Chicago journal of international law最新文献_第5页

Unfair competition under the TRIPS agreement: protection of data submitted for the registration of pharmaceuticals. 《与贸易有关的知识产权协定》下的不公平竞争:保护为药品注册而提交的数据。

Chicago journal of international law Pub Date : 2002-01-01

Carlos Maria Correa

引用次数: 0

Tying Prometheus down: the international law of human genetic manipulation. 绑住普罗米修斯:人类基因操纵的国际法。

Chicago journal of international law Pub Date : 2002-01-01

Stephen P Marks

引用次数: 0

International response to human cloning. 国际社会对人类克隆的反应。

Chicago journal of international law Pub Date : 2002-01-01

Elizabeth L Shanin

引用次数: 0

The human right to health, national courts, and access to HIV/AIDS treatment: a case study from Venezuela. 享有健康、国家法院和获得艾滋病毒/艾滋病治疗的人权:委内瑞拉案例研究。

Chicago journal of international law Pub Date : 2002-01-01

Mary Ann Torres

引用次数: 0

TRIPS, pharmaceutical patents, and access to essential medicines: a long way from Seattle to Doha. 与贸易有关的知识产权、药品专利和获得基本药物:从西雅图到多哈还有很长的路要走。

Chicago journal of international law Pub Date : 2002-01-01 DOI: 10.4324/9781315254227-25

{"title":"TRIPS, pharmaceutical patents, and access to essential medicines: a long way from Seattle to Doha.","authors":"","doi":"10.4324/9781315254227-25","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315254227-25","url":null,"abstract":"I. INTRODUCTION Infectious diseases kill over 10 million people each year, more than 90 percent of whom are in the developing world.1 The leading causes of illness and death in Africa, Asia, and South America-regions that account for four-fifths of the world's population-are HIV/AIDS, respiratory infections, malaria, and tuberculosis. In particular, the magnitude of the AIDS crisis has drawn attention to the fact that millions of people in the developing world do not have access to the medicines that are needed to treat disease or alleviate suffering. Each day, close to eight thousand people die of AIDS in the developing world.2 The reasons for the lack of access to essential medicines are manifold, but in many cases the high prices of drugs are a barrier to needed treatments. Prohibitive drug prices are often the result of strong intellectual property protection. Governments in developing countries that attempt to bring the price of medicines down have come under pressure from industrialized countries and the multinational pharmaceutical industry. The World Trade Organization (\"WTO\") Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (\"TRIPS\" or \"Agreement\"), which sets out the minimum standards for the protection of intellectual property, including patents for pharmaceuticals, has come under fierce criticism because of the effects that increased levels of patent protection will have on drug prices. While TRIPS does offer safeguards to remedy negative effects of patent protection or patent abuse, in practice it is unclear whether and how countries can make use of these safeguards when patents increasingly present barriers to medicine access. The Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, held in 2001 in Doha, Qatar, adopted a Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (\"Doha Declaration\" or \"Declaration\") which affirmed the sovereign right of governments to take measures to protect public health. Public health advocates welcomed the Doha Declaration as an important achievement because it gave primacy to public health over private intellectual property, and clarified WTO Members' rights to use TRIPS safeguards. Although the Doha Declaration broke new ground in guaranteeing Members' access to medical products, it did not solve all of the problems associated with intellectual property protection and public health. II. THE ACCESS PROBLEM AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY A number of new medicines that are vital for the survival of millions are already too costly for the vast majority of people in poor countries. In addition, investment in research and development (\"R&D\") towards the health needs of people in developing countries has almost come to a standstill. Developing countries, where three-quarters of the world population lives, account for less than 10 percent of the global pharmaceutical market. The implementation of TRIPS is expected to have a further upward effect on drug prices, while increased R&D investment, despite higher levels of intellectua","PeriodicalId":87172,"journal":{"name":"Chicago journal of international law","volume":"72 1","pages":"27-46"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85869762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 92

The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of Foreign Human Rights Trials in Latin America 司法级联:拉丁美洲外国人权审判的演变与影响

Chicago journal of international law Pub Date : 2001-04-01 DOI: 10.4324/9781351155526-6

