Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal最新文献

Don’t shoot yourself in the foot! A (real-effort task) experiment on income redistribution and voting. 别搬起石头砸自己的脚!这是一项关于收入再分配和投票的实验(实干任务)。

Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal Pub Date : 2022-11-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3485548

Natalia Jimenez Jimenez, E. Molis, Ángel Solano-García

{"title":"Don’t shoot yourself in the foot! A (real-effort task) experiment on income redistribution and voting.","authors":"Natalia Jimenez Jimenez, E. Molis, Ángel Solano-García","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3485548","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3485548","url":null,"abstract":"According to the World Inequality Database 2020, income inequality has increased in almost all countries in recent decades. Nevertheless, top tax rates on upper-income earners have declined during the same period. This empirical evidence seems not to support models based on the median voter theorem as the one proposed by Meltzer and Richard (1981). To shed some light on this contradictory evidence, this paper reports results from a laboratory experiment that investigates the Meltzer–Richard model of equilibrium tax rates in which individuals face a real-effort task that includes leisure at the work place. We classify participants into high-skilled and low-skilled workers, according to their performance in a tournament at the beginning of the experiment. They vote over two (high and low) exogenous tax rates and their pre-tax income is determined according to their performance in a real-effort task and also to the skill premium. We find that a large proportion of low-skilled workers vote for the lowest tax rate (the one that gives them the lowest payoff), especially when the alternative tax rate is very high. However, this proportion is significantly reduced in treatments in which the subjects are given extra information about how the tax operates in redistributing income. This result suggests that the lack of information about the role of taxes in income redistribution may be an important factor in explaining the counter-intuitive voting behavior of low-income voters over income redistribution. We also find some support that the prospect of upward mobility and the belief in the negative effect of taxes on productivity make low-income voters support low tax rates, especially when the alternative tax rate is very high.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78282578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Causal Attribution, Benefits Sharing, and Earnings Management 因果归因、利益分享与盈余管理

Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal Pub Date : 2021-10-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3951261

Lukas J. Helikum, H. Tan, Tu Xu

{"title":"Causal Attribution, Benefits Sharing, and Earnings Management","authors":"Lukas J. Helikum, H. Tan, Tu Xu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3951261","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3951261","url":null,"abstract":"We conduct two experiments to examine the joint effect of two justification factors of earnings management, namely attribution for the firm’s underperformance and benefits accruing to other employees from inflating reported earnings. In the main experiment, we predict and find that managers are more likely to manage earnings when the firm’s underperformance is caused by an external event and misreported earnings benefit other employees besides the reporting manager. Further, we show that the extent to which participants use moral justifications mediates the effect of benefits sharing on earnings management, but only when causal attribution is external, and that it mediates the effect of causal attribution on earnings management, but only when benefits are shared. In the second experiment, we use a neutral control condition that makes no mention of causal attribution or benefits sharing to demonstrate that both justification factors jointly increase earnings management relative to what managers normally do in a situation without an explicit mention of either factor. We contribute to the accounting and psychology literature by proposing and testing a theory that explains how multiple justification factors interact to cause opportunistic behavior. Our results have important implications for practice.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85387794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Sleep Debt and Information Processing in Financial Markets 金融市场中的睡眠债务与信息处理

Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal Pub Date : 2021-10-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3934115

William J. Bazley, Carina Cuculiza, Kevin Pisciotta

引用次数: 0

Game Changer: Can Modifications to Audit Firm Communication Improve Auditors’ Actions in Response to Heightened Fraud Risk? 改变游戏规则:对审计事务所沟通的修改能否改善审计人员应对日益加剧的欺诈风险的行动?

Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal Pub Date : 2021-08-12 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2951396

Ashley A. Austin, Tina D Carpenter

{"title":"Game Changer: Can Modifications to Audit Firm Communication Improve Auditors’ Actions in Response to Heightened Fraud Risk?","authors":"Ashley A. Austin, Tina D Carpenter","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2951396","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2951396","url":null,"abstract":"Regulators express concern over auditors’ failure to respond to fraud risks. Audit firms communicate the importance of remaining skeptical and alert for fraud, but busy auditors give these messages insufficient attention. Building on psychology theory, we develop an innovative intervention designed to improve audit firm communication by incorporating game-like elements. We expect game-like elements to pique auditors’ interest, deepen their cognitive processing, enhance their awareness of important fraud concepts, and make them more alert for fraud. We experimentally demonstrate that the intervention improves auditors’ awareness of important fraud concepts, and these benefits persist to improve auditors’ fraud detection actions. Importantly, auditors receiving communication that simulates current practice fail to respond to heightened fraud risk, confirming regulators’ concerns. In additional analyses, a model supports our intervention promoting deeper processing of the communication, enabling auditors’ subsequent recognition of heightened fraud risk and effective actions. Thus, our results contribute to theory and practice.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78143288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Retail Bond Investors and Credit Ratings 零售债券投资者和信用评级

Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal Pub Date : 2021-06-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3872111

E. dehaan, Jiacui Li, Edward M. Watts

引用次数: 6

The Effect of Advice Valence on the Perceived Credibility of Data Analytics 建议效价对数据分析可信度感知的影响

Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal Pub Date : 2021-06-04 DOI: 10.2308/jmar-2020-015

Clara Xiaoling Chen, Ryan Hudgins, William F. Wright

引用次数: 4

Exploring Contagion in Budgetary Misreporting 探讨预算误报的传染

Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal Pub Date : 2021-04-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3788643

Jeremy B. Lill, Michael Majerczyk, Ke Xu

引用次数: 0

'Come On, Man!' On Errors, Choice, and Hayekian Behavioral Economics “加油，伙计!”错误、选择与哈耶克行为经济学

Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal Pub Date : 2021-03-18 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3807371

C. Sunstein

{"title":"'Come On, Man!' On Errors, Choice, and Hayekian Behavioral Economics","authors":"C. Sunstein","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3807371","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3807371","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 With respect to the views of dead thinkers, answers to many particular questions are often interpretive in Ronald Dworkin's sense. Such answers must attempt (1) to fit the materials to be interpreted and (2) to justify them, that is, to put them in the best constructive light. What looks like (1), or what purports to be (1), is often (2). That is, when a follower of Kant urges that ‘Kant would say x’, or that ‘Kantianism entails y’, the goal is to make the best constructive sense of Kant and Kantianism, not merely to adhere to something that Kant actually said. An approach to behavioral economics cannot claim to be Hayekian if it is rooted in enthusiasm for the abilities of planners to set prices and quantities, or if it sees the price system as a jumble of mistakes and errors. But within a not-so-narrow range, a variety of freedom-preserving approaches, alert to the epistemic limits of planners, can fairly claim to be Hayekian. Hayekian behavioral economics, I suggest, is an approach that (1) recognizes the importance and pervasiveness of individual errors, (2) emphasizes the epistemic limits of planners, (3) builds on individual choices rather than planner preferences, and (4) gives authority to choices made under epistemically favorable conditions, in which informational deficits and behavioral biases are least likely to be at work. The key step, of course, is (4). If it is properly elaborated, the resulting approach deserves respect. It is worthy of serious consideration, even if some of us, including the present author, would not entirely embrace it. In defending that proposition, the present essay responds to some critical remarks on behaviorally informed policy, including the resort to ‘explainawaytions’ (Matthew Rabin's term) for behavioral findings.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91350037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

The Influence of Auditor Narcissism and Moral Disengagement on Risk Assessments of a Narcissistic Client CFO 审计师自恋和道德脱离对自恋客户CFO风险评估的影响

Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal Pub Date : 2021-02-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3743018

Eric N. Johnson, D. Lowe, Philip M. J. Reckers

{"title":"The Influence of Auditor Narcissism and Moral Disengagement on Risk Assessments of a Narcissistic Client CFO","authors":"Eric N. Johnson, D. Lowe, Philip M. J. Reckers","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3743018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3743018","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Global capital markets rely heavily on independent and skeptical auditors as gatekeepers to provide assurance that corporate financial reports are free of material fraud. The rise of narcissism among the ranks of both client and audit professionals challenge this gatekeeper function. In addition, auditor moral disengagement may undermine auditor skepticism, further eroding public confidence in the integrity of financial reporting and the audit process. We conduct a quasi-experiment with 118 auditors from three international audit firms. In a simulated interview with a client CFO, we examine whether auditors underestimate risks of fraudulent financial statements due to the interactive effects of (1) client narcissism (manipulated verbally and nonverbally) and (2) auditor narcissism. We also examine the influence of auditor moral disengagement on client risk assessments. Results indicate that CFO verbal and nonverbal narcissism significantly influenced auditors’ assessment of management-related client risk. Moreover, auditor narcissism was found to interactively influence client risk inferences such that auditors higher in narcissism exhibited narcissistic tolerance (lower risk assessments) when the hypothetical CFO displayed high verbal narcissism. Auditor moral disengagement was negatively associated with client risk assessments. We discuss the implication of these findings on future audit judgment research, audit firm policy and training on maintaining auditor skepticism, and the audit oversight role of standard-setters.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73101527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 11

Trading Frictions and the Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift 交易摩擦和收益公告后漂移

Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal Pub Date : 2021-02-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3788093

Josef Fink, Stefan Palan, Erik Theissen

引用次数: 0