kim","doi":"10.17256/JER.2012.17.2.004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17256/JER.2012.17.2.004","url":null,"abstract":"Nash (1951) proved the existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibria for finite games using Brouwer’s, rather than Kakutani’s, fixed point theorem. This paper adapts Nash’s (1951) proof to large games with a finite number of classes to establish the existence of pure strategy equilibria. The new approach sheds some light on the old results.","PeriodicalId":90860,"journal":{"name":"International journal of economic research","volume":"83 17","pages":"189-202"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72430307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Self-Control and Provision of Education Subsidies","authors":"Soohyung Lee","doi":"10.17256/JER.2012.17.1.004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17256/JER.2012.17.1.004","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides a simple yet unified framework that not only provides a rationale for a government’s education subsidies but also allows us to examine what kinds of subsidies would be the least costly. The paper builds a model based on hyperbolic discounting utilities in which a government’s intervention in education is justified to ease individual’s self-control problem leading to the underinvestment in education; it shows that when the degree of self-control problem is high (low), conditional cash transfer is more (less) cost-effective than price subsidies. Those model predictions are consistent with the empirical patterns observed in education subsidies around the world.","PeriodicalId":90860,"journal":{"name":"International journal of economic research","volume":"24 1","pages":"61-76"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87025855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Predicting TV Audience of International Sporting Events in Korea","authors":"Nayoung Kim, Yungsan Kim","doi":"10.17256/JER.2012.17.1.005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17256/JER.2012.17.1.005","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we use the Korean viewership data for the 2006 FIFA World Cup games to establish a model to predict the TV ratings of big international sporting events. We focus on the ex ante determinants of viewership that can be taken into consideration by the time the TV commercial air time is sold. The results show that the TV ratings of each game can be predicted very accurately in a simple model employing several predetermined variables. The participation of the national team is the single most important factor, adding a whopping 47 percentage points to the viewership on average. The local time of the day for a live broadcast is the next most important factor.","PeriodicalId":90860,"journal":{"name":"International journal of economic research","volume":"312 1","pages":"77-88"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75438398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Extreme Spillover Effects of Volatility Indices","authors":"Yue Peng, W. Ng","doi":"10.17256/JER.2012.17.1.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17256/JER.2012.17.1.001","url":null,"abstract":"In this study, we analyse contagion effects and extreme comovements of equity and volatility indices in major international markets. The tail dependence coecients (TDCs) increase during a financial crisis, especially for the lower TDCs of stock index returns and upper TDCs of volatility index returns. This indicates that crashes and uctuations are easier to transmit between markets during turmoils, implying the existence of contagion. In particular, we find that the crash events transmit from the Japanese market to other markets, whereas booms are more likely to transmit from the US and Europe to Japan.","PeriodicalId":90860,"journal":{"name":"International journal of economic research","volume":"292 1","pages":"1-17"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73632888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A General Framework for Asset Pricing","authors":"S. Cho","doi":"10.17256/JER.2012.17.1.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17256/JER.2012.17.1.002","url":null,"abstract":"Gerber and Shiu (1994) and Henne and Reichling (2006) have independently derived similar stochastic discount factor asset pricing principles in justifying their arguments regarding asset pricing. In this paper, we show that if we slightly modify the two principles, they reach the same asset pricing principle. To be speci fic, in deriving their pricing principles, both Gerber and Shiu (1994) and Henne and Reichling (2006) deal with the case of a single risk-free asset and a single risky asset for which Gerber and Shiu (1994) further assume a financial derivative. Here, we simply extend their logic to portfolios of the entire capital market, in line with the portfolio theory by Markowitz (1952, 1956, 1959), Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966), to make the two principles converge to each other. And based on the converged version of the pricing principles, we show that the capital asset pricing model by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966), the capital asset pricing model with time-dependent beta by Henne and Reichling (2006), the arbitrage pricing theory by Ross (1976), the Gerber-Shiu model by Gerber and Shiu (1994) (a generalization of the Black-Scholes model by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973b)), and the Esscher insurance premium pricing principle by Buhlmann (1980) can all be derived under a unified pricing principle.","PeriodicalId":90860,"journal":{"name":"International journal of economic research","volume":"41 1","pages":"19-48"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75710630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Natural Rate of Unemployment and the Flexibility of the Labor Markets","authors":"F. Macit","doi":"10.17256/JER.2012.17.1.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17256/JER.2012.17.1.003","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I investigate how the natural rate of unemployment is affected from various institutions of the labor market. I find that union density, benefit replacement rate, expenditure on active labor market policies per unemployed person, and employment protection legislation play a significant role in explaining the differences in long-term unemployment rates across the OECD countries. Besides that, I also look at whether the vacancy rate and the participation rate are affected from the structure of the labor markets. An increase in the employment protection legislation index and union density generate a decline in the vacancy rate. As far as the participation rate is concerned, an increase in the employment protection legislation index and benet replacement rate increase the inactivity rate, whereas an increase in expenditure on active labor market policies causes an increase in the participation rate.","PeriodicalId":90860,"journal":{"name":"International journal of economic research","volume":"1 1","pages":"49-59"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89295198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}