Ellen L. Lutz, Kathryn Sikkink

{"title":"The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of Foreign Human Rights Trials in Latin America","authors":"Ellen L. Lutz, Kathryn Sikkink","doi":"10.4324/9781351155526-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351155526-6","url":null,"abstract":"I. INTRODUCTION During the Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982, the British captured Argentine Navy Captain Alfredo Astiz. Non-governmental human rights organizations accused Astiz, a notorious figure during Argentina's \"dirty war,\" of involvement in the disappearance of two French nuns, the arrest and killing of a Swedish girl, and the interrogation, torture, and disappearance of hundreds of Argentines at the Naval School of Mechanics in Buenos Aires.1 After his capture, France and Sweden asked to question Astiz concerning their nationals, and the British transported him to London for that purpose. Astiz, availing himself of the protections afforded by the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, refused to answer. Although there was substantial evidence against him and the Geneva Conventions do not shield prisoners of war from prosecution for human rights crimes, neither country sought his extradition, nor did Britain entertain trying him in the United Kingdom.2 Instead, he was repatriated to Argentina. Seventeen years later, the British government arrested Chilean General and former President Augusto Pinochet on a Spanish extradition warrant for torture and other human rights crimes. This time, the British courts assiduously considered the jurisdictional issues posed by the Spanish request and determined that the Spanish courts had jurisdiction to try Pinochet for crimes committed in Chile over a decade before. Although British authorities ultimately allowed Pinochet to return to Chile, finding that he was too incapacitated to stand trial, the events in Europe had important political repercussions in Chile that are now rippling across Latin America and the rest of the world. Taking a lesson from Spain, a Netherlands court has determined that under a theory of universal jurisdiction it can try former Surinamese military dictator Desi Bouterse for human rights crimes committed in Suriname in 1982.3 From a political point of view, it would have been easier to try Astiz in 1982 than Pinochet in 1999. Astiz was a mid-level naval officer of a country then at war with Britain. Trying him for human rights violations would have given substance to the British government's rhetoric about the repressive nature of the Argentine regime. Pinochet was a former head of state and current senator-for-life of a country that had supported Great Britain during the Falklands/Malvinas War. This Article examines what changed between 1982 and 1999 that made Pinochet's arrest in Britain possible. We address two main questions: (1) why, in the last two decades of the 20th century, was there a major international norms shift towards using foreign or international judicial processes to hold individuals accountable for human rights crimes; and (2) what difference have foreign judicial processes made for human rights practices in the countries whose governments were responsible for those crimes. A. THE IMPETUS FOR THE \"JUSTICE CASCADE\" We argue that the surge of foreign judicial pr","PeriodicalId":87172,"journal":{"name":"Chicago journal of international law","volume":"27 1","pages":"3"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90581948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 241

The Law of Peoples 民法

Chicago journal of international law Pub Date : 2000-10-01 DOI: 10.5040/9781474240062.ch-010

Victor Peterson

{"title":"The Law of Peoples","authors":"Victor Peterson","doi":"10.5040/9781474240062.ch-010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5040/9781474240062.ch-010","url":null,"abstract":"The Law of Peoples John Rawls Harvard 1999 John Rawls, the great political philosopher, has turned his reflections to questions of international justice, much as his philosophical ancestor Kant did toward the end of his career. Indeed, Kant's conception of a \"pacific federation\" of states in Perpetual Peace is Rawls's acknowledged model for the \"realistic utopia\" sketched in The Law of Peoples, which expands upon his 1993 essay by the same title (without, however, revising its basic argument). Despite differing philosophical constraints and geopolitical conditions, both Kant and Rawls aim to develop an ideal normative framework for international law that accommodates a measure of realism and rejects the idea of a world-state. Unfortunately, in its uncritical acceptance of so-called \"decent hierarchical societies\" even at the level of ideal theory, the normative claim of Rawls's Law of Peoples is undermined. This philosophical appeasement, meant to secure perpetual peace in our time through a moderately demanding Law of Peoples that liberal and \"decent\" hierarchical societies alike can endorse, departs fundamentally from Kant's cosmopolitanism. For Kant, the \"First Definitive Article of a Perpetual Peace-as opposed to a temporary interruption of hostilities-is that each member state of the foedus pacif cum must have a republican form of government, which is partly founded upon \"the principle of legal equality for everyone (as citizens).\" By contrast, Rawls weakens his ideal of international justice to buy the assent of hierarchical societies, which by definition lack equality among citizens, at the price of sacrificing a theoretical basis for justifying reforms of the practices and institutions of these hierarchical societies above a minimal level of decency. Rawls's complex argument begins by extending the original position, in which principles of justice for the basic structure of society are chosen under epistemic constraints that ensure fairness, from a single liberal society to what he calls the Society of Liberal Peoples. In a second step, though still within ideal theory, he argues that the substantive principles comprising the Law of Peoples are also acceptable to decent hierarchical societies, which possess decent consultation hierarchies and common good conceptions of justice. Despite being inegalitarian, decent hierarchical societies do respect basic human rights, allow some dissent, and at least consult with representatives of groups whose members are denied full citizenship rights. …","PeriodicalId":87172,"journal":{"name":"Chicago journal of international law","volume":"44 1","pages":"485"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80266137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1435

The Political Economy of Global Multilateralism 全球多边主义的政治经济学

Chicago journal of international law Pub Date : 2000-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.229873

John O. McGinnis

{"title":"The Political Economy of Global Multilateralism","authors":"John O. McGinnis","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.229873","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.229873","url":null,"abstract":"This paper offers a theory rooted in political economy to determine when global multilateralism is justified. Its criteria for justification are three. First, multilateral agreements ideally should offer mutual gains for all the nations that are parties to them. If the gains are not contingent on being part of the multilateral agreement, principles of subsidiarity militate against joining. Second, ideally multilateral treaties should help nations be governed by what Mancur Olson called their encompassing interest- their diffuse citizenry rather than special interests. One important way of achieving this goal is to increase jurisdictional competition among nations which is, in my view, the defining virtue of sovereignty. For instance, trade agreements can increase jurisdictional competition by making capital more mobile. Finally, multilateral agreements should not require a complex and intrusive international enforcement apparatus, because distant international bureaucracies are likely to be captured by special interests and thus reduce the power of encompassing interests in national governance.Using these criteria, the paper evaluates multilateralism in trade, human rights, regulation, criminal law, and military intervention. It concludes that trade multilateralism is currently the best form of global multilateralism because it can extend exchange through sustaining a global market and can empower encompassing interests. Other forms of global multilateralism may sometimes be necessary but even such instances will rarely have the cascading benefits of trade multilateralism.","PeriodicalId":87172,"journal":{"name":"Chicago journal of international law","volume":"66 1","pages":"381-400"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83110096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 8

Sheriff or Prisoner? The United States and the World Trade Organization 警长还是囚犯?美国和世界贸易组织

Chicago journal of international law Pub Date : 2000-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.224802

P. Stephan

{"title":"Sheriff or Prisoner? The United States and the World Trade Organization","authors":"P. Stephan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.224802","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.224802","url":null,"abstract":"I compare two competing accounts of the U.S. role in the global economy. In one version, the United States has built an international system that replicates its ideology, culture and values. This is a unipolar world where the actors have taken off the table fundamental choices about political and economic structure, and a broad range of policy choices reflect Washington's preferences. The United States may not make every meaningful decision in administering the world economy, any more than the headquarters of a multinational corporation dictates precisely what its local managers must do. But, in this scenario, the United States has final say on all questions that significantly affect its interests. I will call this the hegemon story. The contrasting account depicts the United States as a passive instrument subject to forces outside its control. The identification of these forces varies, but often they are seen as some combination of large multinational corporations and international technocrats. The regime may advance some interests of the United States, at least in the sense that it produces better outcome than would genuine international anarchy. But where the goals of the regime conflict with national interest, the regime prevails. This I will call the regime story, because it asserts that some broader regime limits U.S. action. I believe that regimes count for a lot, and that U.S. hegemony has been greatly overstated. There are many way to advance this position, but I concentrate on one. I look at three WTO dispute resolution opinions involving the United States, two of which attacked U.S. law and the third of which sought to vindicate the interests of U.S. producers against Japanese trade barriers. I explore in some detail how these decisions both frustrate important U.S. policies and make it more difficult for the United States to organize and maintain a geopolitical hegemony. I then consider whether the apparent thwarting of U.S. objectives in the three cases represents a real constraint on U.S. power and influence. I draw on political economy and institutional economics to frame an argument that the WTO dispute resolution system really limits U.S. discretion. The usual rejoinder to any characterization of an international institution as limiting national behavior is that international bodies lack the power and ability to deter states, and in particular a superpower, from determining their own course. A variation on this argument is that the justifications for the resolution of a dispute-in this case the opinions written by the WTO organs-bear little relation to the underlying basis of the resolution and thus provide little information about how future disputes will come out. Finally, it might be that the U.S. government has used the WTO dispute resolution process to deflect domestic political pressures that interfered with objectives preferred by policy elites. I explore the possibility that the WTO only insulates the Washington consensus","PeriodicalId":87172,"journal":{"name":"Chicago journal of international law","volume":"45 9","pages":"7"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72480217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 9

International Governance and American Democracy 国际治理与美国民主

Chicago journal of international law Pub Date : 2000-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.224801

P. Stephan

{"title":"International Governance and American Democracy","authors":"P. Stephan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.224801","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.224801","url":null,"abstract":"Over the last two decades international law has gone from something that, in the eyes of many outside the discipline, seemed a contradiction in terms, to a source of genuine and direct conflict with domestic legal institutions. This change has three sources: the internationalization of everyday life in the United States; the emergence of international human rights law; and the growth of international institutional governance of economic matters. Two kinds of constraints on domestic lawmaking have emerged: Many advocates contend that international customary law constitutes the law of the United States and therefore binds all levels of government, absent a positive Act of Congress to the contrary, and the various international institutions increasingly reach decisions that overrule policy choices made by domestic political bodies. Each constraint represents a challenge to American democracy, but the nature of the challenge differs. The claim that customary international law constitutes U.S. law rests on authoritarian premises and invites a principled rejection based on assumptions about democracy. The limits imposed on the United States as a result of international entanglements deliberately entered into derives from considerations of political economy, and the response, if any, should involve changes in the processes that produce such entanglements. I conclude with a discussion of the International Criminal Court, an institution intended to enforce human rights law that the U.S. government helped to design but now has decided not to submit to.","PeriodicalId":87172,"journal":{"name":"Chicago journal of international law","volume":"1 1","pages":"5"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90505162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7